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papers in Danish. 1.  Introduction 
In December  1980  the Mutual  Aid  Centre was  commissioned by the 
Social & Employment  Directorate of the European Commission  to collect 
information on the co-operative movement  in a  number  of EEC  countries, 
including Denmark.  The  main purpose of our study was  to assess  the 
contribution of co-operative enterprises to employment.  It was 
decided in discussion with staff of the EEC  and with the  TEN  Co-opera-
tive de  Conseils in Paris,  who  were  to carry out a  similar study of 
co-operatives in other EEC  countries,  that we  would  concentrate our 
attention on the workers'  co-operative movement  because it was  in that 
sector that the greatest potential for employment  creation lay.  This 
was  not least because of the relatively recent phenomenon  of workers 
taking over ailing capi  taJ.ist enterprises in the grips of economic 
recession.  The  co-operative way  of working also has  appeal for some 
people because it represents a  reaction against large-scale and 
impersonal organisations,  whether run by multi-nationals,  private 
enterprise or the state. 
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The  prospect of seeing Danish co-operatives at first hand was  an 
exciting one.  Before I  went  to Denmark,  I  had received the impression 
that one  of the greatest strengths of its worker co-operative movement 
was  its close association with the  trade unions.  After all, in almost 
every other. country in Europe  the attitude of trade unions  towards  co-
operatives has been cautious,  and sometimes  downright hostile.  In the 
one  place where  co-operatives have  been particularly successful - the 
:Basque  region of Spain - the Mondragon  co-operatives  grew  up  pnd 
flourished at a  time when  trade unions were  banned;  at.  least some  com-
mentators have  suggested that this might have  been in one  sense a  pos-
itive factor.  The  question of how  best to promote  a  successful working 
relationship between trade unions  and workers'  co-operatives has  been 
hotly debated in co-operative circles and frequently written about by 
academics.  Here  then was  a  country in which  the  trade unions had 
seemingly from  the very beginning not only favoured co-operatives but 
had actually set up a  find to finance  them.  Were  there not lessons to 
be  learnt in Denmark.which  could be  applied elsewhere? 
There  are three main types of co-operative in Denmark  which 
broadly fit into the classification of workers'  co-operatives: 
the official workers'  co-operatives which belong to 
the Co-operative Federation,  DKF,  and are largely fin-
anc.ed  by the labour movement's  Co-operative Investment 
Fund,  AKF,  and by individual trade unions.  The  spectrum 
runs from workers'  co-operatives in which all the workers 
are members,  there are no  outside members  and  control is 
on the basis of one  man  one  vote,  to  'trade union'  co-
operatives in which  ownership and control rest entirely 
with trade unions.  The  second type is the most  numerous. 
- employee-owned  companies,  many  of which have  been 
formed  in the last decade in response  to the threat of 
closure of traditional capitalist companies  during the 
economic  recession of the 1970s  and early 1980s. - communes  and collectives which are also a  fairly recent 
phenomenon  and  form  part of the wider alternative move-
ment. 
I  shall look at all of these in some  detail in the  sections that 
follow and in the  case studies which are attached as  an appendix. 
I  shall also look at a  venture to create jobs for the young unemployed 
in Jutland which it is hoped will result in the establishment of viable 
co-operative enterprises.  But first I  must  say something about the 
co-operative movement  in general,  starting with a  brief history of 
agricultural co-operatives and then,  of consumer co-operatives before 
summarising the present state of the movement. 
*  *  * 
2.  Rural  Denmark  - the agricultural co-operatives 
2.1.  There  are a  number  of reasons why  agricultural co-operatives 
developed successfully enough in the late nineteenth century for them 
to serve as a  model  for other countries,  most  notably Ireland.  In the 
1860s  three-quarters of the population of Denmark  lived in rural areas. 
The  Danish peasant farmer had a  number  of advantages  over his counter-
part in other places;  perhaps  the most  important was  that he had access 
to more  and better quality land.  The  average farm was  bigger than that 
in many  other countries including Britain and France  and much  effort 
had gone  into land reclamation and drainage in the  two  decades  between 
1860  and 1880.  Moreover,  the early introduction of compulsory educa-
tion in Denmark  in 1814 coupled with the cultural and educational 
enlightenment brought about by the Grundtvigian movement,  which pro-
moted folk high schools geared primarily towards  young people in the 
rural areas,  meant  that the Danish farmer was  better prepared than 
many for democratic  involvement in business. 
2.2.  The  creation of agricultural co-operatives was  directly stimulated 
first by a  sharp drop in the price of grain in the late 1870s  and early 
1880s which made  Danish farmers  turn to animal products  and  secondly by 
the introduction of new  technological methods  such as  the· cream  S,!3para·~ 
tor.  At  first these progressive methods  had been the monopoly of  the 
big landowners but small and medium-sized :farms  were  not slow to join 
:forces in order to seize this opportunity of competing with their big 
rivals who  were  exporting butter to England. 
2.3.  Dairy co-operatives 
The  :first true dairy co-operative was  set up in Jutland in 1882. 
Si~ years later a  third of all Denmark's  dairy :farmers  belonged to  a 
dairy co-operative and by 1909  this figure had risen to  90';b.  In 1895 
co-operatives had begun to export directly to Britain,  cutting out  the 
wholesalers,  and by 1916  a  third of all the dairy co-operatives 
belonged to one of the seven export societies. 
2.4.  Bacon  co-operatives 
Bacon  co-operatives followed soon after dairies;  the first was 
formed in 1887.  Although they developed more  slowly because of strong 
opposition from  privately-owned slaughterhouses,  by 1891  there were  14 
co-operatives which between them  sl~.ughtered almost half the national  .. pig production.  In 1902  they too moved  into direct ex-port  and by 1913 
they had captured 85%  of the market with 41  firms. 
2.5.  Egg  co-operatives 
Egg marketing co-operatives began to appear in 1895  but were 
unable to capture a  large share of the market because of competition, 
not from  outside but from  the dairy and bacon co-operatives which 
were  already marketing eggs for their members. 
2.6.  Supply co-operatives 
Co-operatives also moved  into other essential areas of agricul-
tural activity;  beginning to supply their farmer members  with fodder 
in 1898,  fertilisers in 1901  and seeds in 1906.  Farmers  could thus 
be  assured of good  quality products in the quantities  they needed and 
at reasonable prices. 
2.7.  Co-operative bankiAK 
DK3 
De  Samvirkende  Danske  Adelsselskaber  (The  Central Co-operative 
Committee)  - formed in 1899  - is the umbrella organisation for agri-
cultural co-operatives,  and still heads the movement  today.  In 1914 
the Committee  was  responsible for setting up a  co-operative bank with 
the express  pt~pose of helping the new  agricultural co-operatives over 
their difficulties in raising loan capital.  Though it suffered severe 
setbacks in the recession of the 1920s  and was  actually forced to close 
in 1925,  the co-operative bank was  reopened before long and became  the 
Danish Co-operative & People's  Bank which still operates successfully 
today. 
2.8.  Oi;her  new  types of co-operative ventures were  developed in the 1920s 
including local co-operative banks  based on  the German  Raiffeisen system. 
The  1930s  saw  a fall in co-operative turnover and controversial emergency 
legislation to regulate production.  This  somewhat  drastic measure  com-
bined with favourable trade agreements,· especially wi.th :Britain, 
improved  n~tters considerably for the agricultural co-operatives. 
2.9.  The  war and post-war ;years 
Under  German  occupation in the 1940s  Denmark's  agricultural co-
operatives remained intact but exported to Germany  rather than Britain. 
Nevertheless when  the war was  ended it took some  years for the movement 
to recover its previous level of turnover and the 1950s  and  1960s  saw  a 
peri.od of rationalisation with many  of the small local co-operatives 
closing down  or amalgamating with the larger ones  to improve  efficiency. 
Today  Danish faxms  reflect the move  towards  specialisation and mixed 
farming is becoming increasingly rare.  Opinion in the co-operative 
movement  is divided as  to whether greater or less centralisation is 
1  needed. 
2.10.  As  in other countries the members  of agricultural co-operative 
socioties are farmers  who  own  and run their farms.  In the past in 
De1nna~k each farmer member  accepted joint liability for any osses 
incurred by the society he  belonged to although it is now  much  more 
common  fr_;";',.agriculutral  societies  to have  the status of lim.i ted 
liability companies.  Since-there is no  specific legislation for 
agricultural or arJ3 other co-operatives in Denmark,  i.t is up to 
each individual society to formulate  the rules by which it is run. In practice,  the generally accepted principles of co-operatiion are: 
open membership;  limited rate of interest on capital; profit-sharing 
in proportion to participation;  and democratic management  by members. 
The  agricultural co-operative movement  in Denmark  aims  exclus-
ively at protecting the economic  interests of its members.  It is not 
seen as  the forerunner for a  socialist society and is deliberately 
neutral in politics. 
*  *  * 
3·  Rural  Denmark  - the consumer  co-operatives 
3.1.  The  development of consumer co-operatives in Denmark  was 
inspired,  as in so many  other countries,  by the Rochdale Pioneers. 
The  first viable co-operative store was  set up  at T.histed in 1866 
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and was  rapidly followed by others until, by 1900,  there were almost 
900.  But  the pattern of development was  markedly different from  that 
in Britain where  consumer  co~operatives were  a  largely urban phenomenon. 
In Denmark it was  the small farmers  already discovering the benefits of 
agricultural co-operation,  who  became  the members  of consumer  co-oper-
atives.  The  workers in the towns,  though busy forming themselves into 
trade unions,  were  more  wary of the notion of providing themselves with 
cheaper food and other staples for fear that lower prices might lead to 
lower wages. 
3.2.  One  factor which gave  the consumer co-operatives  an added boost 
was  a  law which  prohibited ordinary shops  from being built in the 
country areas within a  cnrtain radius of market  towns.  The  co-oper-
atives were  not affected because  they were  societies rather than shops, 
so  they could operate virtually without competition.  Nevertheless, 
they had other problems  to face,  not least the lack of expert manage-
ment.  It was  not until 1896 when  the various regional. groups of co-
operative societies formed  the Danish Co-operative Wholesale Society 
(Faellesforeningen for Danmarks  Brugsforeninger,  or FDB)  that the 
consumer  co-operatives established themselves on a  firmer footing. 
3·3·  Though  nowadays  consumer co-operative societies like the agri-
cultural and workers'  co-operatives  take the form of limited companies, 
the early co-operators were  each called upon  to take  joint responsib-
ility for the debts  of their societies.  Many of the members  of the 
early consumer co-operatives were  landowners,  even if only on a  modest 
scale.  When it came  to raising start-up and working capital,  each 
could offer his land as security with the result that banks were not 
unwilling to lend to them.  A further advantage  that came  with the 
formation of FDB  in 1896  was  the fact that individual stores buying 
goods  supplied by the Wholesale Society were  given 30  days  credit. 
The  early consumer  co-operatives faced considerable hostility from 
the owners  of private businesses.  A.  L.  Godsk,  for.mer  principal of 
the Danish Co-operative College describes  the opposition they had to 
meet:  "  They  regarded the activities of the co-operative movement  as 
an almost indecent encroachment on  the hard-worn,  century-old rights 
of the mercantile classes,  and  the men  behind the societies as aggres-
sive parasites,  who  should be  treated as  such.".* 
·  * A.  L.  Godsk,  How  We  Started:. Origin and First Functions  of the DaniBh 
Consumers'  Co-operatives,  Forenings-og Oplysningstjenesten, 
1976  . DK5 
3·4·  The  first co-operative stores were  run,  in Denmark  as  elsewhere, 
by their local members.  As  time went by and retail societies expanded 
it became  necessary to introduce a  more  complicated democratic struc-
ture with store committees  electing representatives  to district and 
regional committees.  These  in turn nowadays  send delegates to the 
Annual  Congress  at which the  11-member  Board of Directors for the whole 
of the Consumer  Co-operative Movement  are elected.  The  process of 
centralisation accelerated in 1950.  FDB  itself went into retailing, 
joining forces with a  number  of its member  societies to set up a 
department store.  In 1973 Hovedstadens  Brugsforeninger (HB),  one  of 
the biggest retail societies, merged with FDB  which thereby acquired 
a  chain of 290  supermarkets and 11  furniture stores.  The  contribution 
of FDB  to the combined  turnover of the consumer co-operative movement 
as  a  whole is considerable - 5,  782  million Dkr in 1980  compared with 
combined  turnover of 8,794 million for all 1,359 independent retail 
societies put together. 
3.5.  Pleas for increasing the participation of members  in consumer 
co-operatives in a  period of increasing centralisation and rational-
isation are advanced with just as much  urgency in Denmark  as  they are 
elsewhere.  But  at the  same  time  the effect of the economic  recession 
and competition .from  commercial retailers and wholesalers exerts con-
tinuous  pressure  to increase the power  of management.  The  Danish con-
sumer co-operatives,  however,  still have  a  strong enough share of the 
market to exert a  powerful influence on the prices and  the quality of 
goods  sold generally.  They also have an impressive  programme  for con-
sumer protection in their own  stores which covers  such practices as 
more  informative labelling,  special arrangements for elderly and handi-
capped customers,  greater use of easily decomposable  packing materials 
and  the refusal to  se11 products where manufacturers will not supply 
information about chenical composition.  They also criticise the 
pressure of advertising on children and young people and supply to 
them  good quality but cheap goods  such as records,  posters and clothes. 
*  *  * 
4.  Urban Denmark  - the workers  1  co-operatives 
4.1.  As  I  said in the introduction,  my  main concern is with workers' 
co-operatives.  These  have,  as elsewhere,  a  long, if chequered, history. 
The  first manufacturing co-operatives go  back to  the 1870s.  T.hey  failed 
for lack of adequate capital and training.  The  stimulus for the first 
successful urban co-operative was  the agricultural crisis of the late 
· 1870s  and early 1880s which,  while causing the price of grain to drop 
sharply,  brought about no  corresponding fall in the price of bread 
produced by the master bakers.  In 1884 workers in that industry 
decided that the  time had come  to take matters into their own  hands 
a:ad  with contributions of anything between 1  and  10 kroner each,  they set 
up the first co-operative bakery with the aim of producing good but cheap 
i  bread.  By the end.  of the century there were  more  than 20  such co-oper-
atives all over Denmark  and many  of them  exist to this day. 
4.2.  This minor success  did not mean  that workers'  co-operatives were 
taken seriously by politicians or organised labour.  In 1898  the 
Social Democratic  Congress  expressed itself cautious about the estab-lishment of co-operatives.  Nationalisation of the means  of produc-
tion was  preferred and the means  of achieving it were  to hand in the 
trade unions,  which were  regarded as  the builders of socialism.  In 
1898  there were  1,000 unions with 80,000 members,  and that same  year 
the Federation of Trade  Unions  (10)  was  formed. 
4· 3·  The  turning point for the  labour movement  was  1899,  the year 
of the so-called Great Lock-Out when  40,000 workers were  locked out 
of their place of work.  The  stoppage,went on for more  than four 
months  but ended with the mutual recognition of workers'  organisations 
and employers'  organisations and the acceptance of a  General Agreement 
which lay down  the rights and duties of workers  and employers respect-
ively and which remains  in force  today. 
4. 4·  The  year 1899  was  also something of a  turning point for the 
labour movement's  attitude towards  co-operatives.  Skilled men  from 
the building industry were  amongst  the first to decide  to set up in 
business themselves  as co-operators.  The  trade unions responded by 
adding a  few  thousand kroner to what  the workers  themselves were  able 
to contribute in share capital.  · The  rules  of these early co-operat-
ives were  based upon  the Rochdale  principles,  and as in many  of.the 
early British workers'  co-operatives,  there was  no  attempt to  ~astrict 
shareholding to the people working in the new  co-operatives.  Capital 
was  ·needed  and it did not much  matter where it came  from  as long as it 
was  from  the working classes.  From  the very beginning,  Denmark's 
workers'  co-operatives were  seen as an instrument in the struggle 
against the power  of capital and as  a  means  of improving the standard 
of living of working class people.  The  improvement  was  sought not 
simply,  or even at all,  through raising the wages  of workers in their 
capacity as members  of co-operatives,  but in lowering the prices of 
goods  available to them  in their capacity as  consumers.  It is import-
ant to bear in mind  this distinction in order to understand the 
attitude of trade unions  towards workers'  co-operatives  and the way 
they have  developed in the present century.  · 
*  *  * 
5.  Relationship to the Danish economY; 
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5.1.  Now  for the summary  of the present state of Danish co-operatives 
I  start again with agricultural co-operatives.  These  have  achieved a 
market penetration that is as high as in any other European countr,y. 
The  co-operative dairies control  8~~ of milk production,  9~~ of butter 
production and 79%  of cheese production.  One  society,  Butterdane,  has 
75%  of the domestic butter market  and  96%  of the  export market.  Sim- · 
ilarly, 16  co-operative slaughterhouses account for  9~~ of pig produc• 
tion and  5~  of the cattle slaughter.  Poultry,  egg,  seed, horticulture 
and farm  supply societies control around  5Q%  of their markets,  and only 
fn farm machinery does  the co-operative share fall as  low  as  1~fo· 
5.2.  The  consumer co-operatives make  a  better showing than in many 
other European countries.  Societies affiliated to  and  shops  operated 
by FDB  have  25%  of the retail and wholesale market for what  they term 
r daily consumer  goods'  - i.e. non-durables - and  they run about  5~  of' 
all supermarkets in Denmark.  But  from  the point of view of democratic 
control it would be wrong to overlook the fact that nearly a  third of 
FDB  retailing turnover is generated by one  single monolithic society 
·with  321  shops,  and a  further· &;6  by stores which are run by FDB  but are not co-operative societies at all.  The  1,285 locally and regionally 
organised co-operative societies thus  generate less  than two-thirds 
of the  total turnover.  They  do  not run any of the four hypermarkets 
or the five department stores and only just over half of the biggest 
supermarkets.  So  long as the trend towards bigger and bigger shops 
continues  they are likely to see their market share fUrther declining. 
5.3.  The  co-operatives affiliated to  DKF  which include the workers' 
co-operatives,  pl~  but a  minor role by comparison with the other two 
sectors.  Leaving aside  the rental income  of the housing societies and 
the assets of the Workers'  National Bank,  the·turnover of the DKF  co-
operatives is thirteen times  smaller than that of the agricultural co-
operatives  and  twenty times  smaller than that of the consumer  co-oper-
atives.  T.he  figures for the number  of employees  (again excluding the 
housing societies .and  the Bank)  show  a  similar pattern with the agri-
cultural co-operatives providing 30,000  more  and the consumer  co-oper-
atives 50,000 more  jobs  than the DKF  co-operatives. 
5. 4·  In  both the agricultural and retailing sectors consolidation is 
being pursued.  Agricultural co-operatives are declining in number. 
For example,  between 1979  and 1980  the number  of dairies dropped by 
23  (or by 1  ';6)  and  the number  of'  supply co-ops  by 55  (nearly 12%). 
The  same  trend was  visible, if less marked,  even in sectors such as 
bacon factories  and cattle marts where  the number  of societies was 
already very low.  Membership has generally been on the decline over 
the same  period.  But it is notable that the number  of employees  has 
generally remained stable or risen slightly while  turnover has mostly 
increased.  If the  two  years are any guide,  there:f'ore,  agricultural 
societies are maintaining or improving their :financial performance. 
5·5·  A similar picture emerges  for the consumer co-operatives;  the 
trend is towards  :fewer  and larger stores.  Over the five years  from 
1976  to 1980  the consumer co-operatives fell in number  by 165  (or by 
nearly 11%)  while at the  same  time  they increased their turnover by 
5,190 million Dkr  (or 54%).  This very respectable growth rate was 
marred,  however,  by a  substantial fall in profits from  190  million to 
79.2 million Dkr  (a drop  of  5~).  Again,  the number  of'  employees rose 
slightly,  as  did the total sales area of the shops.  Contrary to the 
trend in the agricultural sector the number  of' members  also increased, 
if' marginally. 
5.6.  As  far as  the numbers  of DKF  co-operatives are concerned,  the 
picture is one  of' moderate  expansion in some  sectors,  especially hous-
ing where  44  new  societies were  created between 1975  and 1980,  and 
contraction in others.  The  number  of bakeries fell from  19  to 13 
between 1975  and 1980  and  the number  of canteens from  52  to  35  in the 
same  period.  Overall  DKF  had 28  more  members  in 1980  than in 1975· 
All the  sectors show  a  steadily increasing turnover over the five years 
to 1980. 
5. 7.  The  distribution of co-operatives by type,  membershipt  workforce 
and  turl'lover is shown  in the  tables.  The  latest available figures for 
the agricultural co-operatives were  for 1978.  The  figures for the con-
s·mue·.:- and  DKF  co-operatives are for 1980.  Figures for the number of 
employees  in the  DKF  co-operatives are not published annually and 
those given here are estimates. 
!  !,  I~  ..  ~ .u.n.v 
T.A:BLE  1 
No.  of  Members  Employees  Turnover 
Societies  million Dkr 
ASEicultural  co-o~eratives 
Dairies  (including butter 
and  cheese sales)  179  41,000  8,045  13,416 
Bacon  factories  20  63,000  15,040  12,400 
Supply co-ops  476  70,350  3,833  8,574 
Horticultural co-ops  20  3,340  750  1,220 
Cattle marts  30  28,900  90  913 
Fish marketing co-ops  22  1 '100  617  589 
Other (egg,  poultry and seed 
co-ops  and fur breeders' 
associations)  9  3,575  1 '330  1,512 
TOTAL  756  211,265  39,705  38,624 
Consumer  ~a-operatives 
Retail co-ops  1,285  595,037  7,454  8,974 
FDB  outlets  321  365,914  1 o, 721  5,782 
TOTAL  1,606  960,951  18,175  14,756 
Insurance co-ops  4  1,700  2,237 
COMBINED  TOTAL  2,366  1,172,216  58,580  55,617 
Co-operative banks  61  120,000  3,010  15,734 
(savings) 
GRAIND  TOT~4L  2,427  1,292,216  61,590  71 '341 DK9 
TABLE  2 
eratives 
T.ype  of co-operative  No.  of  Estimated no.  Turnover 
enterprises  of employees  million Dkr 
Housing  544  6,000  4,249* 
Building and  construction  69  5,000  1,403 
Canteens  35  250  72 
Bakeries  13  800  271 
Fuel societies  5  80  206 
Individual societies 
(e.g.  printers,  dairies, etc.)  34  882  859 
Arbejdernes  Landsbank  ~ 
(Workers'  National Bank)  1  768  5, 147** 
TOTAL  701  13,680  12,207 
* rental income 
**  total assets 6.  The  Danish labour movement 
6.1.  When  I  visited Copenhagen in April  1981  one  of the first things 
I  was  told .was  that the Dani.sh  labour movement  is like a  tree with 
three branches:  the trade union movement,  the Social Democratic Party 
an~ the co-operative movement.  But despite  the recognition of the 
third branch, it has  been true that the trade union movement  and the 
Social Democratic Party have  been far more  interested in the promotion, 
first of industrial democracy and latterly of economic  democracy  than 
of co-operatives. 
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6.2.  Industrial democracy or worker participation in the control of 
ind-uStry is much  more  advanced in Denmark  than in many  other European 
countries.  Any company  which  employs  more  than 50  workers  must  allo-
cate a  third of the seats on the board to representatives of the workers. 
Since in many  of the workers'  co-operatives in Denmark  control is shared 
with outsiders,  notably trade unions,  there may  often be little differ-
ence between an ordinary company  and a  co-operative in this respect. 
6.3.  The  ultimate aim  of the Danish labour movement  is that there 
should be  a  complete  transition from  a  capitalist economy  to one  whici~ 
is controlled by labour.  Economic  democracy,  which was  the  subject of 
intense political, public and even parliamentary debate in the 1970s, 
is envisaged as a  system of co-ownership in which workers collectively 
control industry.  One  way in which it is proposed this might happen 
is through investment in companies  by pension funds  acting on behalf 
of workers.  Other proposals have  been that employers  should have  to 
pay a  fixed sum  per employee into a  central fund or that 10';6  of the 
profits of any company  should be paid into a  fund to enable  the workers 
to buy shares in that company.  But  the emphasis would  always  be  on 
collective ownership,  not just by workers  in individua.l companies  but 
by all workers in all companies.  Thus  the share held by an individual 
worker wouJ.d  be  a  share not in his particular factory but in all other 
workplaces.  One  consequence of this would be that workers in strong 
sectors could not benefit at the expense of those in the less strong, 
including the public sector.  Each would have  the same  share in the 
collective wealth of all companies  and by the same  token if one  factory 
closed down  the losses would  be  shared equally amongst all workers  and 
would not fall only on the shoulders of the people who  worked  there. · 
6.4.  Control is another matter and debate  continues  as to whether it 
should be  decentralised and rest with the workforce of particular com-
panies or whether it should be somehow  exercised centrally and collect-
'  ively. 
6. 5.  But for all the  theorising and argument it is highly unlikely 
that great strides will be made  towards  economic  democracy in.the near 
future.  Quite apart from  the fact that the Social Democratic Party 
does  not have  a  sufficient majority in Parliament to get such a  measure 
enacted Denmark  is suffering from  the  same  recession as  the rest of 
Europe.  Unemployment  is high and  the question facing many  companies is 
whether they will survive at all rather than whether they should be 
collectively owned  by the labour movement.  Although in the.se  circum-
stances a  number  of attempts have  been made  by groups  of workers  to 
take over companies  threatened by closure,  the resulting so-called 'employee-owned  companies'  have  not been embraced by the co-operative 
movement  and indeed have  not sought its support.  To  see why  this 
should be  so it is necessary to look more  closely at the workers' 
co-operatives  themselves  and at the organisation to which they belong, 
DICF. 
*  *  * 
7.  Det Kooperative Faellesforbund (DKF) 
7.1.  The  Co-operative Federation (DKF)  is the central union of urban 
or workers'· and trade union co-operative societies.  It was  founded 
in 1922  to :protect the interests of the workers'  co-operatives.  With 
the Danish Federation of Trade  Unions  (10)  DKF  controls the labour 
movementTs  Co-operative  Investment Fund  (AKF). 
DICF 1s  membership is broken down  as follows: 
544  housing societies 
69  building & construction societies 
35  canteens 
13 bakeries 
5 fuel societies 
34  individual societies (e.g.  printers, 
dairies, etc.) 
1 Workers'  Co-operative Bank 
7.  2.  DKF  shares its large 19th-century building beside Copenhagen's 
main railway station with the Economic  Council of the Labour Movement 
which was  established by the Danish Federation of Trade Unions  (10) 
and  by·DICF  itself in 1936.  Together they have  31  employees  and are 
fUnded  by the trade unions and  DKF 1s  member  co-operatives.  The  co-
operatives'  contribution to the centre is based on the turnover of 
each plus 40  kroner per employee.  Most  of the people working in the 
Economic  Council are economists and represent the Labour MOvement  on a 
·wide  range of government bodies including the Monopolies  Commission 
and the Department  responsible for regional aid. 
7·3·  DICF  offers a  financial consultancy service to its member  co-op-
eratives.  Their  'factory economists'  or financial and management  con-
sultants give their services free to co-operatives.  Each consultant 
has  a  different type of expertise.  There is one  legal expert who 
advises about  such matters as  the rules a co-operative should adopt, 
two  consultants who  specialise in advising on labour ag:r.-eements  and on 
dispu·!;es,  and one  consultant on indus trial democracy who  advises co-
operatives on how  to work  together as  effectively as possible and how 
to adapt their rules in such a  way  as  to _enable  industrial democracy 
.to flourish. 
7·4·  Another  g:r.-oup  within DKF  concentrates on education,  especially 
for board members  who  have  been elected from  the workforce.  They 
:run training courses for them.  The  same  g:r.-oup  also deals with gen-
e:r..-.11  education of the public on co-operative matters.  Apart from 
the consultancy services it provides to its member  co-operatives,  DICF 
also does work  f'or trade unions.  It mi.ght,  for instance,  be  commis-
sioned by a  trade union to analyse conditions in a  particular factory 
to find out what  the problems in that industry are.  DKF  is also 
DK11 'involved in international affairs  through the  Danish International 
Development  Agency  on  which  they have  a  representative.  This  agency 
handles  Danish aid to the Third World  and has recently discussed 
courses for workers .in co-operatives and  trade unionists in under~ 
developed countries with the aim  of showing how  they can work  together. 
They  are keen to persuade trade unions  overseas that they can offer 
more  services to co-operatives  than.  they do  at present. 
*  *  * 
8.  Arbejderbevaegelsens Kooperative Finansieringsfond  (AKF) 
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8.1.  The  Labour MOvement's  Co-operative Investment Fund  was  established 
by the Danish Federation of Trade  Unions  (10)  and DKF  in 1953·  Its· 
purpose is to promote workers'  co-operatives by investing risk capital 
in them.  It is  7~~ funded by trade unions who  have  a  corresponding 
degree of control.  The  other 25%  of the funding comes  from  DKF  and the 
Workers'  National Bank.  Its members  are organisations - co-operatives 
or trade unions rather than individuals. 
8.2.  There  are three ways  in which  the Fund  can invest in co-operat.tves. 
The  first is by buying shares' which brings a  corresponding degree of 
control.  The  second is by providing what  is called  'responsible loan 
capital  r  which gives  a  similar degree of control to  share capital.  The 
interest rate is half that of a  bank  loan.  The  third way  is for the 
Fund  to  give  a  guarantee to a  bank which does  not involve any element 
of  control in the co-operative. 
8.3.  Though  the membership of the board l'Thich  administers the Co-op-
erative F'inance  Fund is prestigious - the general secretaries of the 
most  powe1rful  trade unions and the Chairman of the Federation of Trade 
Unions  b1~long - the funds it has at its disposal are relatively Sl1lall. 
They have never risen above  30  million Dkr.  A larger proportion of 
the Fund's  investment .has  gone  to those in the construction and allied 
industries than to anY  other.  It owns  over 44%  of the equity in the 
biggest building co-operative,  JME,  which accounts for a  third of all 
co-operati,re building activity in Denmark.  The  Fund  recently had to 
carry big losses in one  factory as  a  result of which  the trade union 
with the biggest investment in the Fund lost  ~  million Dkr. 
*  *  * 
9.  The  members  of DKF 
9.1.  Co-operative  housin~. 
The  most numerous  of DKF's  members  are 544  housing societies. 
Their main  purpose is to provide  good  quality housing at reasonable 
rents  and their contribution to employment  is not insubstantial. 
:They  employ nearly 6,000 full-time workers.  One  million people - a 
fifth of Denmark's  population- live in housing society property. 
9.2.  The  aim  of the Danish labour movement  in promoting housing 
societies is ultimately to achieve as  good  standards for those in the 
rented sector as for owner-occupiers.  It has  been somewhat  thwarted 
in this pnlicy by the fact that under Danish law  ovmer-occupiers  are 
exemp-t  from' income  tax on the interest they pay~  (In fact,  the Danes 
are exempt  from  ta::x:  on all interest repayments whether or not for the 
purpose of buying a  house.)  Housing society tenants by contrast get 
no  relief on  the rent they pay. ,.~· 
9.3.  Most  housing societies are established as non-profit-making 
organisations;  often by local authorities.  Although  there is no 
particular  ~aw for housing societies the rules they adopt invari-
ably specify that property may  only be let at cost price.  Govern-
ment  subsidies are available to keep rents down  in the first year. 
9.4.  The  members  of a  housing society may  be people who  actually 
live in its property (about half of all members  do)  or  the~ may  be 
on the waiting list for property or p~anning to go  on to the wait-
ing list at some  stage in the future - priority for housing is given 
according to the length of membership..  It costs 100 kroner to buy  ~ 
share.  But  only those members  who  already live in housing society 
property are entitled to attend and vote at general meetings.  It is 
common  for the board to consist of two  representatives of the local 
authority,  two  elected tenants and  two  from  the housing society man-
agement. 
9·5·  B,y  1978  330,000 co-operative dwellings  had been built in 
Denmark;  these included flats as well  as maisonettes  and houses. 
Housing societies cater for a  wide  range of needs,  including those 
of families with children,  single people,  students,  the elderly and 
the disabled.  Many of the larger housing estates incorporate facil-
ities such as nurseries and community  rooms.  The  co-operative housing 
sector is represented to government  by the National Association of 
:Building  Societies which is affiliated to  DKF  and also works  closely 
with local authorities to  ensure that tenants'  interests are  fUlly 
taken into account by those  who  formulate housing policy and legis-
lation. 
9.6.  The  building co-opf!ratives 
In numerical  terms  the second most  important group of co-oper-
atives belonging to  DKF  are the  69  building and contracting companies. 
Though  they have  only a  3%  share of the construction market in the 
country they nevertheless  employ  some  5,000  people including brick-
layers,  joiners and  carpenters,  electricians,  plumbers,  decorators, 
ma1nLfacturers  of kitchen fitments  and  entrepre~eurs. 
9·1·  Some  building co-operatives confine  memb~rship to worker/ 
members  of particular  trade unions.  Some  are largely controlled by 
housing societies.  Many  are  almost completely controlled by trade 
unions  and the Co-operative Investment Fund  (.AKF). 
9.8.  As  in many  other countries the Danish construction industry 
has been hit  by  the  economic  recession  in recent  years  and the 
bu.ilding co-operatives have  been  struggling for survival along with 
commercial  builders.  With a  reduction of new  house-building starts 
from  40,000 per  annum  to 20,000,. the  co-operatives have  even found 
themselves  competing against  one  another,  this  to the  dismay of 
IlKF  and  of Byggefagenes Kooperative  Landssammenslutung  (BK)  -:  the 
National Building Trades  Co-operative Society to which they all belong. 
9·9·  The  problems  caused by this rivalry between the building co-op-
eratives at national,  regional and local level were  thoroughly aired 
in a  seminar run by one  of the biggest trade unions,  SiD,  in December 
1979·*  It was  suggested Ui(it  the larger national co-operatives should 
* ~orkers' Co-operatives - The  Wa~ Forward,  DKF,  December  1979 
DK13 carry out contracts in conjunction with smaller local co-operative 
companies  which would not otherwise be  able to become  involved. 
The  authors of the report on  the seminar warned that the trade 
unions would have  to be  satisfied that these problems had been 
overcome  before  they could make  capital available to the building 
co-operatives. 
9.10.  One  obvious way  in which  there could be greater co-operation 
between the different sectors of the co-operative movement  would be 
for the building co-operatives  to take on more  of the construction 
work  put in hand by the housing societies.  The  contracts.may be 
very big indeed.  But  the housing societies, not surprisingly,  put 
all their contracts out  to tender.  The  building co-operatives have 
not been competitive enough  to win many  of them.  · 
9.11.  Co-ouerative  canteens 
The  next largest grouping within DKF  are  the  35  canteen co-op-
eratives.  Like  the housing and building co-operatives  they aim 
primarily to serve workers  as  consumers  rather than as workers,  and 
they are not necessarily controlled by the people who  work in them. 
The  earliest canteen co-operatives were  started in the 1920s  to 
ensure that workers in larger companies  had reasonable eating and 
resting facilities.  At  that time it was  quite common  for private 
'grocers'  to supply workers in the larger factories;  since their 
market was  captive,  they could make  substantial profits.  So  workers' 
and trade union clubs within the factories  decided to  take matters 
into their own  hands  and started up  canteen co-operatives.  M<;>st 
canteens also operate bulk-buying clubs  through which workers  can buy 
a  wide  range of consumer  goods.  They also buy their own  supplies 
jointly through the union of canteen co-operatives.  All  35  co-oper-
atives belong to this union and together they serve more  than 25,000 
workers  in companies  all over Denmark  and  employ about 250  people. 
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9.12.  When  the first canteen co-operatives were  set up  they were 
providing a  new  service but it did not tske employers  long to realise 
that employee relations and productivity could both be helped by such 
prov~s~on.  Subsidised canteens are now  commonplace  in Danish factories 
and workplaces.  Nevertheless, it was  the co-operative movement  which 
took the initiative. 
9.13.  In addition,  eight hundred people are employed by the 13 co-
operative bakeries which have  already been mentioned.  They  are 
spread throughout the country and have  one  quarter of the important 
market for rye bread. 
9·.14.  The· fuel societies. 
The  first workers'  fuel  co-operatives were  set up during World 
War  I  to alleviate supply difficulties.  In 1978  the fuel co-operatives, 
including Danish  OK  Oil which had originally been part of the highly 
successful Swedish  OK  co-operative,  merged  to form Oil Company  Denmark. 
With a  turnover of 1,000 million Dkr it has  an  8.5%  share of the 
domestic fuel market  and a  6.1%  share of the petrol market. DK15 
9.15.  The  Workers'  National Bank 
.ARB  (Arbejdernes Landsbank)  was  set up in 1919  by trade unions 
and the co-operatives.  It has  34 branches in different parts of the 
country,  a  staff of about 700  and is the sixth largest bank in Denmark. 
43%  of its loans in 1978  went  to individual workers  and  2'"{0~  to industry 
and small businesses.  The  remainder was  made  to housing associations, 
individual housebuyers,  students and other organisations.  Loans  are 
made  to DKF  co-operatives at 1%  less than the normal  commercial rate 
of interest. 
9.16.  Co-o;eerat.ive  insurance 
ALKA,  the trade union and co-operative movement's  insurance 
company,  provides  group life insurance cover for more  than 82p,ooo 
trade union members  and had,  in 1978,  3~fo of the group life insurance 
market.  With 80  staff in its Copenhagen headquarters  and a  further 60 
full-time insurance salesmen working throughout the country .ALKA' s  net 
capital was  70  million Dkr,  its life insurance bonus  fund was  129 
·million Dkr  and i-ts  premium  income  was  179  million Dkr. 
9.17.  The  Wor~ers' Press 
.An  impo:rtant part of the labour movement's  information machine 
is the A-Press which publishes  a  number  of major national newspapers. 
The  daily newspaper Aktuelt had a  circulation of 60,000  in 1978  and an 
estimated readership of 236,000.  S¢'ndags  Aktueltf  the Workers'  Press's 
national Sunday newspaper,  had a  circulation of 124,000  and  an estimated 
readership of 395,000.  Besides  these,  the Workers'  PrEJSS  publishes a 
number  of other daily,  evening and advertising newspap·~rs. 
9.18.  This brief rundown  shows  that the majority of members  of DKF  are 
more  consumer  than worker co-operatives,  even though shareholdings are 
predominantly held by trade unions  and labour movement  organisations. 
Their pu:rpose  is to provide good quality and reasonably priced goods 
or services for working people.  They  are not for the most  part com-
panies which are owned  and controlled by the people working in them. 
Indeed,  according to a  group of researchers at the Institute of Organ-
isation and Industrial Sociology in Copenhagen,  only two  of the hundreds 
of co-operatives which belong to DKF  are actually controlled by the 
employees  who  work in them  and not by the unions.*  But within DKF's 
classification of  'separate,  individual societies'  there are a  number 
of co-operatives which come  much  nearer to that definition,  though 
with varying degrees  of outside control.  They include printing and 
publishing co-operatives,  dairy co'-operatives,  an auditing and a  com-
puter co-operative,  architectural and planning co-operatives and a 
musician's co-operative.  Tb  illustrate how  these workers'  co-operatives 
are organised two  case studies are set out in an appendix - one  of a 
dairy co-operative  (not run by farmers)  and one  of a  printing co-oper-
ative. 
*  *  * 
* Dino  Raymond  Hausen & others,  Producer  co~o:eeratives in Denmark 
Acta Socio1ogica 1980,  vol.  23  no.  4 DK16 
10.  Law  and organisation 
10~1.  Now  that the different categories of workers'  co-operatives have 
been detailed it may  be  as well to turn to the legal regime under which 
they operate.  Denmark  is unusual in having no  legislation for co-oper-
atives.  Consequently there is no  legal definition o£ what  a  co-oper-
ative is.  Nor  are  there  a:ny  requirements for co-operatives  to register 
publicly.  This makes  it virtually impossible to get an accurate picture 
of the number  of co-operative enterprises apart from  those in member-
ship of DKF.  The  law  does,  however,  permit any group of people to get 
together in some  form of business,  though with unlimited liability.  In 
practice most  co-operatives are registered as companies  and so  do  have 
limited liability although it is necessary to accumulate  a  minimum 
shareholding of 30,000 Dkr  to fulfil the legal requirements for the 
formation of a  limited company.  Many  small co-operatives may  have  to 
start life as partnerships for this reason. 
10.2.  The  members  formulate  the rules by which the co-operative is run. 
Just as  there is no  law  to  which  co~operatives must  conform so they 
are  not legally bound  to adhere to any particular set of rules. 
However,  DKF  lays  down  Standard Regulations to which its member  co-Oll'-
eratives are supposed to con£orm.  Controversy has  arisen over some 
proposed amendments  to  these Standard Regulations,  in particular the 
issue of consumer representation on boards of directors  (see Section 
10.4.).  -
10.3.  Loans  from  individual workers  are not generally encouraged.  The 
principal source of capital available to workers'  co-operatives is the 
Co-operative Investment Fund.  This  generally-takes  the form  of share 
capital.  Where  co-operatives have raised loan capital from  banks  they 
have  had to pay commercial rates of interest and,  in some  cases,  their 
members  have  had to give personal guarantees. 
10.4.  According to the standard model  the General Assembly of members 
elects the Board of Directors and the Chairman.  Under  the Companies' 
Act it is a  legal requirement that~  limited companies  employing more 
than 50  people should ensure that one-third of the board of directors 
are employee  representatives.  In co-operatives it is common  £or a 
similar proportion of employee representatives to be elected whether 
or not more  than 50  people are employed.  The  controversial amendment 
to the Standard Regulations  proposed by DKF  would mean  that one-third 
of the board members  in workers'  co-operatives would  also be  represent-
atives of its consumers  defined as: 
- other co-operative enterprises which use 
the co-operative's services or buy its goods; 
- consumer organisations; 
- local authorities; 
- trade union or consumer organisations other 
than those with shares  or an interest in the 
co-operative  • 
.Although  the amendment  was  endorsed c. t  DKF' s  Annual  Congress  as long ago 
as  1977 it has not been widely embraced by individual co-operatives,  some of which have  been extremely reluctant to hand over any control to 
•consumers'.  DKF  is no  longer insisting on the amendment  being 
adopted but neither has it backed down  completely.  New  draft regula-
tions specify that  1 efforts should be  made  to ensure that the con-
sumer point of view is also represented on .the individual board'. 
10.5. Elections of the employee  representatives normally take place 
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by secret ballot before the Annual  General Meeting,  the remaining 
board members  being elected at the meeting itself  •.  Individual members 
have one  vote each,  regardless of .the size of their shareholding. 
Corporate members  such as  trade unions,  workers'  clubs,  consumer 
organisations,  etc.  may  be  allowed a  maximum  of 40  votes depending on 
the  size of their shareholding,  although it is more  normal for the 
rules to allow them  10  or 20  votes.  Until now  the Co-operative Invest-
ment  Fund  has had a  similar number  of votes in those  co-operatives 
in which it has  invested share capital.  A somewhat  controversial 
proposal by the Fund.  and by ~  is that in  future  the Fund  should 
only invest in co-operatives if it has  voting rights  in proportion 
to its investment.  Thus,  if the Fund  were  to put up 90';b  of a  co-
operative's share capital, it would have  9~;b of the votes. 
10.6. Managers  are generally appointed by the board  o~ directors.  In 
a  paper presented to a  conference in Copenhagen in the spring of 1981, 
Jeppe Als  of the Sydjysk Universitetcenter,  quoted from  the  conclusions 
of  an investigation of ten co-operative enterprises which he himself 
had helped to conduct in 1979·* 
'With regard to  internal conditions within 
these enterprises, i.e.  the employee/enter-
. prise relationship,  a  characteristic feature 
is that all enterprises without  e~ception are 
run on  the traditional hierarchical pattern 
of management.  Not  even in enterprises in 
which the employees  themselves constitute the 
Board and are thus solely responsible for 
deciding the form  of direction has  the wish 
ever been expressed to limit the powers  of 
the board over employee,  nor have  alternative 
or supplementary organs  of management  or con-
trol been introduced to the management  or 
boardroom level.' 
10.7.  Since there is nothing in Danish law to distinguish between a 
co-operative company  and any other company it is not easy for co-
operatives to be  taxed more  favourably than other companies.  There 
is anyway no  state financial aid for co-operatives nor is there any 
specific aid for workers  in companies  threatened with closure who 
wish to form  a  co-operative.  In recent years attempts by workers  to 
save their companies  from  liquidation have  increased in number  but 
neither DKF  nor the state have  been involved in any of these attempts. 
Banks  generally treat co-operatives in the  same  way  as  any other com-
mercial  compe~ although,  as  I  have  said,  the Workers'  National Bank 
m~  in Gome  cases be prepared to make  loans  to co-operatives at 1% 
below the normal  rate of interest for commercial  loans.  Local  auth-
orities are not empowered  to give financial or other help to co-oper-
atives although there is clearly considerable scope .for them  to do  so 
* Jeppe  Als,  The  Danish Trade  Union worker  co-operat~yes.  El§to~y 
'and current trends ,  30. 4. 81 • DK18 
in order to save or create employment. 
*  *  * 
11.  Employee-owned  companies 
11.1.  I  have  talked so far only about  those workers'  co-operatives which 
are members  of DKF  and are closely affiliated to the trade union move• 
ment.  But  since the economic  crisis of the  1970s  a  new  form of co-oper-
ative,  the  employee-owned  company,  has  emerged.  Because  there is no 
central support agency for employee-owned  companies  and there are no 
statistics, it is difficult to get hold of any precise information about 
them.  Some  researchers at the Institute of Organisation and Industrial 
Sociology in Copenhagen  have,  however,  so far identified 30  such enter-
prises.  Their two-year research project should be  completed early in 
1982.*  In their preliminary classification of employee-owned  companies 
they identify three  types: 
- job-saving enterprises set up  by groups 
of workers  when  their jobs were  at risk 
because  a  traditional capitalist firm was 
ailing; 
- production collectives or communities 
whose  members  not only work  but also live 
together; 
- organisations which fall somewhere  between 
the  job-·saving enterprises and  the collect-
ives in that they are often set up in order 
to save  jobs but at the same  time the workers 
are ideologically disposed towards  working in 
a  democratically-controlled enterprise. 
11.2.  These  new  types  of co-operatives differ from  the traditional co-
operative in that they have  no  connection with the established working-
class organisations and are not dependent on them.  Indeed,  relations 
with the  trade unions  have often been strained,  especially when  workers 
in enterprise8 set up in times  of financial crisis have  had to accept 
reduced wages.  In this section I  shall concentrate on  the first and 
third categories,  leaving the second  'collective'  category for the sec-
tion on  the alternative movement  in Denmark  and  the case study of 
Svendborg in the  appendix. 
11.3.  The  job-saving enterprises 
Leaving aside  the study being carried out at the Institute of 
Organisation and Industrial Sociology,  very little has  been written 
about this type of employee-owned  company.  A number  of those identi-
fied by the Institute have already failed and others have returned to  .. 
a  traditional form of organisation.  In the  course of my  visit to  ·  .· 
Denmark  I  asked Peter Mortensen,  the industrial democracy consultant 
at DKF,  why  they had not been more  involved in advising and helping 
workers who  were  trying to save their jobs.  He  replied that three 
........  '··~ 
*  Dina  Raymond  Hausen,  Poul  Ingersler,  Finn Junge-Jensen,  Hardy Roed-
Thorsen,  Helge  Telzschner,  Ann Westenholz,  ]?roducer Co-operatives 
in Denmark,  Acta Sociologica,  1980,  Vol.  23  No.  4· years before he might have  said that DKF's  most  important job was  to 
help rescue ailing companies  and  to help workers  take  them  over as  co-
operatives.  But he had become  very much  more  sceptical because  too 
many  workers  had tried to  take over their factories  and had failed. 
They  often went  wrong because  they lacked management  experience but 
also because  they adopted the wrong sort of rules and ended up with 
ownership being vested in the hands  of just a  few  workers.  If nKF 
had been involved in helping them  they might have  advised them  to 
adopt rules which made  ownership collective through a  workers'  club. 
But as it was,  most  of the new  enterprises had simply been unaware  of 
DKF's  existence and  so  had been unable to seek their advice.  · 
I  asked whether  DKF  could not publicise itself more  effectively 
so that they could play a  part in helping to create new  co-operatives. 
But Mr.  Mortensen  thought that the scope for DKF's  involvement was  in 
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any case limited because  they would not be able to solve the main prob-
lem,  the lack of capital.  This could not come  just from  the  trade unions 
who  are the main  source of finance for the traditional co-operatives.  In 
his view the most  positive way  to help workers  take over their firms 
would  be  to  amend  the legislation to allow local authorities to provide 
finance. 
11.4.  By  way  of example,  the newspaper  Information* is well-known as an 
employee-owned enterprise identified by the researchers at the Institute 
of Organisation and Industrial Sociology as  one  in which the employees 
are ideologically disposed towards working in a  democratic way.  It was 
started as an illegal news  agency during the  German  occupation of Denmark 
in the Second World War  and later became  a  daily newspaper which today 
has  a  circulation of 305,000.  In 1970  the owner of Information offered 
to sell it to  the employees  at a  very lew price on condition that they 
would  own  it collectively and that the  ~;hare capital should be irredeem-
able.  The  employees  formed  an association which holds  the majority of 
the shares; all permanent workers,  and only workers,  are members.  One 
quarter of the shares are held by outside  'Friends o:f  Information'  who 
sometimes  act as consultants and who  also elect representatives to the 
board of directors.  The  rules provide foJ•  a  limited return on invest-
ment  and in fact no  dividend has been paid out since Information was 
converted into an employee-owned  company •. 
The  Employee  Association meets  at least four times  a  year and dis-
cusses all matters of importance with the exception of editorial policy 
which is the prerogative of the chief editors.  Nevertheless  the chief 
editors as well as  the managing directors are elected by the Employee 
Association.  A nine-member  Council appointed by the Employees'  Associa-
tion and including representatives of each department follows up deci-
sions made  by the Association.  Day-to-day decision-making  has  as far 
as possible been decentralised to the workers in the different depart-
ments.  This  is facilitated by the fact that as much  information as 
possible is shared with the  e:ritire workforce.  An  internal information 
editor,  elected by the Association,  produces  a  weekly internal news-
paper which includes details of all meetings  that  have  taken place as 
well as interviews with workers  and others. 
The  differential between the highest and lowest paid workers has 
been  kept as  low  as possible.  From  1976  to 1980  a  minimum  wage  based 
* Ejvind Larsen,  The  development  of collE;tctive  leadership .i.n  a  ~sh 
e~o~ee~owned newspaper.  Paper presented at conference in Copenhagen,  ·r- .  981. on  that of a  printer on  dayshift was  paid to all  workers,  on  top of 
which some  received a  disadvantage bonus.  In practice what  this meant 
was  that the traditionally l9w-paid workers  got a  lot more  than they 
would normally and  the people who  normally would be  the highest paid 
got less.  In 1980  the newspaper which had until then been performing 
well experienced a  fall of circulation for the first time.  The 
employees  had to decide  to  lower their wage  claims for  the year if 
the newspaper was  to survive.  At  that point the Printers' Union 
announced that it would not allow its members  to accept a  reduced wage 
increase.  Despite  some  misgivings  the rest of the workforce  agreed 
that they would stick to the original reduced increase even though 
their fellow  employees  were  getting more. 
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The  economic  recession has  continued to hit Information,  mainly 
because the amjority of its readers being students  and academics,  have 
themselves  been hard hit.  The  situation did,  however,  improve  consider-
ably in the first quarter of 1981.  Most  of the other Danish newspapers 
went off the streets when  a  dispute brought on a  lockout of printing 
workers.  But  because  the workers  of Information were  also its owners 
they did not lock themselves  out.  Information was  just about  the only 
national newspaper available and thus received a  strong boost to its 
circulation and advertising revenue. 
*  *  * 
12.  The  alternative movement 
12.1.  The  traditions of the co-operative movement,  the  fo~~ high schools 
and a  still living spirit of liberalism are  (according· to Professor  To~ 
Jacob Hegland of the Aalborg University Centre)  three of the elements 
which have uniquely nurtured social experiments in Denmark.*  Behind the 
upsurge of such experiments in the 1970s  he  identifies the anti-author-
itarian spirit of the times,  the reaction against the giantism and 
bureaucracy of modern life and the more  down-to-earth protests of the 
environmentalists,  women's  liberation and local community movements. 
~1atever the explanation,  there are several  thousand co~es in Denmark, 
some  experimenting with new  styles of work,  some  with alternative energy 
progjects,  some  with a  new  approach to education (perhaps  the best known 
is Tvind),  and others where  an alternative form  of care is offered to dis-
turbed or delinquent children.  The  most  famous,  or to some  people  infamous, 
member  of the commune  movement  is the Free  Town'  of Christiana which has 
more  than 1,000 inhabitants.  What  may  have  been the biggest  'squat'  in 
Europe  occurred in 1971  when  the· Danish army moved  out of a  22-hectare 
site in Christianshavn,  near the centre of Copenhagen.  The  Municipality 
of Copenhagen had ambitious  plans for developing this prime central area 
of the city but lacked the funds  to  do  so.  Large  numbers  of homeless 
people,  students, minority groups  and dissidents  took advantage of their 
i~ctivi  ty and moved  in to make  their homes  in the  empty huts,  barracks 
. and workshops.  By 1972  there were  more  than 400  inhabitants who  declared 
, that: 
*  Professor Tove  Jac?b Hegland,  Social Experiments & Erluoation for 
Social Living,  Aalborg University Center,  Paper presented at con-
ference in Copenhagen,  May 1981. 'The  aim  of Christiana is to build a 
self-ruling society,  where  each indiv-
idual can develop him  or herself freely 
while remaining responsible to the  com-
munity as ·a  whole.  The  society is to be 
economically self-sufficient,  and the com-
mon  goal must  always  be  to try to show 
that mental  and physical pollution can be 
prevented.'* 
12.2.  Cars  and hard drugs were  banned,  though the sale of marijuana 
was  permitted.  The  people who  lived there began to organise them-
selves into working groups;  shops  and workshops,  a  market,  places 
for eating and making music  and a  weekly newspaper were all set up. 
People outside were  not so happy.  Some  upright Danish citizens were 
convinced that it was  a  breeding ground for criminals,  perverts and 
drug addicts.  In particular,  the MUnicipality was  unhappy and tried 
to dissuade the government  from its plan to give Christiana the status 
of a  'social experiment'  for three years  and persuade  them instead to 
allow  the bulldozers  to move  in. 
12. 3.  The  arguments  have  flown backwards  and forwards  ever since and 
have still not been entirely resolved.  Christiana has attracted a 
sympathetic following from  outside.  Its fate was  once  the cause of a 
demonstration  in which  30,000 people marched on the  town hall and 
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parliament.  It  has  been the subject of debate in parliament on a 
number  of occasions  and,  following a  decision to close it 'without un~ 
necessary  delay'  in 1976,  was  the  centre of  what Per Lovetand 
describes as  'one of the strangest cases in the history of  the High 
Court  •••  with a  motley  crowd of Christainites with children,  dogs, 
horses  and music  as  the  plaintiffs,  and  the Danish  Government  -
the  Defence Ministry  - as  the defendant' • **  Christiana lost the 
case,  as  they  also lost their  appe~l to the  Sq.preme  Court of Justice 
in  1978.  Both court verdicts pointed out,  however,  that the social 
and human  aspects were  exclusively the responsibility of  the Folketing 
(lower house of  parliament)  and the government. 
In a  subsequent  debate in parliament the Minister of Defence 
stated that the  closing of Christiana would  raise a  lot  of social 
and  human  problems,  the solution of which would require reasonable 
time.  A  respite of three years was  therefore allowed and  though this 
:has  since elapsed,  Christiana is still in existence.  Though  many of 
the people who  live there are  'social losers'  and most of them are 
unemployed,  attempts have been made  to create jobs in Christiana.  One 
small  example is of a  group of· Christiani.tes who  decided to recycle  ti:rnber 
from houses  that were being demolished.  A government  grant to buy a  chain 
saw  enabled eight or ten people to earn a  living making new  products out 
of the timber they retrieved. 
12.4. Whatever happens  in the future Christiana will  long remain in 
people's memories  as  a  remarkable social phenomenon.  The  ideas and 
attitudes it represents were  summed  up by an anonymous  Christianite in 
a  poem  quoted by Kar  Lemberg,  the Planning Director of Copenhagen,  in 
* Quoted in Per Lovetand,  The  Freetown of Christiana,  from ,Pominant Ways 
£f Life_ in Denmark/A! ternative Ways  of Life in Denmark,  United Nations 
University,  1980. 
**  Op.  cit. an account of Christiana's recent history.* 
'Christiana and the macro-society are opposites. 
Not  opposing poles of the  same  unit,  but irreconcileable 
opposites. 
Where  Christiana has  a  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY 
the macro-society has  NUCLEAR  FAMILY  CELLS 
Where  Christiana has  CRAFTSMEN· 
the macro-society has  FACTORY  WORKERS 
Where  Christiana has  RECYCLING  OF  OLD  MATERIALS 
the macro-society has  OVER-CONSUMPTION  OF  NEW  MATERIALS 
Where  Christiana has  NATURAL  MATERIALS 
the macro-society has ARTIFICIAL  MATERIALS 
Where  Christiana has  CHILDREN,  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS 
the macro-society has  CARS 
Where  Christiana has  ECOLOGY 
the macro-society has  ECONOMY 
Where  Christiana has  TOLERANCE  AND  TRUST 
the  ma~ro-society has  PREJUDICES  AND  SUSPICION 
Where  Christiana has  OPEN  SUFFERING 
the macro-society has HIDDEN  SUFFERING 
Where  Christiana has  SPIRIT 
the macro-society has  THINGS.' 
Christiana is not the only manifestation of the alternative 
movement  in Denmark.  It is just the' best known.  Durim.g  the course 
of my  visit I  went  to see two  quite different types of communal 
experiment,  one  in Svendborg and one  in Vejle.  Both are described 
in the appendix. 
*  *  * 
Denmark  is of some  special interest because in three important 
respects it differs,  at least in degree,  from  other EEC  countries. 
(a)  There is no  body of law specifically for co-operatives as  there 
is elsewhere.  Students of the subject are likely to be  taken aback 
when  they first hear this.  How  can there be  ~a-operatives' when 
' there is no  legal definition of them  nor any legal framework within 
lvhich  they can operate?  But clearly there are.  Agricultural and 
consumer co-operatives play a  highly significant part in the ~sh 
* BUD  International Review economy,  and workers'  co-operatives  even though they are on  a  much 
smaller scale,  also exist, as  the preceding account has  shown.  The 
conclusion must  be  that the possession of a  specific law  does  not 
matter nearly as much  as many  outsiders would  expect.  Man is a 
rule-making animal.  If the state does  not make  the  ~~les people 
will make  their own,  and in some  respects  they may  do  so all the 
more  effectively when  not constrained by the state.  This is not to 
say that when  there is a  body of law it does  not have  a  considerable 
influence on what  happens  then. 
(b)  The  trade unions  have,  as  I  have  shown,  played a  larger part 
DK23 
in the support of workers'  co-operatives  than in most other countries. 
The  enthusiasm for them  in the unions  has  not always  been as abundant 
as some  of the keener co-operators would  have liked and  there have  been 
criticisms of a  certain stuffiness being displayed by the unions.  As 
one  Danish commentator has  put it, rather coolly,  'Worker  co-operation 
in the strictest sense neither really exists nor has it done  so in 
Denmark.  Since the beginning of the 20th centur,y,  there have,  however, 
been a  number  of enterprises owned  jointly by their employees  and their 
labour organisations'.* But  the striking fact from  a  Euxopean  point of 
view is that there are  trade union co-operatives at all, and that they 
have survived.  In some  other countries trade unions  have  not been all 
that sympathetic,  leading some  observers  to conclude that there are 
fUndamental  structural and ideological divides which are bound  to 
produce union hostility.  Denmark  shows  that this need not be  so. 
(c)  Some  people would  see the alternative movement  in Denmark  as being 
almost at the opposite extreme from  the official trade unions.  There is 
not always all that much  love lost between them.  But as Denmark  is 
remarkable at the one  ex1;reme,  in the extent of union involvement,  so it 
is at the other, for the vitality of an alternative movement  which 
embraces  co-operatives within it and includes also a  number  of elements 
which are peculiarly of this century.  The  Rochdale  Pioneers hoped  to 
make  Rochdale  a  co-operative town;  if they had succeeded it would not 
have  looked in the least like Christiana. 
*  *  * 
* J eppe  AJ.s,  The  Danish trade union worker co-operatives.  His  tory and 
~~rent trends,  Sydjysk Universitetcenter,  April  1981 14.  Appendix 
Case  study no.  1:  Co-operative dairy- Maelkeriet Enigheden 
The  Unity Dairy Co-operative  came  into being after a  strike in 
a  milk plant in Copenhagen in 1896.  The  strike was  as usual over low 
wages  and poor conditions.  The  President of the Craftsmen's Union 
was  the driving force behind the new  co-operative and encouraged 
workers  - including the grandfather of the present Director - Palle 
Hansen - to invest their money  in it.  From  wages  of 25  kr a  week  the 
workers  bought their 10 kr shares.  But that money in itself was  not 
enough and the workers  had to persuade the trade unions  and local 
people  to put up money  as  share capital as well in order to  get 
established.  · 
From  1897 until 1978  the Unity Dairy operated on its own  as  a 
workers'  co-operative.  It bought milk from  individual farmers,  pro-
cessed it and then sold it in the Copenhagen  area.  Under  a  law passed 
in 1941  to ensure that the population could secure as much  milk as it 
needed the six or seven different milk distribution companies  in 
Copenhagen  had each been given their own  area of operation and so 
effectively had a  form  of monopoly.  But  Denmark's  entry into the  EEC 
in 1972  meant  that this somewhat  monopolistic arrangement was  no 
longer allowed and strong competition broke out between the dairy co-
operatives - all of them  except the Unity Dairy owned  by farmers.  In 
1978  when  competition between dairies was  particularly fierce an agri-
cultural co-operative in Ringsted suggested that they join forces with 
the Unity Dairy.  Since neither co-operative could easily join the 
other (because the members  of the Dairy Co-op  were  not farmers  and the 
farmers were not workers) it was  decided to form  a  new  company  in which 
each  co-operative would hold  5~fo of  tl~ shares.  So  the workers•·co-
operative still exists and has retained ownership  o:f  the  building and 
land but it has sold all the machinery and equipment  to  the new  com-
pany which it half  owns. 
Problems  were  looming when  I  visited the  dairy co-operative 
in  April 1981  because  the  farmers'  co-operative was  threatening to 
merge with  Danmilk,  an  agricultural co-operative  and the biggest 
competitor of them  all.  As  things  are  the Unity Dairy is already 
having to fight fierce competition from  other agricultural co-operative 
dairies.  Although the  retail price of milk is fixed by the government, 
many dairies are offering 3,  4 or even  5%  discounts  to the  shops  with 
which they deal,  thus  cutting their own  margins.  The  trade unions, 
who  are  major shareholders in the Unity Dairy,  intend to fight hard 
to keep their members'  jobs and if the determination of the  Director 
has  anything to  do  with it they seem likely to  succeed. 
The  Unity  Dairy,  like most workers'  co-operatives in Denmark, 
takes  the legal form  of a  company  limited by  shares.  At  the begin-
ning there were  three  types of  share - A,  B and C.  The  A shares  no 
longer exist;  they were  those shares  subscribed by  individuals in the 
local community when  the co-operative was  first set  up.  The  majority 
of  the B shares are held by 22  different trade unions,  mostly in the Copenhagen area,  but some  970,000 Dkr  share capital is held by the 
Financing Institute of 82.44,  the Workers'  National Bank  and  the 
Co-operative Finance Fund  (AKF).  The  Enigheden Workers'  Club  holds 
one  B share collectively on behalf of the workers.  The  remainder is 
own  capital,  held bythe co-operative itself.  The  C shares are held 
by individual workers  and board members  and also retired workers  as 
well as by the co-operative itself. 
Each share costs  500  kroner and although individuals can buy 
more  than one  share they are entitled to only one  vote.  After an 
initial trial period of between one  and  two  years,  every worker is 
entitled to become  a  member  although of the 208  workers  employed at 
Engiheden in 1981  only 57  had done  so.  I£ a  worker leaves,  other 
than on retirement,  however,  he  must  sell his shares.  The  shares are 
all held on  a  parity basis and cannot increase in value.  Interest on 
share capital is paid at  ~~'  one  per cent above  the bank rate. 
Besides  the B and C shares there is a  third type of preference 
shareholding which  the co-operative has  created for the Workers' 
.Fund.  1.5 million kroner has been invested by the co-operative on 
behalf of the workers'  fund in the form  of preference shares.  Each 
year the interest on these shares,  which amounts  to a  fairly substan-
tial 100,000 kroner,  is paid into the workers'  fund and may  be used 
by them  in any way  they see fit.  In practice the money  is generally 
spent on education courses,  on summer  houses  for the workers  and on 
extra benefits for workers who  are off sick for a  long time.  Aa  the 
word  'preference'  suggests,  the workers'  fund would be first in line 
for payment  in the event of liquidation. 
Although the  system of non-voting preference  shru~eholding oper-
ates in some  private companies,  the Unity Dairy system is unusual in 
that it allows  the Workers'  Fund  some  20  votes  on  these shares. 
Control 
Besides  the  20  votes allocated to  the Enigheden Workers'  Fund, 
individual worker members  are entitled to one  vote each at  th~ Annual 
General Meeting.  Forty-two retired members  of the co-operative also 
have  shares and are also entitled to one  vote.  Attendance at AGMs  by 
the •.vorker  members  is high.  Mr.  Hansep.  said that it is usually  10()>~ 
even though the meetings  are held in the evening.  But he  added that 
this might  have  something to do  with the long-standing tradition of 
paying 40  kr to each person attending the meeting. 
The  proportionately higher shareholding of the  trade unions 
and  the three financial institutions and the fact that they a,re  col-
lective institutions entitles them  to greater voting power,  in most 
cases 20  votes  each.  They  generally send between one  and five rep-
resentatives to  the  AGM  to exercise these votes  on their behalf. 
~~ 
Election Procedures 
At  the Annual  General Meeting the President of the Board gives 
his annual report and  the Director presents  the accounts.  After a 
DK25 discussion on  future policy,  elections are held for the  six-man board. 
Under  Danish  law  one  third of the Board of any limited company  employ-
ing more  than 50  people must  be  elected from  the workforce.  So  even 
if Unity Dairy were  not a  co-operative they would still have  to elect 
two  worker members  to  the Board.  The  election of these worker members 
is carried out by secret ballot before  the  AGM  each year.  The  other 
four members  are elected at the meeting itself and may  include other 
worker members  besides  those statutorilly elected. 
What  is particularly unusual  about  this co-operative is that 
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Poul Holst-Pedersen,  who  has  been Chairman of the Board for the last 
four years, is also the  shop steward.  Whenever  Mr~ Holst-Pedersen goes 
into Mr.  Hansen's office the Director has first to find out which hat he 
is wearing.  If he is coming in as  Chairman then the  Director is his 
employee; if he is coming in as  shop steward then the Director is the 
boss.  Mr.  Hansen  said that this could cause problems  but his  tone of 
voice and the fact that Poul Holst-Pedersen has  been returned unopposed 
for four years running suggest that they have  found a  workable solution 
of a  somewhat  unorthodox kind. 
I  aske~ Mr.  Hansen whether people preferred working in the co-oper-
ative because they had better conditions  th~~ workers  in ordinary firms. 
He  replied that that might have  been the case ten years  ago  when  they 
had been able to afford better than average working conditions,  but  the 
fierce competition of recent years had changed all that.  Nevertheless 
he did think that some  of the workers at least had a  different attitude 
from workers in traditional companies.  Though  others  regarded their 
job in the co-operative as  no  different from  any other there was  a  strong 
group of old timers,  some  of whom  had been members  for 25  years,  who 
thought there was  something special about the co-operative.  They  fel1; 
that they belonged to the co-op and  that it belonged to them.  Mr.  Hansen 
thought that another reason why it was  a  good place  to work  was  that they 
were very open and there was  always  plenty of discussion.  Meetings  were 
held four  times  a  year which every worker,  whether member  or not,  could 
attend.  MOre  frequent meetings.were held of particular groups of workers, 
according to the  type of work  they did and almost every aspect of the 
co-operatiYe 1s  investment policy was  discussed in these small groups  as 
well as  the day to day problems  they encountered. 
The  wages  paid at Unity Dairy are fixed by agreement with the 
three main unions  involved,  the officer workers'  union,  the  engineering 
union and the dairy workers'  union,  and are generally the  same  as  those 
paid by the other dairy co-operatives in Copenhagen.  The  most skilled 
workers,  however,  tend to be  ..  paid more  than the union rates because 
the dairy is afraid that it might otherwise lose them.  Because  the 
majority of workers  work at night their rates of pay are higher than 
the average for daytime workers  on that account as well.  The  differ-
ential between the highest and lowest paid workers is no  different from 
what  one  might expect in any other company with the highest paid earning 
perhaps  600  kroner a  week  more  than the  lowest paid. 
The  Unity Dairy regards itself as  a  pioneer in the  labour move-
ment's objective of improving  in~ustrial democracy.  Though  nowadays 
the move  towards  giving workers  greater influence on  the policies that 
affect their working environment is by no  means  confined to  the co-op-
eratiYe movement  in Denmark,  the Unity Dairy prides itself on the fact 
that it has  been in the forefront of industrial democracy since the  1930s, 
long before  the vogue  of the 1960s  began to change  the face  of Danish 
industry. Case  stu~y no.  2:  Printing co-operative - Eks  Skolen 
Eks  Skolen is much  more  like a  conventional workers'  co-oper-
ative than most  of DKF's  member  bodies because it is owned  and con-
trolled by the people who  work  in it.  When  I  visited Eks  Skolen in 
Copenhagen in April 1981  there were  13  employees all of whom  except 
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for one  apprentice,  were  members  of the co-operative.  It was  started 
in the early 1970s  after a  group of artists had got together to produce. 
posters.  Although the artists did not  themselves  form  a  co-operative 
they introduced the  printers, who  did,  to many  of their future cust-
omers  in universities,  trade union and political circles,  environment 
groups  and  so on.  Most  of the co-operative's. work is done  for such 
groups. 
Eks  Skolen started  off as  a  partnership because  the original 
members  did not have  enough capital to fill the legal requirements 
for the formation of a  company in Denmark.  (These  are that you must 
have  a  minimum  shareholding of 1  00, 000  kroner for an AS-type  of limited 
company or  30,000 kroner for an .APS-type  of company.)  The  original 
partnership had to wait until it had accumulated 30,000 kroner from 
profits before it could register as  an APS  company.  At  that stage  each 
of the twelve workers was  allocated a  2,500 kroner share  to be  held ind-
ividually even though they did not actually have  to pay for them  out of 
their own  pockets.  Partly because they have  not contributed to share 
capital as individuals the members  of Eks  Skolen have  amended  their rules 
so  that no  interest is payable on shares. 
Raising capital has  always  been a  problem for the co-operative and 
the fact that there are no  outside shareholders  does  not necessarily 
reflect  ~t ideological reluctance to share control with outsiders, 
although they certainly seem  to va.lue  their independence.  But  they did 
recently seek a  loan from  the Co-operative Investment Fund  (AKF)  which 
would have meant  sharing the control with them.  In the event they were 
turned down  and had instead to negotiate a  bank overdraft.  This  entailed 
not only changing banks but also each member  of the co-operative giving 
a  personal  guarantee.  To  start with this guarantee was  10,000 kroner 
each and it has  since risen to 25,000 kr.  Only one  of the members  of the 
co-operative has  baulked at giving this personal guarantee for family 
reasons  and the others had agreed that he  should be  exempt. 
Decision-making at Eks  Skolen is very much  a collective affair. 
Although there is a  five-member board,  as there has  to be by law, it 
is perhaps a  measure of how  unimportant it is in the way  the co-operative 
works  that Werne  Skovborg,  the Marketing Manager  who  showed  me  around 
the co-operative,  was  not sure who  the chairman was,  but thought that 
it was  the friendly--looking young man  I  had earlier seen working at a 
word  processor.  Instead of policy decisions being made  by the board 
there are weekly meetings of all the members,  held on Mondays  at 4.00. 
These  general meetings are almost invariably attended by all members 
o:f  the workforce  even though they nearly always  go  on for several hours 
after the official working day stops at 4-30. 
At  these meetings  they plan production for the  coming week  and 
discuss  the past week's work.  I:f  there have  been any complaints from 
customers or any technical faults they discuss  exactly what  went wrong, 
whose  responsibility it was  and how  they can avoid anything similar DK28 
happening in the future.  A report is then given by a  member  of each 
of the different departments;  the camera room,  the plate department, 
the print shop,  the typesetting department and the administration 
department.  The  jobs of preparing and presenting these reports,  of 
chairing the  meetings  and taking minutes are given  to different people 
each  week  so  that  each takes his or  her turn at everything. 
Joq  rotation as  such is more  difficult because they are nearly 
all highly skilled in their respective  jobs,  but the three people who 
work in the  typesetting department  take on  responsibility for the 
entirety of each  bit  of work  they do,  doing both  the typesetting 
(on micro-processors which  the  co-operative have recently leased) 
and the pasting-up.  Werne  Skovborg thought that  this practice might 
be  frowned  upon by  the unions  if they were  a  big company but it 
certainly made  for more  satisfying  work for the people  concerned. 
Once  a  month  the members  of the co-operative have  a  session on 
the accounts which are prepared for  them  on a  computer by an outside 
firm.  Wages  are discussed about every six months  and the general rule 
has  been that they are raised in accordance with the  cost-of~living 
index.  But  they had been through a  particularly tough half-year in 
the six months  before my  visit and had decided not to give  themselves 
a  pay rise at all.  Because  they had been paying slightly more  than 
the going union rate before this they hadn't actually dropped below it 
but  they nevertheless  found it a  difficult decision to make.  They 
regarded themselves  as lucky that they had not had to make  the even 
more  difficult decision of who  to make  redundant.  It had very nearly 
come  to that on one  occanion two  years previously when  they had been 
through a  bad patch,  but as luck would have it, two  of the workers had 
decided to leave for reasons of their own.  If they had not done  so it 
seems  likely that the group meeting would have  decided to make  redund-
ancies rather than take a  general cut in wages.  Werne  considered that 
agreeing not to take  a  rise was  about as far as  anyone  should be  expected 
to go.  But when it came  to getting rid of people who  were inefficient 
the co-operative had had no  qualms.  Their previous book-keeper was 
fired for just that reasor.;  a  decision reached by all the members  in a 
general meeting. 
One  problem which has not so far arisen is what  to do  with profits; 
they have not made  any since  the co-operative was  formed~ mainly because 
of lack of own  capital and the consequent difficulties of raising loan 
capital.  If they did in the future the first step would almost certainly 
be  to raise their wages.  After that they might discuss investment in new 
machinery and perhaps  getting a  summer  house for the workers. 
If the co-operative ever went  into liquidation the  share capital 
would probably be  paid at its face value to its notional owners  even 
though they had not actually contributed individually.  If there were 
:any surplus after that they would probably decide to give it for some 
social  p~pose to  do  with artists or perhaps  to the university. 
Peter Mortensen of DKF  says that they are hoping for  a  change in the 
rules  so that any such surplus would automatically go  to the Co-oper-
ative Finance Fund. Eks  Skolen has  been a  member  of DKF  for the past couple of years 
and  I  asked what  the advantages of membership had been.  In the first 
place  DKF  had advised the founder members  on how  to change  from  a 
partnership to a  company  and also on the sort of rules they should 
adopt as a  co-operative,  especially as  they wanted to ensure that 
only workers  could be  members.  After that,  when  they had been going 
for a  while  DKF  had sent along a  consultant who  went  through their 
accounting and other procedures  and made  suggestions about changes 
they might make.  They have also received quite a  bit of extra work 
through DKF  although this hasn't come  about in any particularly 
systematic fashion.  Rather,  when  people like Peter MOrtensen are out 
advising other co-operatives they might hear of some  printing job that 
needs  to be  done  and tell them  about the printing co-op. 
Eks  Skolen's chances of expansion seem  somewhat remote given 
the lack of capital for investment in new  machinery.  If they did 
persuade the Co-operative Finance Fund  to put up such capital they 
would no  longer be  able to operate as  they do  at present.  Two  radical 
changes would have  to be made: 
- their present rules  do  not allow £or the 
payment of interest on share capital  and 
the Fund will not invest in any co-o11erative 
which  does  not pay at least 8%; 
- more  fundamentally they would have  to give 
at least one  place on  the Board to the Fund 
and policy decisions would  then have  to be 
made  by the Board instead of at the weekly 
meetings of all the merrbers. 
DK29 Case  study no.  3:  Alternative way  of life in Svendborg 
I  had wanted  to see for myself what  was  going on in Denmark  by way 
of  'alternative'  co-operative enterprise and a  friend suggested that I 
go  to Svendborg on  the island of Fyn to see Per Llvetand.  I  arrived 
there knowing nothing about Mr.  L~vetand except that Peter MOrtensen of 
DKF  had  told me  the  day before that he  was  one  of the academics  and 
intellectuals who  had in the sixties coilectively adopted the n~e 
Lovetand,  which is the Danish word  for dandelion!  I  only later. dis-
covered that he is a  well-known author of,  amongst others,  a  book  on 
Christiana. 
It was  a  warm,  sunny morning when  I  made  my way  across  the rail-
way  track to Per Livetand's house.  From  the outside it looked like a 
traditional worker's  cottage,  single-storey and made  of stone.  I  rang 
the bell several times  to no  avail and  then realised that the note pinned 
to  the door,  of which  I  couldn't understand a  single word,  was  probably 
telling me  to try somewhere  else.  A line of well cared-for bicycles, 
a  dog and  some  children finall7 pointed me  to  the right door round at the 
side.  I  was  greeted by Per L¢vetand and a  fellow-member  of the collective 
called Steen who  had his leg in plaster.  Per himself is a  gentle,  rather 
dreamy-looking man.  He  was  wrapped in an orange blanket· and· it was 
immediately apparent that he  had forgotten I  was  coming.  Moreover,  he 
was  about  to set off on  a  journey and  I  began to fear that my  own  journey 
by train, ferry and bus  from  Copenhagen might have  been in vain.  But 
Per was  much  too polite to leave me  in the lurch and as we  sat down  round 
his pine table he  talked of the collectives springing up all over Denmark, 
of the  growing number  of wholefood shops  and groups,  of the  co~lectives' 
ownnavspaper called Kokoo  and of Christiana.  We  talked,  too,  of the 
economic  recession and of the all too familiar problems facing the 10,000 
young people who  had been through government  employment  schemes  only to 
find at the end of a  year that there were  no  jobs to be  had.  After that 
Per really did have  to go  and so Steen took me  to meet  some  of the other 
members  of the collective. 
What  had looked like an ordinary cottage from  the outside was,  in 
fact,  just one  side of a  quadrangle consisting of a  group of cottages 
with a  communal  garden in between.  Steen,  who  is  an unemployed high-
school teacper,  had bought up three cottages for 375,000 Dkr  (about 
£25,000)  three  years  previously.  He  had had to do  a  lot of work  to 
get  them habitable but it was,  he  said, at least as  cheap as renting 
a  house  would have  been,  so it was  worth it.  After a  while he sold the 
houses  to a  co-operative and along with other members  he  now  rents· an 
individual apartment from  the co-op.  It costs  100  Dkr  to join the co-op 
after which each member  pays  1,100 Dkr  per adult and half that per child 
.in rent.  This includes lighting,  heating,  maintenance,  even newspapers  -
everything except food and entertainment.  When  I  went  there they were 
discussing the possibility of a  jointly owned  car.  All  the children play 
together in the vast garden behind one  of the groups  of cottages which 
forms  the courtyard and they all go  to  the collective's own  school.  No 
one  gets any money  back if they move  away  from  the co-op and  the houses 
can never be  sold for profit.  This  means  that the rent doesn't keep 
rising,  as it would  elsewhere. 
The  sun was  now  quite hot and we  sat in the garden,  joined by 
Klaus Eggert Hausen  w~1 was  an architect in Copenhagen before he moved 
to Svendborg where  he is now  a  part-time but unpaid  teacher at the col-DK31 
lective's school.  Since both Steen and Klaus  were  unemployed but 
seemed  to be enjoying life a  great deal  I  asked them  to tell me  what 
it was  like.  They  both said that it was  one  of the biggest potential 
strengths of people in the alternative movement  that they were prepared 
to look on unemployment  positively.  For most  people being unemployed 
represented a  loss of status which was  difficult to bear.  But  people 
like them  looked on  the state of unemployment  in a  quite different way. 
They called it 'free from  work'  and there was  much  discussion about 
taking pride in unemployment  and showing what  could be  done  by way  of 
collective projects.  Both of them  thought that there were  positive 
benefits to be  gained from working only part-time.  Unemployment  benefit 
is still payable~-·based on the percentage of time per week  for which 
the recipient is unemployed. 
I  asked them  about union membership.  Steen is a  paid-up member 
of the Union for High-School  Teachers  and also belongs  to  an organisar 
tion for unemployed high-school  teachers which represents  a  fairly 
large minority within  the union.  In  most unions in the  U.K.  unemployed 
members  are not allowed to vote on  union issues.  I  asked whether  the 
same  thing happened in Denmark.  Steen said that it  certainly did not and 
that  the unions  would  be  too afraid of people forming special unions 
for the unemployed where  they might  be  tempted to work for less than 
members  of the official unions.  Nevertheless,  some  of the co-operative-
type  enterprises started by the alternative movement  were  definitely 
disapproved of by the  trade unions  because workers were  often underpaid 
or even unpaid and so they were  regarded as unfair competition.  They 
pointed out that unless unemployed  people were  prepared to work for 
nothing to get new  projects going there would never be  any jobs.  The 
government  was  apparently quite interested in the sort of things they 
were  doing but both the trade unions  and the private employers  dis-
approved strongly. 
By  now  I  wanted to hear about the projects  they had got going in 
Svendborg,  especially the complex of a  bookshop,  a  cafe and a  launder-
ette which had been mentioned several  times in the  course of our conver-
sation&  Steen stayed behind because of his broken leg but on  the walk 
up through the  town  to see the complex,  Klaus  told me  how it had come 
about.  A lot of  'alternative' people live in collectives or communes  in 
the Svendborg area.  Most  of them  are relatively small - 10 or 20  people 
sharing a  large old house or farm.  A few were  much  bigger with up  to 
100 people.  They call themselves  the 2nd October Group  (the day in 1972 
on which Denmark  joined the Common  Market)  and have been going since 
2nd October 1973·  I  wasn't entirely sure about the significance of the 
name  but suspected that it was  tongue-in-cheek!  To  start with the 
various collectives belonging to the  group used to pool all their income, 
including unemployment  benefit,  and  then share it out equally.  But 
problems  arose because  they were  geographically split up - with collect-
ives at opposite ends  of the island of FYn  from  one another - and it was 
dif.ficuH; for  them  to  get together as often as they would  have  liked. 
Even greater problems  arose when  some  of the large houses  they lived in 
became  under-occupied.  It got to the stage where  they had to  take in new 
~tenants' regardless of whether they were  the right sort of people.  In 
the end,  "'hen it had been agreed that one  house would have  to be sold 
but not whose  house it should be,  they abandoned  the  system of pooling 
their money  and instead each collective now  contributes a  certain amount 
to a  central fund which is used for projects such as  the shop. DK32 
The  shop project originally got under way  because  a  lot of people 
wanted a  left-wing bookshop in the town.  At  about  the same  time  one  of 
the collectives bought  an old cork factory and wanted to set up  some 
worthwhile project.  Together with a  number  of other groups  they formed 
a  non-profit-making  1self-owner.ship1  company.  The  first board of 
directors consisted of representatives of the left-wing parties,  a 
women's  group and  people working on the project. 
More  and more  activists* joined the group,  while  the political 
parties gradually left so  that within a  year or so all of those involved 
were  activists.  Problems  cropped up over the question of decision-
making by the board on the affairs of the individual groups - the book-
shop,  the cafe and  the launderette.  People working in these groups 
didn't like decisions being taken once  a  month  by such a  large body so  they 
folded up  the board of directors and changed the rules so  that decisions 
were  made  within each working group instead.  That way  the workers  have 
much  more  influence.  I  asked Klaus  how  they had raised the capital for 
converting the factory and buying equipment,  especially for the launder-
ette which must have  been expensive.  He  said that about 30  people had 
taken jobs in factories  and saved half a  million kroner from  their 
earnings  (about £33,000). 
By  this time we  had arrived at the  complex  and  I  could see for 
myself what  they had managed  to  do  with the money.  It was  very impres~ 
sive and obvious  that a  lot of care and hard work had gone  into renovat-
ing the old cork factory.  We  went first into the cafe which was  already 
fairly full as it was  nearly lunchtime.  It was  very clean, bright and 
attractive with pine tables and a  box of lights up on  the wall  to tell 
people when  their washing machines  in the next-door launderette had fin-
ished!  Tt,e  cafe is run by t:b.ree  paid part-timers and a  series of unpaid 
activists who  work in shifts from  10  a.m.  to 10 p.m. 
The  launderette was  quite unlike any I  have  ever seen in England 
and apparently fairly unlike the other launderettes in Svendborg too. 
The  washing machines  and tumble  dryers were  bright red,  there was  plenty 
of space  fo~ folding washing and there was  a  giant blackboard and a  play 
area for chHdren.  While  the washing was  being done  you could wander 
out into the garden,  sit in the cafe or go  into the bookshop.  This was 
up to the same  standard as  the rest - well displayed books,  pamphlets, 
posters and records.  Here,  too,  they have  one  or two  paid part-timers 
with activists to.  help.  Although it costs a  lot to stock the bookshop 
it is running on an even keel. 
The  school was  deserted because it was  the Easter holidays.  There 
were  four rooms  in which  the  25  children and two  teachers  spend their 
working days.  All the furniture  had been made  by the  children as part 
of their first project.  In fact there wasn't a  great deal;  just boxes 
to sit on and a  few  low  tables.  The  children also clean the school and 
cook their own  lunch each day but those are the only things  they~ 
to do.  For the rest they are encouraged to  think up their own  projects 
and learn the  'normal'  disciplines that way,  rather than in any formal 
or systematic fashion.  It sounded quite attractive although I  would 
have had second thoughts  about  sending my own  children there and ob-
viously some  of the parents in the collective had been having second 
*  Activist was  a  word  that was  constantly repeated during my visit to 
Svendborg.  It means  unpaid worker.  The  English equivalent might be 
volunteer except that it clearly does  not have  'alternative'  overtones. thoughts  too because  a  meeting had been called for that evening to 
discuss a  disagreement over teaching methods  and whether they should 
adopt  a  more  formal  system. 
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Apart from  this little 'free'  school which,  like others in 
Denmark,  is  8~/o subsidised by the state (the parents having to find 
the remaining 15%  of the running costs as well as all the capital 
cost of equipment,  etc.  themselves)  Svendborg has  two  Folk High Schools·-
another peculiarly Danish phenomenon  which are also  8~/o state subsidised 
and which cater for adults of all ages  from  16 upwards.  The  two  in 
Svendborg are called the Red  High  School  and the Workers 1  High School. 
Each has  about  50  pupils and five or six teachers.  The  pupils live in 
the schools for anything from  three months  to  two  years  and  can take 
different courses  during this  time.  Sometimes  a  course may  be split 
between academic  and practical work,  for instance a  group of pupils may 
stu~ the Soviet Union or Cuba  for half of the year - these are  the 
examples  they gave  me  - and spend the second half of the year visiting 
the country itself.  One  distinct advantage for pupils in Folk High 
Schools is that they can,  according to Klaus,  still receive unemployment 
benefit. 
Another project the  2nd  October group has not under way  is a 
discotheque.  They started it because there was  nowhere  to listen to 
decent music  i.n  Svendborg,  only a  rather old-fashioned discotheque  'where 
people in their "forties" went 1 !  The  collectives bought an old restau-
rant and  turned it into a  place where  you could listen to rock and beat 
groups.  They  got a  licence which  enables  them  to stay open until 5 a.m. 
(it was  either 1  a.m.,  which was  judged too early,  or 5).  They had to 
borrow a  lot of money  frcm  the bank for this venture  and many  of them 
gave  personal guarantees  and put up their houses  as security.  Althoug.'ll 
they have  to  pay quite a  lot of money  to get good  groups for the disco-
theque the income  from  the  30  Dkr  entrance fee  and  the sale of beer has 
been enough  for them  to invest in such things as air-conditioning and 
still break even.  When  they have  paid back all  the loans they should 
be  able  to employ  more  than the four full-time paid staff they have 
now. 
The  impact of the alternative movement  on Svendborg has not been 
confined to readers of left-wing books  or  listeners  to rock music.  Two 
of its members  have recently been elected to the  town  council.  This was 
regarded as useful in two  ways:  the alternative movement  can get inside 
information about what  the  council are  doing and they can also get 
alternative ideas across  to the council.  Though  Steen,  Klaus  and  the 
others said that  they'd only really got  elected because  there hadn't 
been  any  other  left-wing  candidates it was  also because  they had 
got the  votes  of  a  lot of elderly people who  would  never have 
voted left in a  general election  but who  were  prepared to vote for 
them  on  environmental  issues such as making it safer and easier for 
cyclists to get around the .town. Employment  creation in Vejle 
This  proje.ct in the County of Vejle is the brainchild of a  group 
of unemployed young  people  and of Arne  Thomsen.  He  is Unemployment 
Counsellor for Vejle  County Council.  He  started his working life as  a 
blacksmith but after doing his national service decided to g0  to 
university to study history.  After graduating he became  a  university 
teacher for a  while but then decided to devote himself to the Workers' 
Education Association.  It was  while he was  teaching for the WEA  that 
he  got to know  a  group of youngsters who  wanted to create jobs for 
themselves but had no  real idea how  to raise money  or negotiate with 
the local authority.  Arne  Thomsen  says  that he is a  child of the 
fifties and sixties and was  brought up with the idea that he  could do 
anything he  set his mind  to.  What  he  did in this instance was  to 
apply for and  get the  job of Unemployment  Counsellor which he holds 
today.  From  this inside position he  was  able  to help his young friends 
achieve what  they had set·their#minds to. 
The  three projects which grew  from this initiative come  under the 
collective heading of Project New  Jobs.  It was  launched in May  1978 
with the  twin aims  of finding new  and permanent  jobs  through the efforts 
of the unemployed  themselves  and of giving the young unemployed con-
fidence in their own  abilities  ~~d a  zest for an active life after com-
pletion of the project.  With a  bit of ingenuity and a  lot of hard work 
on the part of Arne  Thomsen,  Project New  Jobs  has  secured grants from 
both central and local government,  from  the Vejle Labour Market Board 
and from  the  EEC  Social Fund.  The  three parts of the project are now 
described. 
1 •  The  Fish Farm 
Under  the guidance of qualified marine biologists up to ten young 
people are  employed on a  fish farm on the banks  of a  fjord in Fredericia. 
The  project uses the cooling water from  a  power station which is about 
8° warmer  than that of the fjord to breed a  variety of fish.  Experiments 
elsewhere had shown  that breeding in warm  water could have  a  very favour-
able impact on fish growth in the early m')nths  of life.  The  main  'prod-
uct'  of the  New  Jobs fish farm is trout bat they are also experimenting 
with turbot,  eels,  oysters and mussels •.  There  seemed to be little doubt 
about the beneficial effect of warmer  water on size;  the  ~ully grown 
trout I  saw  looked more  like salmon.  They  are normally sold when  between 
250  and  300 grammes,  but there is apparently a  good market for  the mtich 
bigger trout which sell at a  higher price per kilo than the  smaller ones. 
The  trout and other fish with which  they are experimenting such as eels 
and halibut are fed on pellets and there is therefore very little risk of 
contamination.  But  the farm is also experimenting with shellfish.  The 
research is concentrating on whether  there is any danger of metal contam-
ination because of the way  they ingest food. 
The  fish farm  group started by making pontoons  and  nets and plant-
ing out fish both in the fjord and  inside the cooling water area.  The 
group fed the fish and measured the water temperature  and  oxygen and 
chlorine content in various places.  Initial trials. suggested measures 
that had to be taken to counteract some  of  the side effects of using 
water from  the power  station such as supersaturation of air,  chlorine, 
and ash.  As  a  result the group built a  number  of ponds  and  tanks in-
shore  5.n  which heated water and cold fjord. water could be mixed  and careful control could be  exercised.  Fish are bred in the pond  during 
the winter months  and put out into the fjord in wire mesh net instal-
lations during the summer. 
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So  far they have  sold only about one  ton  of fish a  year because . 
the project has concentrated on research.  Although research will con-
tinue into which different species of fish might  lend themselves  to this 
sort of farming,  Arne  Thomsen  is confident that there is scope for large-
scale production of fish for the export market.  The  biggest problem would 
be finding the money  for the capital outlay that .would  be  needed but if 
that could be  overcome  there was  no  reason to suppose that the project 
could not combine  expansion with the creation of a  great many new  jobs. 
Research elsewhere in Denmark  suggests that it should be  possible to 
establish between 1,000 to 2,000 new  jobs using the cooling water of 
power  stations for fish breeding. 
2.  The  Drier Grou;e 
This  group works  on collecting and recycling swill from  hospitals, 
nursing homes,  etc.  The  food scraps collected are dried in a  specially-
built machine  in the project's plant house.  The  process  takes about  ten 
hours  during which it changes  from  a  porridge-like consistency to some-
thing resembling dark brown  sugar.  In the first year'the group worked 
on the construction and installation of the drier and on analysing the 
dried food to find a  relevant use.  It was  decided that it might be suit-
able for feeding pigs  and,  because  the authorities insisted that ~  pigs 
used in the experiment should be kept isolated,  the  group rented some  old 
pigsties and cowsheds  and themselves  converted them for use  as  a  pig 
unit.  The  pigs certainly seem  to be  thriving on their new  fare but it is 
unlikely that the scheme  could ever beqome  viable.  The  Danish bacon 
industry is very highly automated to  the extent that one man  can look 
after as  many as  1  0,  000  pigs whereas  in this scheme  there are up  to eight 
people looking af·ter a  few  hundred.  rn  any case if the project were  to 
pose any serious threat to the industry it would  immediately arouse  the 
opposition of the Danish far.mers  and  their unions.  One  hope  is that there 
m~  be  some  future in the idea of producing pet  food~ 
3.  The  Greenhouse  Group 
This  group produces  traditional and new  varieties of houseplants 
and also experiments with methods  of heat and energy-saving.  They 
started. by themselves building the 800-square-metre greenhouse.  They 
installed the pipework for the heating and trolleys for the plant trays. 
T.he  group generally buys  small plants from  local people for around 3 kr 
and sells them  six to  eight weeks  later for about 8  kr.  While  I  was 
there two  of the group were  hard at work  installing an automatic watering 
system so that they could take  time off over the Easter holiday•  One  of 
the project leaders was  herself a  group member  when  theschemefirst 
started. 
Prospects for continuation of the greenhouse project as  a  profit-
InaT:ing  venture are good.  With further capital investment the same  :rwmber 
cJ:  people could run a  greenhouse four to five  times  the size of the present 
one  and  the export market. could easily take  the increased production. How  the project operates 
There  are around ten participants in each of the  three  groups 
with one  or two  leaders  each.  All  the young unemployed people are 
girls which Arne  admitted was  somewhat  unusual although he  said there 
was  nothing unusual  about  Danish women  doing so-called men's work. 
It was  all the more  disappointing that the majority of the group 
leaders were  men.  Most  of the young people are between 19  and 24  and 
quite a  few  of them  are single mothers.  Day  care provision is apparently 
much  less of a  problem in Denmark  than it is in the U.K.  The  target 
group for the project were unskilled and relatively uneducated young 
people.  MOst  of them  were  already union members  when  they joined the pro-
ject which employs  them  for a  year for around £100  a  week.  The  length of 
employment  is somewhat  unusual for Denmark  where  most  similar schemes  are 
only allowed to take people  on for six months. 
Integral to the project are the regular lessons each group under-
takes.  The  basic week  consists of  31  hours'  paid work  and nine hours' 
instruction.  At  the. beginning of the year the primary aim of the teaching 
is to  support the daily work  of the  group  and to impart the various skills 
required,  such as  the use of tools  and measuring techniques.  Biology is 
compulsory for all three  groups  and is geared specifically towards  their 
particular job:  fi~h and pig breeding or horticulture.  Towards  the end 
of the year  the lessons centre around career guidance,  and subjects of 
particular interest to the young people such as unemployment,  sex discrim-
ination in industry,  trade unions,  management  and organisation.  But  they 
also discuss  the impact of the project on the local community  and cross-
fertilisation between that and the group.  Throughout  the year two  lessons 
a  week  are  devoted to planning the  coming week's activities and detailing 
job tasks. 
The  project places great emphasis  on continuing evaluation of what 
the participants get out of the project and uses  these evaluations for 
long-term planning of future projects.  One  important measure of.the 
success of the project has  been the rate of placement of participants in 
jobs and training places at the end of the scheme.  In the first year the 
results were  disappointing but after two  years  the rate of placement fr·om 
Project New  Jobs was  higher than the national average for employment  pro-
jects of all kinqs.  This was  considered to be  mainly because of partic-
ularly effective collaboration between the project and the Job Centres. 
Cost-effectiveness of the project 
In a  recent report on  the economic  aspects of the project Arne 
Thomsen  calculated gross  arid  net costs  taking account of the subsidies 
from  central and local  government  on  the one  hand,  and the savings in 
unemployment  and other benefit, in the  cost of subsidising new  jobs  on 
the private market,  and on increased tax revenue  on  the other.  At  the 
most pessimistic valuation the gross  cost per person employed was  est-
imated at £5,000 but  the net costs were  only £466.  These  figures  assume 
an income  from  sales of around £137,000.  The  potential is probably much 
greater if the fact is taken into account that it has not so far been an 
objective to attain the highest possible volume  of production and that 
the workers  are in fact only working for  31  hours  a  week. DK37 
Future of the project and co-operation 
The  project has  beeri run as  an experiment with three main objects: 
to find alternative manufacturing processes using relatively few  man-
ufacturing units;  to find new  and  permanent placements  through the 
efforts of the unemployed  themselves;  and to give  the young unemployed 
confidence in their own  abilities and a  zest for an active life after-
wards. 
The  first and last objectives  seem  to have  been me.t  with some 
success.  What  remains in question is whether new  and permanent  jobs  can 
be  created.  It is Arne  Thomsen's  hope  that each of the projects will 
continue as  profitable enterprises and 'that they will be  run as co-op-
eratives.  He  admits  that there could be  problems  because the idea of a 
co-operative  would not necessarily appeal to the target group of 
unskilled youngsters  and  even after a  year working on  the project they 
might find it difficult to  adapt  to  the rigou.rs  of self-management. 
But he has  alrea~ proved that it is nonsense  to say that it is only 
possible to  produce  goods  in the private sector or that unskilled, 
unemployed people would  be  incapable of such production.  If  his past 
record is anything  to go  on  there may  be three new  co-operatives in 
Denmark before long. EUROPEAN  CO-OPERATIVES 
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MY 1 •  Introduction 
Agricultural co-operatives are so much  pre-eminent in Greece  as 
to overshadow other types.  This  pre-eminence has not been becoming 
any less.  The  re-introduction of democracy when  the Colonels were 
ousted and,  what  became  possible after that,  the accession to the 
EEC  have  both worked strongly in favour of agricultural co-ops. 
This is not to say that the time for worker co-ops may  not be 
arriving. 
Farm  co~ops have  their roots  deep in Greek history,  owing very 
little in their origins  to the influence of Rochdale or any other 
foreign example.  Informal associations for the common  rearing and 
marketing of sheep,  known  as  TSELINGATA,  have  a  long and  honourable 
history of their own.  They  can be well-documented in Greece for 
more  than six centuries*,  and a  more  formal  co-operative,  both 
industrial and agricultural,  at .Ambelakia in Thessaly was  set up in 
1780  to finance and organise the production and  export of purple 
cotton yarn. 
The  modern  form  of agricultural co-operative originated at 
Almyros  in 1900.  In that case it granted credit to its members  and 
purchased costly farm machinery which  could then be used in common 
by its members.  Its counterpart today would be hiring helicopters 
for spraying the olive trees owned  by its members. 
The  growth after that was  sharp enough  to  justify legislation, 
and for this foreign example  was  heeded:  the Law  of 1915  was  modelled 
on those of Germany  and Austria.  This  Law  accelerated the  ~wth 
still further.  A system was  built up which was  (and is) as highly 
articulated in its organisational structure as it is comprehensive in 
its scope. 
2.  Local  farm.ers'  co-ops 
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The  structure is in its basic outline fairly familiar for the 
EEC.  At  the base of the pyramid are the usual first-degree co-ops 
for local farmers  - some  7,000 co-ops in all.  Nearly three-quarters 
of a  million individual farmers  are members.  Practically all of them 
serve a  variety of needs - very few,  at this local level,  being 
specialised.  They  supply consumer  goods  as well as seeds,  fertilisers 
and foodstuffs.  They operate small food-processing plants such as 
olive-mills and fruit and vegetable-packing stations.  They market 
members'  products.  They  supply credit as  agents of the Agricultural 
Bank  of'  Greece.  They  store. 
Above  them is a  tier of second-degree co-ops,  Regional Unions, 
and another of third-degree ones,  the National Central Unions  and Reg-
ional Central Unions.  The  Regional Unions,  speaking broadly,  perform 
the same  functions  f'or  the local co-ops  as  they do  for their members 
wherever it is an advantage to have  a  larger body covering a  larger 
area which can buy cheaper or in other ways  gain economies if the 
scale of operations is larger.  The  National Unions,  and some  of the 
*'The Greek  Farmers  Co-operative MOvement',  Panhellenic Confederation 
of Unions  of Agricultural Co-operatives,  Athens,  1977  and later 
editions.  · Regional Central Unions  are specialised.  They market a  specific 
product or group of products,  and may  process  them  as well. 
:;.  Paseg:es 
At  the top of the pyramid is P.ASEGES  (The  Panhellenic Confed-
eration of Agricultural Co-operative Organisations).  It is the 
forum within which  and by which decisions about national policy are 
taken.  It is the main representative body of the  co-op movement  and, 
as  such,  deals with government.  It provides all the member-co-ops 
with information and consultancy services.  There is no  division at 
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this top level,  as  there is in many  other countries,  between the roles 
which national bodies must perform - that is, between assisting member-
co-ops  to becomemore effective and pressing the  government  for more 
support while negotiating with the  government  from  a  non-party point 
of view.  Paseges  does  both.  It is both non-political - it cannot 
possibly afford to be fully identified with any one political party 
for fear that the opposition to it will one  day be in power;  and also 
political insofar as it must mobilise what  political support it can to 
bring pressure on  the government in the interests of the movement.  To 
do  and be both can sometimes  give an uncomfortable ride.  The  way  has 
been opened for a  new  propagandist body to appear - the General Confed-
eration of Agricultural Societies.  This  is allied with the left in 
politics and is far more  overtly and one-sidedly political than Paseges. 
If Paseges  asks  the government  for a  price rise for a  particular prod-
uct of,  say,  2~fo,  supported by a  heavily documented  and well-reasoned 
case,  the General  Confederation will jump  in with a  demand  for  3~fo or 
4Q'Jfo,  but without reasoned backing.  Such activityhas not gained it much 
support as yet.  It does  not publish the number  of its members.  It 
does  not seem  to have any member-societies.  But it may  be a  portent. 
4·  ££-operatives in schools 
Before I  leave aside the description of the ongoing structure I 
should move  from  the top back to the bottom and mention one form  of 
co-operation which does  not exist at all in some  cour.tries,  that is, 
co-operatives inside primary schools.  These  engage in economic  act-
ivities designed to illustrate the advantages of co-operation.  The 
children-members  pick aromatic herbs  and then dry and sell them,  or 
they sell the seedlings of trees that they have  grown  or they sell 
notebooks  and other materials to their fellow-pupils.  The  profits 
are used to give help to sick and  handicapped children,  for school 
visits and for publishing their own  newspapers.  Paseges publishes 
a  magazine for them  call Co-operation with suggestions in it about 
what  they might like to do.  The  decisions  they make,  about what  to 
do  with the money  as well as how  to earn it, are  the responsibility 
of a  Council  elected by all the pupils,  and so is the President of 
the school cos-operative.  Each one  is supposed to give a  training 
in democracy which will bear fruit in the adult co-ops.  There are 
some  680  such school  co-ops at present. 
5·  Becent changes 
How  about  the recent changes  referred to at the beginning of 
this note?  One  of the effects of the abolition of tJ.1e  dictatorship 
was  short and sharp.  Under  the Colonels all the elected board members 
at every level were  dismissed;  the government  appointed their own 
instead.  The  'co-ops  1  were  then co-ops  only in name.  But  as soon as democracy in general was  restored,  democracy in the co-ops was  also, 
and elections held within  the~ar in 7,000 primary co-ops  and from 
there on in all the higher tier ones. 
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The  other main  consequence  has  taken much  longer to work itself 
through.  The  decision to enter the Common  Market  put paid to several 
of the monopolies  which the government  had maintained either directly 
or through its agent,  the Agricultural Bank  of Greece.  It used to 
have a monopoly in the supply of fertilisers,  fodder grains and seeds 
even if local co-ops were used as  agents for their final distribution. 
It also had control as far as  the purchase of cereals and  some  other 
products was  concerned. 
By and large these functions  have been taken over by co-operatives. 
The  purchase and distribution of fodder are now  handled by a  co-op 
called Kydep.  8Q%  of the Regional Unions  belong to it.  A new  co-op 
has  also been set up for the distribution of fertilisers. 
Other initiatives have  followed on these,  even though they have 
not expressly followed the decision about the EEC.  A central distrib-
ution agency has been set up to handle groceries and  to deal with 
private as well as  co-op shops,  all in competition with private whole-
salers.  The  plan for this was  drawn up by a  group of experts from  the 
Swedish Co-operative MOvement.  A co-operative agency for international 
transportation has  been established to ship goods  by road,  sea,  train 
and air, and startedoffering its services in 1981.  The  hope is that it 
will help exports by reducing costs,  especially of goods  sold by co-ops. 
A new  agency to hand.Jle  advertising for the whole movement  was  set up 
earlier in 1981.  A co-operative children's theatre has  been started in 
Saloniki.  It will tour agricultural communi ties. 
6.  Changes  in the law 
The  story of recent changes would not be complete,  even in this 
bare outline, without mention of the changes in the law.  Discussions 
between Paseges  and the government started in 1975  and went  through 
ma.:ruphases,  with different drafts being prepared,  considered and  dirJ~ 
carded,  before the new  Law  was  promulgated in 1979·  Much  of the old 
Law  of 1915  was  retained and consolidated in it.  But  there were  also 
some  important changes.  For instance, before 1979 it was  always 
unclear whether co-ops  could handle the processing of this or that 
kind of foodstuff.  Every new  factory or plant was  liable to be the 
subject of dispute with private enterprise.  So  it was  with the super-
markets for ordinary consumers  set up  by the agricultural co-ops. 
There are now  between 200  and 300 of these,  mostly in central and 
northern Greece.  In the past,  before the new  Law,  each proposal for 
yet another supermarket was  oppo~ed by private enterprise and some-
times  taken to the courts.  Since the new  Law  there can  be~  and is, 
opposition to expansion by the  co~ops but there cannot  any longer be 
appeal  to the Law. 
These  supermarkets are not consumer co-ops.  They  do  not have 
consumers  as members  but (directly or indirectly) producers in the 
for.m  of the farmers  who  are the ultimate owners  of co-operative assets. 
:By  contrast,  there are some  consumer co-ops.  An  adviser from  Sweden 
~  ~,  came  to Greece  as long ago  as  1965  and proposed the establishment of 
some  genuine  consumer co-ops.  Five or six have been started in 
.· SaJ.oniki,  four or five in Athens,  again by the agricultural co-ops 
but with consumers  in control.  They  have not  grown in the wa:y  that 
was  hoped.  The  other  supe~arkets have  done  much  better. 
7.  Resistance to co-operative expansion 
The  resistance of private enterprise to co-op  expansion has 
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been continuous.  The  passing of the new  Law  has not by any means 
reduced the opposition.  Complaints by the Federation of Greek  Indus-
tries,  and others - that co-ops  can get loans from  the state for new 
investments,  on better terms  than private companies  can get;  that co-
ops  pay1>3  or 4%  less inte.rest than private enterprise;  that co-op 
advertisements on the TV and the radio were,  for a  time,  charged only 
at  5~~ of the full rate paid by private enterprise;  tha~ loans were 
written off during the Colonels'  regime - have  been as vociferous since 
the new  Law  as before. 
8.  The  Ap;ricul tural Bank 
If extension of the powers  of co-ops has  been one  effect of the 
new  Law  another has been a  reduction in the power of the state's 
Agricultural Bank.  It used to be responsible both for supervision 
and auditing of co-ops.  Some  co-ops resented this and felt that th$f 
were  not being allowed to  take on the responsibilities and risks of 
their own  decisions.  They  could find that their supply of credit was 
cut off.  That will not happen so easily in the future.  For aucli ting, 
a  new  body is being set up independent both of the bank and of Paseges. 
The  job of supervision is left with the state. 
9.  J3hipping lines 
Agricultural co-ops are,  therefore,  progressing steadily and look 
as  though they are going to continue to do  so unless  the forthcoming 
general election brings in a  government with policies unfavourable  to 
co-ops.  There  have been important extensions into wholesale and retail 
distribltion.  But  there has not so far been any sizeable growth of 
producer co-ops apart from  the 400  or so  groups of producers involved 
in cotton production,  unless  the various shipping lines started betw.een 
Greek islands count as producer co-ops.  Their legal form  has been that 
of ordinary commercial  companies.  T.ypically,  they have been initiated 
in order to provide markets  forproducers  of industrial and agricultural 
goods  who  might otherwise have  had none  as  a  result of the withdrawal 
of private shipping lines and the failure of the state to intervene. 
One  of the best known  and most  successful of the new-style co-ops has 
been A:nek.  This  .. was  started by a  churchman,  Bishop Irinaios,  to run a 
regular service between western Crete and the mainland.  The  rule of 
the company is that no  famly in Crete should own  more  than 2%  of the 
equity.  Anek  was  begun in 1972  and has  been the spur for others: 
Minos  Line to Heraklion (1974) 
Ionian Line - Patras to Brindisi (1979) 
Na:x:os  Line  (1979) 
Rhodes  Line  (1979) 
Samos-Jkaria Line (1979) 
Th~oe ~o-ops' have  shown  that you  do  not need to be a  Niarchos  to run 
a  successful shipping company. G5 
10.  The  prospects for worker co-ops 
Shipping apart,  and  fishing and forestry co-ops also left on 
one  side since they belong with agricultural co-ops,  very little pro-
gress so far has  been made.  As in ?ther countries doctors have estab-
lished clinics which they own  and operate in common,  but employing 
many  others as well - sometimes  over 200  nurses  and other auxiliary 
staff.  These  can hardly be called 'co-ops'.  A taxi-drivers'  co-op 
has  been started here,  a  waiters'  co-op there.  But  so far worker 
co-ops have not grown  as they have in many  other countries.  The  EEC 
may  again provide the impetus.  If any interest is shown  from  Brussels 
the agricultural co-ops  could be the promoters of a  different kind of 
co-op.  If the decision is taken· to move  in this direction a  recent 
change in the government's stance could prove usefUl.  The  MOnetary 
Committee  of the government  decided on' 17th June 1981- and its dec-
isions have  almost the force of law - that employees  should have  the 
right (which they had not had before)  to buy shares in a  bankrupt 
company  to prevent it  from.going out of existence.  When  they do  they 
will be able to  get loans  from  banks  on favourable  terms.  But  the 
result may  be.  to establish some  de  facto  co-ops.  It is all the more 
likely to happen since Paseges has  already offered its experience rotd 
willingnessto.support the General  Confederation of Greek Workers  in 
setting up worker co-ops in the same  way it did consumer  co-ops.  One 
hopes it will meet with more  success. EUROPEAN  WORKERS 1  CO-OPERATIVES 
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September 1991 The  land of Ireland,  lush and  green in parts,  boggy  and  almost 
unworkable in others,  has  always  provided the livelihood of many  of 
the people,  and it still generates  a  significant proportion of the 
national  income.  It is thus  no  surprise that the co-operative move-
ment  in Ireland is based fairly and  squarely on  the land. 
Three  types  of co-operative,  old and new,  predominate in the 
rural areas.  The  first,  with roots reaching back to  the late 19th 
century,  are agricultural co-operatives which market farm output such 
as livestock,  grain and  dairy produce  and sell farm input such  a.s 
seeds,  fertilisers,  feedstuffs  and agricultural machinery.  Their 
members  are farmers,  individual entrepreneurs working their own  or 
rented land.  There  are  200  agricultural co-operatives,  some  with 
turnovers of several hundred million pounds  and a  substantial share 
of agribusiness with  900;6  of the dairy products market  and  a  600;6  share 
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of livestock marketing.  Jointly they fulfil  the  same  functions  as 
state-organized bodies  such as  the Egg Marketing Board  and Milk Marketing 
Board in the United Kingdom,  while at the same  time  acting as bulk-buy 
and service organizations for their members.  They  alsc  aim  to improve 
farming. 
Very different are  the multi-purpose community  co-operatives which 
have grown up in mainly remote,  declining areas  since  the 1960s.  Their 
objectives are both economic  and social.  Attempting to :ceverse  the decline 
'  in rural e_conomies,  ·especially in the  Gaelic..;speaking or  1 Gael tacht  1 
West  of Ireland,  they have  made  initiatives in land drainage,  water and 
electricity schemes  and farm improvement  on  the one  hand while on the 
other seeking to halt migration to industrial areas  and  to revive the 
Irish language  and local communi ties and customs.  By  1981  their number 
had grown  to  25. 
The  third important group  are  the credit unions,  which represent a 
new  phase  in the history of small-scale bank:i;ng  in rural areas.  Credit 
societies, first established in the 1890s  in the early da~s of the co-
operative movement,  and often known  as village banks,  had declined into 
insignificance by the 1940s;  but the savings movement  has  since  reviv~d 
and credit unions,  run on the same  lines as  i;ne  old village banks,  nm-1 
have  a  flourishing membership. The  agricultural  and  community  co-operatives  and the credit unions 
account for the vast majority of co-operative enterprises in Ireland. 
The  :remainder are concentrated in fishing,  home  produce  and crafts. 
Only a  handful of workers'  co-operatives exist (they are treated separately 
in the fifth section of this report)  and Ireland is unique  among  European 
countries· in having virtually no  high-street co-operatives.  Among  the 
reasons for this exceptional lack of development is the fact that when· 
consumer co-operatives sprang up  elsewhere in Europe  during the  indus-
trial revolution 'the vast majority of the Irish population was  too poor 
to  trade wich any store which had as  one  of its firmest principles,  as 
the early co-operatives  did;  that no  credit was  to be  allowed.  For 
co-operation to serve  a  useful  pu~:pose in the 19th century,  it had to 
address itself to  the needs  of  the peasant farmer. 
Because of the  imbalance in favour  of agriculture in the Irish 
co-operative movement,  I  have  devoted considerably more  attention to  the 
history and  development of the  ag£icultural societies in the sections 
that follOvT  than would be  appropriate for other countries with a  more 
diversified co-operative sector. 
*  *  * 
2.  The  Place of Co-operatives .in the Irish Economl 
2.1.  Distribution of co-o,)eratives 
The  distribution of co-operatives by type,  membership,  workforce 
and turnover  (1979  figures)  is shown  in the table on the following page: Most  of these figures  cover societies which  are members  of the 
Irish Co-operative Organization Society (ICOS),  the Inain umbrella organ-
ization for agricultural co-operatives.  The  workers'  co-operatives 
operate  independently of ICOS,  mainly in association with the National 
Co-operative Council  (founded in 1954)  and  the Co-operative Development 
Society (founded in 1955)  but the figures  come  from  the societies them-
selves or from  the Registry of Friendly Societies.  Credit Unions  are 
also  independent of ICOS,  and the figures  quoted come  from  the Irish 
Credit Union League. 
2.2.  Analysis  of strengths  and weaknesses 
From  the figures  some  salient conclusions can be drawn.  With just 
over 600,000 members,  nearly 21,000  employees  and a  turnover  (including 
credit ur1ion  savings)  approaching £2,500 million,  co-operatives are 
established as  a  significant force in a  country with a  population of 
only just over three million and a  labour force of barely more  than a 
million. 
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No  less striking is the extent of their concentration in agriculture. 
Co-operatives  dominate  agricultural marketing,  in particular the marketing 
of dairy produce,  and control a  signific.ant slice of the farm supply and 
service industry in Ireland.  Within the co-operative movement,  agricul-
tural societies are both financially and as  employers of labour without 
peer.  They  account for  20  per cent of all societies,  32  per cent of 
members,  94  per cent of employees  and 96  11er  cent of turnover (including 
savings).  If the credit unions  are excluded,  and we  take only producer and 
service co-operatives,  the predominance of the agricultural societies is 
even more  obvious:  on this basis they account for  67  per cent of the total 
number  of co-operatives,  have  81  per cent of the members,  97  per cent of 
the employees  and  generate 99  per cent of turnover. 
The  credit unions,  while numerous  and well subscribed (they account 
for 70  per cent of all societies and have  62  per cent of the members),  are 
of trifling importance when it comes  to employment  and financial clout. 
They  have  only 3 per cent of employees  and turnover. 
Going by the figures  alone,  l'rorker  and  community  co-operatives are 
insigni!icant on  every count.  Together  they·  make  up  only 3·5  per cent of 
the total number  of co-operatives,  possess 1.5 per cent of the membership, 
·,  per cent of the  employees  and generate  a  mere  0.2 per cent of turnover. 2.3.  Trends  in co-operative development 
Looked  at over  time,  however,  the performance of the different 
societies and  the nature of their successes  and failures  can more 
readily be  seen.  The  number  of agricultural co-operatives has been 
declining sharply - from  366  in 1969,  to  243  in 1976  and less than 
200  in 1981.  The  main reason for this decline has been the  amalgama-
tion and rationalization of the co-operative dairies.  During the same 
period their membership  has gone  up  from  just below 150,000 to nearly 
225,000  and  their annual  turnover from  just over £200  million to the 
1979  figure of nearly £2,300 million.  Discounting inflation,  this is 
a  tP-reefold increase in real terms,  a  performance  the societies are 
justifiably proud of.  The  words  that best sum  up  their recent develop-
ment  are consolidation and  commercial  success,  features of middle  age, 
one  might feel,  and no  real match for their youthful  expansionism in 
the first two  decades  of the century,  when  they more  than trebled 
their numbers,  more  than quadrupled their membership  and  increased 
their turnover by more  than seven times. 
The  community  co-operatives,  on  the other hand,  are clearly 
still in the first phase of youthful  growth.  TheY  have  increased in 
number  from  one  in the mid-1960s  to 15  in 1975  and  25  in 1981;  their 
membership  has  gone  up  from  a  few  hundred to more  than 8,000 and their 
turnover from virtually nothing to.  £3 million plus.  When  co-operatives 
are at such an early stage of development,  it is tempting to  avoid com-
paring them  with the well  established and to  judge  them  ei~~erby their 
rapid growth rate or by non-economic  criteria.  I  shall. consider these 
questions  and make  a  full appra:i,sal  of the value of community  co-
operatives in Sections 4.2.  and  4.7.  The  other fast growing co-oper-
atives are the credit unions,  which have multiplied from  one  in 1957 
to  453  in 1975  and  542  in 1981. 
I  shall devote considerable space to the isolated examples  of 
worker co-operatives which,  like the community co-operatives,  represent 
a  new  development  in the Irish co-operative movement. 
*  *  * 
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3.1.  The  Ralahine  experiment 
Tho  origins of agricultural co-operation in Ireland are steeped 
in the  same  idealism that prompted Robert  Owen  in the early 1820s  to 
set up  co-operative communities  in England and Scotland and at New 
Harmony,  Indiana,  in an unsuccessful attempt to realize his vision o:f 
a  'new moral  world  1 •  Owen  visited Ireland in 1823,  receiving a  ,.,.arm 
welcome  from idealistic members  of the  landowning class.  After hearing 
Owen  lectu:ce,  one  wealthy landowner,  John Scott Vandaleur,  was  inspired 
to set up  an Irish version of an Owenite  community.  He  proposed that 
a  600-acre estate which he himself had run as  a  progressive farm at 
Ralahine near Bunratty,  County Clare,  should become  a  village of co-
operation and  communal  living.  In 1831,  when  famine  and agrarian 
outrage was  rife in much  of Ireland,  surly peasants became  willing 
workers  in Vandaleur 1s  Ralahine Agricultural and Manufacturing Co-
operative Association.  Beginning with 52  elected members,  the  associer· 
tion rented the land from  Vandaleur,  paying in barrels of wheat  and 
barley,  and  obtained livestock and  the use of farm implements  and 
effects jn return for an annual  interest payment  on their capital 
value nn-l;il  such  time  as it could afford to buy them.  The  members 
received wages  in the  form of labour notes which they could trade at 
the association's own  store or exchange for coin for outside spending. 
Every evening a  committee met  to allocate the next day's work. 
In his history of the Irish co-operative movement*,  Patrick Bolger, 
an expert on co-operative development,  gives  a  vivid account of this 
early experiment. 
At  first the members  found  communal  living (in single-sex dorm-
itories except for the married couples  who  had cottages) difficult to 
get used to,  but the  experiment proved a  success.  When  all around  them 
there was  famine  and murder,  the people of Ralahine were  thriving as 
never before.  Harvests  were  plentiful under the co-operative regime 
and no  one  went hungry. 
Patrick Bolger,  The  Irish  co-oE~rative movement;  its history and 
development,  Institute of Public Administration,  Dublin,  1977. 
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Owenite  communities  which had all collapsed after short lives.  It 
lasted only two  years.  Vandaleur gambled at his club,  lost all his 
possessions and  sailed for America.  The  tenants of the  commune  were 
dispossessed by Vandaleur's family and  Craig,  a  former editor of the 
Lancashire Co-operator who  had given up  everything to further the 
Ralahine  experiment,  almost went broikrupt himself honouring the labour 
notes with which  the co-operators had been paid. 
Bolger ends  his  account with.a quotation from  the preface to 
Craig's own  history of the  commune. 
'When  John Scott Vandaleur gambled  at his club he 
gambled  away  not merely his own  property but what 
may  well have  been a  happier destiny for his country. 
It is inconceivable that if the community  founded at 
Ralahine had  developed as it began,  it would  not have 
affected the rest of Ireland.  It might have  saved us 
many  years of tragic history and  instead of beginning 
our agricultural co-operation long after Denmark, 
Germany  and France,  we  might have been the pioneer 
nation.'* 
In the event nothing so  thoroughgoing as  the Ralahine experiment 
was  ever attempted again in Ireland,  for the agricultural co-operatives, 
when  they appeared,  were  associations of landowners or tenants,  not 
groups holding and working land in.common,  and neither the workers'  nor 
the community  co-operatives have  experimented in communal  living. 
3· 2.  The  age  of the famine 
After the collapse of the Ralahine  experiment half a  century 
passed before co-operation in any form was  revived.  It was  during 
the period of the  Great Famine  of 1845-51.  Until then,  rural Ireland 
had been very largely in the hands  of absentee landlords.  The  popula-
tion,  at eight million,  had grown  dangerously large for a  small island 
so  dependent on agriculture and in particular on the potato crop.  Sub-
lettings were  so numerous  it was  by no  means  uncommon  for a  peasant 
farmer to have  no  idea who  owned  the  tiny piece of land he farmed. 
*  Patrie~ Bolger,  op.  cit. 
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caused another million to emigrate.  Those  who  remained were left to 
the mercies  of the  1gornbeen  man',  whom  Bolger describes  as  the  'Irish 
species of dishonest  shopkeeper,  produce-buyer,  moneylender  and usurer'. 
These  men  acquired enormous  power  in the Irish countryside and helped 
to  ensure  that the peasant farmer remained tied to inefficient farming 
and marketing methods  by his debts.  .Arnold  Bonner  summed  up  his 
plight thus:  'Whilst he remained an individualist,  freedom  and  com-
petence were  beyond his reach.'* 
3·3·  The  f~rst co-operative creamery and the Irish Agricultural 
Organization  Societ~ 
The  acknowledged father of co-operation in Ireland was  Horace 
Curzon Plunkett,  the  son of an English aristocrat.  He  went  from  Eton 
to Oxford  and  then to the United States of America in 1879  where he is 
said to have  acquitted himself bravely in the face of an Indian uprising 
and made  a  great deal of money  in ranching and property transactions. 
He  had become  interested in co-operation as  a  young man  and had helped 
to set up  a  co~operative shop at  Duns~~y,  Co.  Meath,  where his family 
had estates;  he  even served behind the counter for a  while.  But  thoue~ 
he  sought  the help of the British Co-operative Union  to  teach Irish con-
sumers  and workers  the principles of co-operation he realized that the 
consumer  co-operative as it had  developed in Britain was  not  the  answer 
to  the problems  the Irish peasant farmers  faced in competition with 
the world markets  newly opened by railways  and steamships. 
Ireland had been exporting butter to Britain and in particular 
to  the Co-operative Wholesale Society for more  than a  generation.  But 
its quality was  poor.  'A  firkin of Irish butter arriving on  the 
British market would frequently contain layers of butter of varying 
ages,  flavours,  colours  and  textures,  not to mention aromass'**  More-
over,  competition was  fierce.  It came  chiefly from  Denmark  where  new 
methods  of butter making had been introduced - notably the separator 
and the pmver-driven butter churn - and where,  by 1890,  there were  some 
600  highly organized and efficient co-operative creameries.  The  Swedes 
and French were  not far behind in technical and  co-operative development • 
*  .Arnold  Bon.'l'ler,  British co-o;eeration,  Co-operative Union,  1961 
·**Bolger,  op.  cit. 
..I!J.J..  u Although  the netv  techniques  gradually became  aceepted in Ireland, 
Horace  Plunkett saw  that action would  have  to be  taken if they were 
not to be  entirely taken over by middle men.  It was  not  an  easy task. 
'Opposition from  business interests and  from  various movements  in the 
tangled web  of Irish political and social life were  encountered,  but 
the most  serious difficulties were  the ignorance,  timidity,  hapless-
ness  and mutual  suspicions of the farmers  themselves.'* 
After forty or noremeetings·had been held around the country 
in attempts  to publicize co-operation,  the first co-operative creamery 
was  finally established at Drumcollogher in West  Limerick in 1889  and 
thirty more  followed in the next five years.  That was  a  crucial first 
step,  but Pltuikett realized that an advisory and propagandist body 
would be necessary if anything worthwhile was  to be  achieved.  The 
real turning point for agricultural co-operation in Ireland came  in 
1893  with the formation of the Irish Agricultural Organization Society 
(IAOS),  the forerunner of ICOS.  Its main objectives were  to  improve 
the condition of the agricultural population of Ireland by teaching 
the methods  and principles of co-operation as applicable to farming 
and the allied industries;  to  promote  in1ustrial organization for any 
purpose which might  appear beneficial;  and generally to counsel  and 
advise those in agricultural pUrsuits.  In the  same  year the Irish 
Co-operative Agency  was  formed by sixteen dairy societies for the 
joint marketing of creamery products.  Each of the societies sub-
scribed capital and agreed to sell all its butter through the agency. 
Despite initial setbacks it rapidly developed into one  of the largest 
exporters of butter in the com1try. 
3·4·  Government  support for collective effort 
In 1894  Plunkett became  president of the IAOS.  Determined to 
capitalize on the experience of agricultural co-operatives in other 
parts of Europe,  Plunkett sent investigators at his  own  expense  to 
re:J;>ort  on what was  being done  abroad.  The  resulting study was  coupled 
*  Bonner,  op.  cit. p.411 
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minated in a  proposal  to  the government which argued that state aid 
was  needed to bring forth and  supplement individual  and collective 
effort.  As  a  means  to this  end,  Pl~~ett called for  a  consultative 
Council  on Agriculture,  the  development of co-operative banking and 
a  new  Department of Agriculture  and  Industries. 
As  a  result of the  IAOS  call for  the  development of co-operative 
banking,  agricultural credit societies were  introduced into Ireland, 
the first being established in County  Cork in 1894·  A major obstacle 
to  the spread of agricultural co-operatives had been the continuing 
dependence  of farmers  on  the money-lending shopkeeper,  the gombeen  man. 
Caught by their indebtedness,  they were  forced to sell their produce 
at low prices to  the gombeen  man  and buy inferior goods  from 2im  ~t 
exorbitant prices.  The  solution was  a  credit society run on the lines 
of the German  credit banks  started in Westphalia by Frederich W. 
Raiffeisen in 1849·  The  Raiffeisen system was  based on five principles: 
1.  The  member's  liability is unlimited.  All members  are 
jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the 
society. 
2.  There is rio  share capital. 
3·  Membership  and activities are limited to  a  local area,  where 
each member  will be personally known. 
4.  No  dividends  are paid.  Any  surplus is used to form 
a  reserve fund. 
5.  The  management  is not paid. 
Helped by the new  credit societies,  Irish farmers  were  freed from 
debt  and  enabled to  join the  developing agricultural co-operatives. 
In July 1899,  Plunkett's efforts  to  organize state aid cul-
minated in an Act  establishing a  Department of Agriculture  and  other Industries and Technical  Instruction in Ireland.  By  November  of that 
year Plunkett had been appointed Vice President of the new  department. 
One  of his functions  was  1to stimulate and strengthen the self-reliance 
of the people'  and  part of the new  machinery to l1elp  him fulfil this 
was  the Council of Agriculture,  the majority of whose  members  were 
elected by  the county councils. 
Meanwhile  the  IAOS  was  in the midst of its most  rapid growth. 
By  the turn of the century it represented 374  co-operative societies 
with a  membership  of 36,683,  most  of them  creameries or store co-op-
eratives.  By  1904  the number  of societies had risen to 900,  and by 
1920  to 1,114- a  peak.  The  trade  turnover of co-operatives that year 
reached a  previously unparalleled £14-5 million.  In other respects, 
however,  the ·v-igour  of the movement  was  tailing off. 
3.5.  Poor member  participation in agricultural societies 
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Plunkett died in March  1932  leaving behind a  co-operative movement 
no  longer much  in the  eye  or the mind  of the public.  A number  of import-
ant weaknesses  had by then been exposed.  When  a  public  commission, 
the Drew  Commission,  reported on  the movement  in 1924,  it criticized 
the  'gross undercapitalization and  min~nal share capital, which left 
the majority of its members  with no  real stake in the business;  lack 
of co-operative loyalty and of "binding :r.-ul.es"  to effect it; lax bus-
iness methods,  account keeping and stocktaking;  and  lack of education 
and training'.*  Two  years later, Henry  Kenna~, a  hard-headed economist 
and  technologist,  was  appointed secretary of IAOS  and launched into an 
expansion of co-operative creameries in new  parts of the country,  fin-
anced by loans  from  the newly set up  Agricultural Credit Corporation. 
But Kennedy's  almost  exclusive concentration on  the  development  of 
creameries was  a  source of worry to many  who  wanted  to  see a  much 
broader-based co-operative movement. 
Between  1931  and 1961  the combined  turnover of the powerful 
creamery co-operatives increased almost ten-fold from  £4.68  million 
to £41.66 million,  but it was  not matched by a  substantial increase 
in .;;hare  capital.  In the  same  period share capital did not  even 
double,  rising from £340,240  to no  more  than £547,736.  Member  part-
*  Bolger,  op.  cit. icipa'Liun in these years was  poor,  pa:r:tly perhaps  tlu·ough lack of a:n:y 
real education and partly because it suited the societies'  officers 
for this  to be  so.  In 1904  the  IAOS  had changed its rules so  that it 
was  democratically controlled by its member  societies.  But  the lack 
of interest at grass root level was  passed on,  and  support from ind-
ividual societies for the  IAOS  was  consistently poor.  The  hope had 
been that the work  of the  IAOS  would be paid for by the subscriptions 
of its members,  but it has rarely been indpendent of government subsidy. 
Bolger recalls that in 1916  R.  A.  Anderson,  later president of the  IAOS, 
had made  an impassioned plea for societies to  subscrib~  the halfpenny 
per pound turnover that would give the society the strength and indep-
endence it required;  Bolger concluded that in 1977  'the halfpenny is 
still being sought  ~~d is still not forthcoming.  It remains  the most 
fundamental  defect of the whole  movement  that inadequate funds  mean  that 
the  IAOS  provides  a  poor service,  which in turn makes  it exceedingly 
difficult to collect an adequate contribution from  the societies.'* 
That view is not accepted by ICOS  whose  Director General  claims that 
the co-operatives'  record has  steadily improved and that from  1978 
over  800fo  of the required affiliation fees  have been fully paid. 
Thro'lghout  the 1950s  Henry Kennedy,  Secretary of the_IAOS,  con-
tinued his policy of building up  the strongest societies and  the 
result was  a  very strong creamery movement  but renewed criticism from 
some  quarters for his neglect of smaller societies and the areas of 
greatest need.  There was  more  criticism too of IAOS 1s  failure to 
promote co-operative education and development. 
That criticism was  endorsed by a  report commissioned by the 
Department of Agriculture in 1963  and carried out by an American expert 
on agricultural co-operatives,  J.  G.  Knapp.  He  concluded with a  number 
of recommendations  for the strenghtening of IAOS  and  the reorganization 
of the dairy industry but more  fundamentally he  argued that  'the IAOS 
must become  a  leader in vigorous  new  co-operative activity and not a 
custodian of old-fashioned principles and practices.  It must recapture 
the spirit of the IAOS  in its very early days  when  the  IAOS  was  a 
driving force with principles which enlisted the interest of the best 
minds  in Ireland'. 
*  Bolger,  op.  cit.  p.130 
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The  IAOS,  renamed in 1979  the Irish Co-operative Organization 
Society,  did take heed  of Knapp's  call to strengthen and reorganize 
itself.  Speaking at the National Co-operative Conference in 1978, 
the Director General of the  IAOS  said:  ':Because  of the  size,  strength 
and structures it has  developed within the last decade,  the co-oper-
ative movement  alone can determine the shape and  form of Irish agri-
business and  the food industry- it has  never had so much  commercial 
influence or strength.'  The  older established dairy co-operatives 
have  amalgamated into large regional groupings  and though this has 
undoubtedly helped to·raise the annual  turnover of the agricultural 
co-operative sector to impressive heights, it has been at the cost 
of a  further decline in member  participation,  such as has accompanied 
t~e centralization and  rationalization of consumer  co-operatives in 
many  other countrles.  Speaking at the same  National Co-operative Con-
ference in 1978,  the Chairman of An  :Sord  :Sainne,  the biggest dairy 
society in Ireland,  identified eight main weaknesses in the relations 
between agricultural co-operatives  and  their members: 
a  lack of understanding of the co-operative movement, 
its aims  and  objects and its role in economic  and 
social improvement; 
communications  are irtadequate and often unsuitable; 
the co-operatives are not always  operating (or seen 
to operate)  to  a  satisfactory degree for the primary 
purpose of improving members'  incomes; 
there is not a  family-type attitude of co-operation 
between the different sections within a  co-operative; 
all members  are not  always  treated equally; 
loyalty is not as high or as  apparent as it should be; 
co-operatives tend: to isolate themselves,  and are not 
co-operating with  each other as well as  they could; 
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critj.cism  a..Yld  not  enough  defence from  the membern 
and praise for  the many  good  things that co-·opcr-
atives are  doing.·>!-
3.7.  Potential for the future 
Agricultural co-operatives have raised farming efficiency in 
Ireland.  They have created employment,  especially in the small 
country towns  and rural areas where  they have based their marketing, 
supply and processing services.  They  have nearly 20,000 people 
already on their payrolls,  and in 1978  T.  J.  Maher,  President of the 
ICOS,  claimed that 50,000 more  jobs could be created if they developed 
their own  food manufacturing industry.** 
There are signs of increasing interest in worker participation 
in agricultural societies,  and this has been encouraged by ICOS 
especially in societies involved in food processing;  this impulse 
might perhaps help to regenerate  democracy  among  the members  of the 
societies - the farmers. 
ICOS  and  the agricultural societies are striving through budget·· 
ing for member  relations and establishing advisory committees  to keep 
alive the co-operative ethic.  It is, naturally, not an easy task to 
conjure up within large organizations  the  same  sense of common  involve-
ment which grows  in small  ones.  They  are also  showing some  interest 
in helping the new  types of co-operatives discussed in the following 
sections,  commercially weak  organizations which can benefit from  the 
training and educational programmes  of their powerful  agricultural 
counterparts  and perhaps offer back to  them  some  of the community 
vitality which stimulated the early farmers'  co-operatives  a  century 
ago. 
*  *  * 
*  People and their co-operatives,  IAOS,  1978 
**  Maher  challenges  trade unions  on  job creation,  Irish Times, 
6 May,  1980. 
-CJ..J..  I 't 4·  Community  Co-operatives 
4.1.  A new  role for co-operation 
At  a  time when  the agricultural co-operative movement  was  pre-
occupied with planning for the  commercial  expansion and consolidation 
of its bigger and more  prosperous  socities,  a  new  and distinctive 
form  of co-operative was  emerging in the West  of Ireland.  The  first 
community  or multi-pU2'pose  co-operatives were set up in the mid-1960s 
and by 1981  their number  had grown  to 25.  Unlike any of the more 
traditional sectors of co-operation their membership is not limited 
to  one particular group - whether farmer,  worker or consumer - but is 
open to  the whole  community.  They  are  therefore controlled by the 
community rather than by any particular interest group or group of 
workers.  The  type of activities they undertake depends  both on the 
needs of the particular community  and on  the skills and resources 
available within it.  The  range of activities is diverse as  can be 
seen from  the  Table  on  p.  EI 16  which  shows  the actual  and planned 
activities of 24  community co-operatives in 1979. 
EI 15 Actual  and  planned activities  i.n  24  Gaeltacht co-operatives  and some 
co-operatives  and  development  groups  in the rest of the countrY* 
Land  and Bog  development 
Electricity and water 
Ferry/Cargo  Service 
Housing scheme 
Machinery sharing/maintenance 
Adjustment  (members  fatten livestock owned 
by co-operative) 
Demonstration forum 
Livestock Mart 
Supplies - farm,  household,  building 
Coal  store 
Q;u.arrying,  stone crushing 
Blockmaking,  building services 
Fish farming 
Services to Fishermen 
Fishing Tackle manufacture 
Tomato/vegetable farming,  growing,  chilling 
Lamb  fattening 
Sheep Marketing and  lambs 
Wool  purchase,  marketing 
Wool  sale  (manufactured) 
Knitting (:1and)  marketing 
Knitting machine 
Weaving/tanning 
Fencing posts 
Pottery/crafts 
Printing/publishing 
Stationery/office supplies 
Wood  screw manufacture 
Community Hall/Folk museum 
Launderette 
Hotel,  hostel 
Caravan/house letting 
Summer  Colleges 
Boat hire 
Bingo,  dances,  festivals,  sports amenities 
Licensed club 
Actual 
6 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
13 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 
4 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
9 
2 
2 
9 
1 
1 
8 
Planned 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
*  Terence O'Brien,  Rural  development  co-operatives in Ireland;  their 
role as  agents of economic  and social development;  International 
Seminar ·c~ Marginal Regions,  Trinity College  Dubl~n,  1979. 
.1!:1  16 The  economic  and  social significance of the  comn1unity  co-oper-
atives has  to be  judged in the light of the abnormal  demographic 
and  economic  characteristics of the places in which  they have flour-
ished.  These  are the Gaeltachts,  the Irish-speaking areas mainly 
concentrated along the Western seaboard of Ireland.  The  population 
of the Gaeltachts is small - around 70,000- and more  than 50  per cent 
of the workforce is engaged in agriculture or fishing as against 
24  per cent in the republic  as  a  whole.  Over  two-thirds of the farms 
are smaller than 40  acres  and because the land is poor much  of the 
farming is part-time.  The  other part of the .time is idle time. 
Almost  all the farms  are non-viable by EEC  standards.*  -In  general 
incomes  are low  (about half the national  average)  and unemployment  is 
very high.  Social services and community facilities are meagre.  Not 
surprisingly there has been a  history of emigration either to better-
off parts of Ireland or to Britain or the USA.  This  has  been partic-
ularly marked  amongst  young women  for whom  marriage prospects are poor 
(64%  of the farmers  in the Gaeltacht areas are over 50  years of age), 
with the result that populations have fUrther  declined. 
4.2.  A success story in County Kerry 
Against that background the achievements of the  community co-
operatives are considerable.  The  first,  the Ballyfer.riter Development 
Co-operative  (Comharchumann  Forbartha Chorea  Dhuibhne  Teo),  which  I 
visited in the  course of my  study,  serves  as  an example  of what  those 
achievements are.  The  co-operative is based in the village of 
:Ballyferri  ter on the Dingle peninsula in County Kerry.  It was  set up 
in 1967  by a  group of local people,  mainly teachers,  wi~~ the help of 
the County Development  Team.  The  present manager,  Mi.cheal  Mac  Giobuin, 
says  that it was  ?6rn out of the frustration of a  group of idealistic 
people who  were  concerned about  the cultural heritage of the area and 
especially about the preservation of the Irish language.  Their con-
cern was  prompted by the fact that although most families living in 
and  around Ballyferriter speak Irish at home  there is constant pressure 
from outside to  speak English,  especially on  the young people who  tend 
to go  to  the English-speaking town  of Dingle for their social life. 
So  the founder members  of the co-operative set about  creating anirish 
College where  children and teachers from other parts of Ireland could 
*  Terence O'Brien,  Rural Co-operatives in Ireland,  their role as 
agents  of economic  and  social development  and Patrick Cummins, 
Co-operation and Community  Development  in the West  of Irelanu, 
International Seminar on Marginal Regions,  Trinity College Dublin, 
1979· 
EI 17 come  on  Slunmer  and weekend courses.  In 1970  they started with 500 
students;  by 1980  they had 2,500. 
For Micheal  Mac  Giobuin the Irish language is the key to the 
country's folklore  and cultural traditions about which he cares deeply 
and he  judges  the  success of the Irish College in terms  of its contrib-
ution to preserving those traditions.  He  estimates that 20,000 children 
a  year attend Irish courses in the Gaeltacht areas  and that they are 
different children each year,  which means  that over five years  200,000 
parents  send their children on Gaeltacht courses.  That  thought gives 
him  great satisfaction. 
The  co-operative has  one full-time employee  devoted to  developing 
the heritage of the area.  He  is responsible for a  quarterly magazine 
and newsletter and for organizing an annual  exhibition in Dingle which 
has been a  good tourist attraction as well  as of educational value to 
the local people.  Micheal  Mac  Giobuin sees  the growing interest in 
art,  music,  drama,  archaeology  a~d ecology as  the foundation stone for 
Gaeltacht  development. 
The  second major activity to be started by the co-operative was 
land reclamation.  A lot of the land around the Ballyferriter area is 
very marginal;  an impervious  iron pan a  foot or so  below the surface 
makes  it very difficult to work;  much  of it is bog.  With  the help of 
a  grant from  the  Department of the Gael  tacht,  the government ministry 
charged with preserving the Irish language  and culture,  the co-operative 
bought bulldozers and special ploughs  to drain the land.  Local farmers 
pay about  £200  for every acre of land thus reclaimed,  towards which 
they get a  7~fo grant from  the EEC.  Since the co-operative started it 
has reclaimed over 7,000 acres.  This  achievement has had a  very big 
impact on the lives of the local people.  Most  of the farming in the 
area is dairy.  The  improvement of the land combined with more  modern 
techniques  demonstrated on the co-operative's demonstration dary farm 
have resulted in a  greatly increased milk yield for the farmers. 
Unlike Micheal  Mac  Giobuin,  the financial controller,  Mr.  Brosnam, 
judges the co-operative's achievement more  in terms  of the  impact it 
has made  on  the local  eco~emy than its contribution to Irish traditions. 
Apart from  improving farm yields,  the  co~operative has  created employ-· 
EI 18 mcnt  - 40  full-time  jobs  and up  to 100  part-time jobs in the  summer  -
where before there were  none.  Another  economic  benefit for the local 
community is that most  of the students at the Irish College stay with 
Irish-speaking families  during their summer  courses.  Since there is 
hardly any employment  for women  in the area,  the income  they can earn 
in this way  is very important.  A further spin-off is that the children 
bring up  to £50  pocket money  with them which  they spend in the local 
shops. 
More  direct employment was  created in 1973  when  the co-operative 
built glass houses  to  grow  tomatoes.  The  capital came  from  the  co-op 
itself,  from  the Department of the Gaeltacht and  from  the Irish Sugar 
Company  which  invested in the project without taking any control. 
Despite the high cost of electric heating,  the greenhouse venture has 
broken even over the years  and  the co-operative is beginning to  exper-
iment with new  methods  of growing such as hydroponics.  In addition to 
tomatoes  the co-operative grows  potatoes,  corn,  cabbages  and cauli-
flowers,  some  of which are sold locally and  some  to the same  marketing 
co-operative which buys  the  tomatoes.  This helps to  ensure a  healthy 
cash flow because the members  do  not have  any worries  about chasing 
debtors or finding sales outlets themselves.  In pure money  terms  the 
co-operative is doing well - it made  a  profit of £30,000  on  a  turnovei~ 
of £1,000,000 in 1979- but the contribution it has made  to improving 
the quality.of life for the people of Ballyferriter is of greater sig-
nificance still. 
4·3·  ~e  making of a  community  co-oEerative 
Ballyferriter is just one  of the community co-operatives,  each 
of v1hich  has its own  story to tell.  But  the  steps leading to their 
formation tend to follow a  common  pattern, frequently beginning with 
the initiative of one  committed individual.  In her paper on  community 
co-operatives in the British Isles,  Leonora Stettner sets out the fol-
lowing essential procedures: 
The  activator arranges for small  group  discussions 
within the community. 
A public meeting is convened  and  a  small steering 
group  (up  to ten members)  is appointed to  examine 
possible projects,  determine priorities, plan a 
EI  19 funr'l-rnising campaign and p:r.epare  detailed proposals 
for projects. 
- A systematic  survey of community needs  and resources 
is undertaken. 
- A campaign is launched to sell co-operative shares to 
households in the community. 
A general meeting of shareholders is convened at which 
a  managing committee is elected  .• 
- A constitution is drafted,  discussed and adopted. 
- The  community  co-operative is legally registered. 
- Application is made  to  the development authority, 
Udaras  na Gaeltachta,  for a  management  grant and 
subsequently a  manager is recruited. 
- Application is made  to  the  develQpment  authority 
for an establishment grant. 
- General meetings of the co-operative are called as 
often as required.* 
4·4·  The  will of the local people 
The  single most vital ingredient for the success of a  community 
co-operative is a  desire for change within the community itself and a 
willingness to participate in the process.  This  may  come  about 
naturally as  a  response ·to  economic  and cultural decline or it may  be 
prompted by some  outside stimulus such as the Save the West  campaign 
started by Father MacD.yer,  founder of the forerunner of the community 
co-operatives,  a  group of 13  co-operatives known  collectively as 
Glencol~ille.  At  least five other co-operatives have been started 
on the initiative of parish priests, while in other instances it has 
been the local teacher or an outsider such as an agricultural adviser 
*  Leonora Stettner,  Community Co-operatives in the :British Isles,  1980 or conunum ..  y  development officer who  has  ignited the i'irs  t  spark of 
enthusiasm.  :B'or  that to be kept alive there must usually be at least 
half a  dozen local  people who  are prepared to put in a  lot of hard 
work  to get  the co-operative off the  ground.  Where  the main  aims  of 
the community co-operative are agricultural,  for instance land re-
clamation,  the founder members  are likely to be farrners. 
Much  of the initial effort must  go  into encouraging the involve-
ment of the  community at large.  Ideally the members'  involvement 
should be more  than just financial  but even that poses  serious prob-
lems.  The  minimum  shareholding in a  community co-operative is £1.00 
but it is not unusual for  each family to  be  expected to contribute 
£50,  perhaps  over five years.  Of  course,  conununity  co-operatives are 
not alone in having difficulty raising adequate share capital but their 
problems  may  be  exacerbated not only by the fact that they are opera-
ting in poverty-stricken communities  but also because  they tend to have 
a  high proportion of elderly members  who  are less lil<ely than other 
potential co-operators  to want  to  invest in the future.  Nevertheless, 
the contribution of share capital by the community itself signifies 
the commitment  of local people  to provide  themselves with the services, 
employment  and income  they lack.  It is the key which  i3 needed to 
unlock additional sources of funding. 
4.5.  Helping those who  help  themselves 
It probably has  to be accepted from  the outset that many  com-
munity co-operatives are going to need government subsidy or outside 
financial backing if they are to flourish on the stony ground of the 
remote areas.  As  more  than one co-operative manager pointed out  to me, 
if the communities  they serve were well off there would be no  need for 
the co-operatives in the first place.  A wealthy community would pro-
vide itself with  the basic services either by its contributions  to 
local  taxes  and rates or by attracting commercial  enterprise. 
The  two  main  sources of government  funding for  the  community 
co-operatives are the Department of the Gaeltacht and  Gaelterra Eireann, 
the  elected development authority. 
Both are charged 'IIi th preserving the Irish laneuage''and culture 
and both participate in the government's policy of encouraging indus-
tries to  establish in designated regions.  Tax  and other concessions 
have  done  much  to encourage foreign investment in the  country but it 
EI.21 is recognised that there is also  a  need to give special assistance to 
smaller enterprises  and  to  set up  industries where  private enterprise 
has  not  come  forward,  especially in the remote areas.  Community  co-
operatives  can attract grants both for their contribution to preserv-
ing the Irish language  and for their initiatives in setting up  small 
enterprises.  They  are eligible for a  variety of subsidies including 
capital grants  to  cover  6~A of the cost of buildings,  machinery and 
equipment;  training grants;  and grants of up  to  7~A of managers' 
salaries and office costs. 
None  of the grants available in the Gaeltacht areas are  specif~ 
ically for co-operatives.  The  criteria used by the  Development  Auth-
ority to  decide whether a  co-operative is eligible for grant aid are 
exactly those used for private enterprise:  a  substantial proportion 
of the capital must be put ·up  by the applicants,  the enterprise must 
be commercially viable  and  there must be  evidence of sound management. 
One  further criterion which applies only to  the community  co-operatives 
is that the members  should be Irish speakers  and that the manager  should 
be able  to  transact his duties  through Irish.  If that criterion were 
removed  there would be  immediate  scope for  the development of community 
co-operatives in other :pa::ts  of Ireland ivhich are just as much  econom-
ically and socially deprived but are not Irish-speaking. 
In the :past  Gael terra Eireann,  now  Udaras  na Gael tachta,  has  c.ome 
in for a  certain amount  of criticism for failing to  take sufficient 
account of the social and cultural objectives of community  co-operatives 
when  deciding whether to issue grants.  It has responded by appointing 
a  full-time liaison officer and improving the training and  advisory 
services it :provides.  Another way  in which.  the Development  Authority 
can help is to guarantee loans from  banks which are even less likely 
to  appreciate the social as opposed to  the  economic  motives of the 
co-operatives. 
Local  government  can also :play a  :part in supporting community 
co-operatives,  in particular by awarding them  contracts for the pro-
vision of infrastructure such as water supply.  Indeed community  co-
operatives  can fulfil many  of the functions of locaJ.  government.  For 
a  County Council  to undertAke  the provision of basic services  to  a 
remote  community can be  extremely expensive.  The  Islands  Development Co-operatl\nJ in West  Galwa,y  is just one  which  hAB  p:rov.irlP.d  group 
water schemes  at half the cost of an official scheme.  For good 
measure it has  given employment  to nine men.  There is also  scope 
for community  co-operatives to  supplement  the social services and 
provide help to  the  co~nunity for less than it would cost the state 
or local authority- assuming they were willing or able  to  provide 
such services at all. 
Examples  of the  type of service that has  been provided include 
schemes  for delivering fUel  to  needy people,  and  an intercom system 
which one  comm1mity  co-operative installed in forty houses where 
elderly people were living so  that they could call for help when 
needed.  The  provision of school  transport is another service that 
might be provided with significant savings. 
Apart from  central  and local government grants  and bank  loans 
and the money  they have  themselves provided many  community co-opera-
tives have succeeded in raising money  through appeals  to  emigrants 
living in other parts of Ireland or even in Britain and the USA. 
4.6.  Education and training 
Apart from  finance,  the areas in which  community  co-operatives 
most need help are management  and administration.  For people who  are 
unfamiliar with running a  business let alone rur.crrlng  one democratic-
ally,  some  form of training is almost bound  to be essential.  Support 
of this kind has  come  from  academics  who  have  seen the potential of  . 
comn1unity  co-operatives for economic  and social revival in rural areas 
and are interested in developing it, and from  ICOS.  Terence O'Brien 
and Liam  Kennedy of the University of Ulster have played an active 
part by bringing together managers  of small rural co-operatives on 
both sides of the Northern Ireland border.  One  positive result of 
this initiative has been the establishment of a  Managers'  Association 
whose  objectives include the bringing together of managers  to  seek com-
mon  solutions  to their problems  and  the establishment of a  better struc-
ture of financial  support for small rural co-operatives.  ICOS  services 
the Association and provides  a  Secretary. 
An  important initiative which is not confined to  community  co-
operatives has  come  from  the Bank  of Ireland Centre for Co-operative 
EI  23 Studies at University College,  Cork.  Opened  in March  1980  with the 
financial backing of the  bank  and ICOS,  the Centre has brought together 
a  nmnber  of people  from  diverse professional  and  academic  backgrounds 
to work  on  issues of importance  to  the co-operative movement.  As  a 
first step they are working on a  comprehensive  examination and re-
evaluation of co-operative philosophy and intend to  develop  a  set of 
guidelines against which  co-operatives  can measure their performance. 
Research apart,  the Centre also provides training;  the first course 
for co-operative managers  on Management  Communications  was  held in 
March  1981. 
An  important  job for the newly-formed Managers'  Association and 
ICOS  is to  study the special  circumstances of the community co-opera-
tives and help evaluate  the contributions which could be of most last-
ing benefit in the remote areas.  It is certain that much  more  could 
be  done  in the basic job of educating people about  the various  forms 
and purposes of co-operatives,  stimulating interest in them  and train-
ing managers.  ICOS  already sets funds  apart for education and train-
ing.  Among  the community co-operatives  a  real need exists for just that. 
4.7.  The  potential of community co-operatives 
The  achievements of co-operatives in other sectors and in other~ 
countries are relatively easy to quantify in hard terms of jobs created 
or saved and of financial  stability.  No  such obvious  success can yet 
be claimed for community  co-operatives in Ireland. 
In terms of providing jobs and generating revenue,  the  community 
co-operatives represent a  marginal  sector of the co-operative movement 
in. Ireland.  But  then on the other hand they are operating in areas 
of marginal agriculture,  areas indeed that are marginal in every respect. 
Thus  even a  small  showing on  the balance sheet can be significant in 
the place where work  and money  have been created.  The  non-economic 
consequences have  to be  taken into account also,  especially the pride 
that comes  from  a  successful initiative in self-help,  the confidence 
that is built up in what was  a  residual peasant community,  the lasting 
advantages of reclaimed land,  increased farm yields and an infrastruc-
ture of services such as water,  drainage or other essentials which 
previou.3ly did not exist.  If the  re~rival· of remote rural  economies, 
the halting of urban emigration and  the revival of traditional lang-EI 25 
uage  and  "· 1 tu:re  is judged to be worthwhile,  then for all their fin-
ancial  weakness  the  community  co-operatives  should also  be  judged 
worthwhile. 
They  represent a  series of experiments which have  developed in 
a  haphazard fashion with varying degrees of support both from  within 
the communities  they have  sought  to help and from  outside.  If the 
experiment is to  be given a  proper chance  a  much  more  conscious 
attempt  should be made  to  incorporate  the role of community  co-operatives 
in an agreed rural development  programme  which  defines  the parts to be 
played by statutoryand voluntary agencies,  and  ensures that financial 
advice  and  support  and.  training are available.  If,  given these more 
favourable conditions,  the experiment proves  a  success,  then the lessons 
that can be  drawn might be applied in similarly deprived areas in other 
EEC  countries and Ireland's community co-operatives will have  produced 
benefits of value to Europe  as  a  whole. 
*  *  * 
5·  Workers'  Co-operatives 
5.1.  ~.;phill struggle 
Ireland has less than a  dozen workers'  co-operatives.  Until 1954 
there were no  support organisations nor any model  rules for this kind 
of society.  Even  now  the  tl'IO  sponsoring bodies,  the National  Co-opera-
tive Council and the Co-operative Development Society are without 
resources and staff.  They  share the same  Honorary Secretary,  John 
O'Halloran,  a  hard-working and deeply committed man  who  spends  a  great 
deal of his free time travelling round Ireland addressing meetings of 
people in the hope  of interesting them  in the idea of co-operatives. 
It is an uphill struggle but he takes  comfort from  the fact that the 
father of co-operation in Ireland,  Horace Plunkett,  held forty meetings 
throughout  the country before a  single agricul  tu:ral  co-operative got 
going. 
The  NCO  is a  largely promotional  body,  intended to raise interest 
in co-operative principles and practice.  It was  founded in 1954  by 
:Brendan  0 1Cea:rbhaill,  the now  retired General  'l'reasu:.:er of the printing union,  the Irish Graphical Society.  A year later Mi·.  O'Cearbhaill 
and  a  group of trade unionists,  businessmen,  a  Catholic priest and 
a  Church of Ireland rector set up  the Co-operative Development  Society 
to assist in the practical task of forming co-operatives in urban 
areas.  They  drew up  a  set of model  rules more  appropriate than those 
of the agricultural societies for the new  co-operatives  they hoped to 
foster. 
Apart from workers'  co-operatives,  they were keen to  promote 
consumer co-operatives and actually started a  co-operative shop in 
Dun  Laoghaire in 1955.  It was  quite successful in the grocery business 
for some  yea-rs.  Unfortunately,  the supermarket era was  beginning.  The 
loyalty of the members  succumbed in a  cut-price war which  sounded the 
death knell of the  small grocery co-operatives.  Although in Northern 
Ireland the Belfast Consumer  Co~operative Society has been very success-
ful,  the idea has never taken off in the South. 
Though  now  in his seventies and  showing no  sign of losing his 
commitment  to  co-operation,  Brendan 0 1 Cearbhaill admist with a  wry 
twinkle in his eye  that the general attitude of the Irish to  co-opera-
tives is apathy and distrust.  He  says  that the agricultural co-·opera-
tives are strong in every sense except genuine co-operative spirit. 
That is what he seeks  to kindle and he remains  convinced that there is 
no  point in starting new  co-operatives without it. 
O'Connor  and KellY*  have  suggested that the NCC  might  form  the 
basis of a  Workers'  Co-operative Agency  (WCA)  which  they see as an 
essential step if industrial workers'  co-operatives are to  develop 
and  h~ve a  chance of surviving in Ireland.  Funded by central govern-
ment  on an annual grant-in-aid basis,  the WCA  would have a  full-time 
secretary and  a  Development  Officer whose  job would include advising 
private firms wishing to convert to co-operatives as well  as helping 
groups of people to  set up new  co-operatives.  In 1980  the CDS,  ICOS, 
the Irish League of Credit Unions  and  the National Association of 
Building Co-operatives made  a  submission to  the Government  proposing 
the establishment of a  Co-operative Development  Agency. 
One  important  task for any new  co-operative agency would be to 
seek solutions  to  the perennial problem of raising finance.  Even 
*  Study of Ind'..lstrial Workers 1  Co-operatives,  Robert  O'Connor  and 
Philip Kelly,  Economic  and Social Research Institute,  Dublin, 
April,  1980. thouch worK.:rs 1  co·-operatives  tend to  develop in the most labour-
intensive sectors of induntry it is unrealistic to  imagine  that 
workers will be able  to  contribute more  than a  small  proportion of 
start-up capital required,  especially when  the country is in the grip 
of economic  recession.  One  suggestion made  by O'Connor  and Kelly is 
that capital raised in the form of bank  and other loans,  and  repaid by 
deduction from  salaries,  should be allowable for tax purposes. 
5.2.  The  co-operatives  themselves 
Despite the fact that they are so  few  there seems  to be  some  dis-
agreement  about precisely how  many  worker co-operatives  there are in 
Ireland.  The  Co-operative Development  Society and  the  NCC  acknowledge 
the existence of four:  Graphic  Arts in Dublin,  the Crannac  Co-operative 
in Navan,  and  Irish Springs  and Castle Shoes  in Dundalk.  Both  0 1 Conno~ 
and Kelly and.  Robert Oakeshott* include Bewley's  Cafes which is a 
member  of the British Industrial Common  Ownership movement  and is a 
non-profit making company  limited by guarantee.  Ownership of the com-
pany is vested in a  trust which holds  the  shares on behalf of the staff. 
The  only workers'  co-operative  to  be set up  from  scratch is the 
Graphic  Arts Co-operatiw, Society in Dublin.  The  other three were 
formed as a  result of private firms  getting into difficulties:  Castle 
Shoes in 1971  after the original company went into receivership, 
Crannac after a  highly publicized sit-in in 1972  and Irish Springs in 
1973  when  the previous ownE:rs  decided to shut the firm  down  after 
three years of losses. 
In the course of this study I  visited and looked in detail at 
two  of these co-operatives,  Crannac  and  Graphic Arts.  I  also  found 
out about one which failed to get off the ground despite a  great deal 
of effort from  all concerned because it illustrates some  of the prob-
lems faced by workers  trying to  save their jobs. 
5·3·  George  Watts & Co. 
Late in 1980  the Co-operative Development Society was  approached 
by the Combat  Poverty Group  to  see whether it could help to  save at 
least some  jobs when  the oldest established engineering company  in 
*  Robert Oakeshott,  The  Case  fo2  Workers'  Co-ops,  Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, · 1978. 
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liquidation.  It was  felt that the 1lllfortunate combination of events 
leading up  to  the closure of the firm made  it a  special case.  Two 
years before,  the managing director,  who  was  then 86,  and the firm's 
business manager had both died suddenly.  The  company  had been a  family-
run business,  but now  a  business consultant was  appointed and given 
full control of it.  On  his advice  the firm bought property,  but this 
move  proved a  mistake  and the purchase contributed to  the firm's  down-
fall shortly afterwards. 
Those  workers  who  were  aware  of these events were  convinced that 
the biggest single cause of failure was  poor management  and that there 
was  a  good  chance that with outside help the workers  themselves might 
make  a  go  of it.  The  idea of a  co-operative was  first mentioned by 
Mick  Doyle of the Combat  Poverty Group.  It was  greeted with scepticism 
by some,  enthusiasm by a  few  and ignora...."l.ce  by most.  To  help overcome 
the latter Mick  Doyle  asked the CDS  for help.  Its secretary,  John 
0 1Halloran,  met  the workers  and  explained just what was  meant  by a 
workers'  co-operative.  He  also went  to  see  the directors of the  company 
who  said that they would  do  what  they could to assist ·U1e  workers, 
although by then there was  precious little that could be done. 
Sixteen of the workers,  including three apprentices,  decided to 
Jo~n the  embryonic  co-operative and they stuck. together throughout 
the months  that followed until it became  apparent that there was  no 
hope.  Their first job was  to  draw up  a  profit and loss account for 
the co-operative's first 18  months.  They  did this with the help of 
an accountant who  was  one of the 16.  Then  they approached the 
Industrial Development  Authority.  Having approved the financial fore-
casts and  the proposed management  structure,  the.,.;EDA  said that they 
were prepared to make  a  grant of £91,000,  which should enable the co- • 
operative to buy the engineering works.  Unfortunately the liquidator 
turned down  their offer and insisted that the assets be  sold by public 
auction.  The  premises  alone went for £81,000,  leaving the equipment 
to be sold separately.  At  that stage  the IDA  suggested that it might 
be better to rent a  factory in any case,  but the workers felt that 
their only hope was  to  take over the existing premises  and with them 
the firm's  existing customers.  The  last nail was  hammered  into  the 
co-operative's coffin when  the  equipment  and machinery was  auctionau 
a  few  weeks  later.  Most  of it was  bought up by the firm's  competitors who  subsequently offered it to  the workers  but at too high a  price. 
Even  though  they had had  tho  support of the  CDS,  the financial  back-
ing of the  IDA  and were  themselves  prepared to  put in thej_r  redund-
ancy money,  the workers  did not in the  end  have  the resources  to 
compete  against their capitalist rivals.  The  result might have been 
'  different if the liquidator had been prepared to accept their offer 
and several of the people involved to  whom  I  spoke  thought that there 
was  a  good  case for amending legislation so  as  to  allow workers first 
option on buying their workplace in such circumstances. 
5-~·  Crannac  Co-operative Society Limited 
The  Crannac  Co-operative Society makes  furniture in the small 
town  of Navan,  about  an hour's drive from  Dublin.  Its history goes 
back  to 1945  when it was  started as  a  private company,  John Hogg  & Co. 
It was  subsequently taken over by Gael  Linn,  an organization for the 
promotion of the Irish Language  and  a  somewhat  unlikely owner of a 
furniture-making factory.  Nevertheless  the firm did reasonably well 
to start with and developed  the contract side of the business,  furn-
ishing hotels  and  buildings of large organizations.  But  the hotel 
trade was  badly affected by the start of'  the troubles in Northern 
Ireland in 1969  and when  government grants failed to keep the firm 
solvent Gael  Linn sold the factory for £13,000  to  a  company  which 
already had a  furniture factory in Co.  Monaghan  in 1971.  The  new 
owner received a  grant of £6,000  towards  the purchase price from  the 
Industrial Development  Authority on condition that the factory be 
kept open for at least a  year.  The  factory closed twelve months  to 
the day later. 
The  liquidator was  called in on  a  Friday and.  after a  prelim-
inary appraisal told the workers  that their jobs would be safe.  They 
returned to work  the following Monday,  May  1st 1972,  to find themselves 
locked out.  What  happened next helped to make  Crannac  the best known 
if not the most  infamous  of Ireland's workers'  co-operatives.  The 
liquida·tor was  persuaded to allow the  shop  steward and branch secret-
sw~ies of the workers'  trade union into  the factory.  Within a  short 
while they had opened  the gates  to let in the rest of the 45-strong 
workforce.  They  occupied the factory for.  the next three months. 
The  first problem for the workers was  their immediate  econoli:dc 
survival.  When  the factory was  closed down  they were  owed  a  week's 
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or redundancy  p~ments while  they were  occupying the factory.  The 
local  Trades  Council  organized a  distress fund out of which  each 
worker received £12.00  a  week  during the sit-in. 
Although  the workers  formed  a  committee,  they at first hoped 
that someone  might be found  to  t&ce  on the factory as  a  going concern. 
They had never really considered the idea of a  co-operative.  The  first 
suggestion that they might run the factory themselves  came  from  the 
curate of Dundalk,  Father Campbell,  who  had been involved in the Castle 
Shoes  co-operative,  and  from  Sam  Dowling who  was  on  the committees 
of both Castle Shoes  and the  Graphic  .Arts  Society.  When  they had heard 
how  a  co-operative might work,  nearly half the workers  decided to have 
a  go  and agreed to  commit  £200  each  to  the venture from  their redund-
ancy money.*  With  £4,000 of their own  and with the help of the local 
parish priest the workers  then raised a  further £18,000 in share capital 
from  local people and well-wishers.  Having demonstrated their own  com"" 
mitment and the support of the local community  the workers  approached 
Foir Teoranta,  a  state-sponsored body which gives assistance to indus-
trial concerns in danger of closing down.  They  requested a  loan of 
£50,000 which they were given,  interest free over three years.  The 
loan enabled them  to buy the factory and its contents.  One  of its 
conditions was  that they should  ~point an outside manager.  Jim 
Thornton who  had been sales manager of the old company,  but was  not a· 
member  of the co-operative,  was  given the job. 
In its first year,  1972,  the Crannac  Co-operative made  a  profit 
of £11,000  although this was  partly due  to  the fact that they had 
inherited a  lot of stock and also had fairly substantial orders in 
the pipeline when  they started.  Turnover increased in the following 
year,  but profits fell because  they had got their pricing policy wrong. 
In 1974 profits were  back up  to £12,000 but 1975  saw  a  complete reversal 
of fortune  and a  loss of £16,000. 
They  decided to put less  emphasis  on contract work  and go  into 
the production of domestic furniture,  a  change of policy which  entailed 
considerable expenditure on  new  stock.  Things picked up again,  but. 
competition in the domestic furniture market was  fierce and after a 
*  Not  all the workers  had this much  redundancy money  but  the local 
credit union agreed to lend them  their contribution to be pai.d 
back out of wages  when  the co-operative got going. good  deal of deliberation it was  decided to sell direct to  the public 
rather than  through  shops.  The  moment  they did so  they found  them-
selves blacked by all the  shops  they had previously dealt with and· 
even banned.  from  exhibiting at trade exhibitions.  Despite this 
unnerving experience they persevered and were rewarded by steadily 
increasing profits and  a  much  improved cash flow for four consecutive 
years.  Most  of the profits were  ploughed back into the co-operative 
to  enable  them  to build an extensive showroom  and to install new  fin-
ishing equipment  and a  sprinkler system which helped significantly to 
reduce insurance premiums. 
By  1980  the effects of the  economic  recession vlere  taking their 
toll on Crannac  and profits fell from  an all-time high of £46,000 in 
1979  to  just over £9,000.  The  .Auditor's report for 1980  concluded by 
exhorting the management  to keep  day-to-day running costs in line with 
sales so  that the Society should be in a  position to capitalize on the 
trading opportunities that should arise when  the  economic  recession 
finally ended  • 
.At  the outset Foir Teoranta had refused to accept a  manager 
from  the shopfloor;  indeei the workers had not  expected them  to. 
But  s:ince  1974  the General Manager of Crannac has been Oliver Travers, 
an upholsterer and one of the original workers.  The  Sales Manager is 
Paddy Brennan who  started as  a  chairmaker;  he is also Chairman of the 
Management  Committee which makes  all the co-operative's policy decisions 
and has  the power  to appoint and dismiss staff  • 
.All  49  employees at Crannac  are members  of the co-operative  • 
. The  original workers had each subscribed £200  and held 40  £5  shares; 
for a  time all new  workers were required to  subscribe a  similar amount. 
But this rule was  later abolished and although any worker may  hold up 
to  £200  in shares the minimum  insisted upon is only one  £5  share.  .All 
members  are entitled to one  vote at the society's .Annual  General Meeting 
regardless of the size of their shareholding. 
When  a  worker leaves  the co-operative he is entitled to withdraw 
his  shax'es  although he is discouraged from  doing so.  Interest on shares 
may  not exceed  5%  per annUIP, 
The  Management  Committee  consists of the Chairman,  five workers -
of whom  tlxree  are from  the factory floor - and three shareholders from 
EI  3"1 outside.  Committee  members  are elected at the  AGM  ro1d  serve for three 
years.  Each year two  worker members  rold  one outside shareholder must 
stro1d  down  or present  themselves for re-election.  The  Chairman must 
put himself up  for re-election each year;  Paddy Brennan has  stood 
unopposed  since 1974• 
The  Management  Committee  meets  on the second Friday of every 
month  and its decisions  are passed on to  a  General Workers meeting 
the following Monday  so  that all the workers  are kept informed. 
Relations between the management  committee  and  the workers have been 
fairly harmonious.  The  Chairman told me  that there was,  perhaps,  still 
a  bit of  'them and us'  feeling and  an idea that the manager  'has  a  great 
job1 ,  but if the firm got a  big order all the  stops would be pulled out 
and the staff would  work  extra hard to  get it completed. 
Perhaps  the other reason for the lack of industrial unrest is 
the fact that the workers get about  £5  a  week  more  thru1  the going rate 
for their jobs.  Although the General Manager,  the Production Manager 
and the Sales Manager  get paid more  than the skilled workers  they do 
not get paid overtime as  do  the others. 
Relations with their trade union,  the National Union of Wood-
workers,  have been good.  Wage  bargaining is centralized and does not 
therefore impinge much  on the co-operative's internal affairs and the 
union is represented on the management  committee by one of its branch 
secretaries.  In the view of Crannac's Chairman,  Paddy Brennan,  trade 
unions  should be  encouraged to invest in co-operatives. 
The  Crannac  Co-operative was  set up  to  save jobs rather than as 
any sort of experiment in democracy.  From  initial hardship and a  good 
deal of courage it has helped to prove  that workers  can m~ce a  success 
where capitalists had failed.  If the liquidator had had his way  in 
1972,  there would have been no  jobs where  now  there are 49.  To  most 
of the  customers who  come  to  Crannac  to buy good  quality furniture 
the notion of a  workers'  co-operative is probably fairly mero1ingless 
but the results are  tangible enough. 
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The  Graphic  Arts Society was  the first workers'  co-operative in 
Ireland.  Set up  in 1956,  it is to this day the only co-operative to 
have been started from  scratch.  When  Griff Cashman,  the founder 
manager of the co-operative,  and  a  small  group of people  associated 
with the printing industry decided to  set up  Graphic  Arts  they had 
three main objectives: 
1to prove that the workers  in our industry could 
set up,  own  and control  an enterprise of their own; 
to  endeavour  to create the best conditions  and pay 
the highest wages  possible;  and 
the most  important of all,  to  educate our members 
and  others in the worldwide  co-operative ethic of 
self-help for ourselves  and  the  community,  not for 
charity,  not for profit, but for  se~rice 1 .* 
The  problems  they faced were  daunting.  First of all they had 
to raise the capital they would need for equipment  and premises. 
T.he  notion of a  workers'  co-operative was  entirely unfamiliar to fin-
ancial institutions and it took three years for the founder members 
to get together the capital they needed.  They raised it entirely 
from  their own  resources,  without financial help from  any outside 
body. 
It was  not just the fact that they had no  track record;  nor 
even the unfamiliarity of the idea of a  workers'  co-operative which 
made  life difficult for Graphic Arts in the early days.  As  the pres-
ent manager,  Noel MUrphy,  explained,  they started at the  time when 
Mcdarthyism was  rampant in the United States and  anti-communism wid~ 
spread elsewhere.  To  many  Irish people  the notion of workers  owning 
and ruxmdng  their own  enterprise was  rather like having 'reds under 
the bed'.  When  the new  co-operators applied to  join the Federation of 
Mastex  Er~ravers their cheque.was returned. 
*  Griff Cashman,  Speech at a  dinner to celebrate the  21st birthday 
of Graphic  Arts in 1977. 
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is undergoing tremendous  technological  changes.  li'rom  being a  leader 
in colour engraving tho  co-operative has had to restrict itself to 
black and white work  because it cannot afford to  invest in the 
expensive  equipment needed for modern  colour reproduction.  li'rom  an 
all-time high of 23  employees  in the 1960s,  Graphic  Ax·ts  was  reduced 
in 1981  to nine.  This  contraction has mainly come  about by natural 
wastage - not replacing workers  when  they left ~ but in the 1973 
recession they had to make  t\<ro  of their number  redundant.  Those  that 
remained  took a  voluntary reduction in wages  of £3 per week.  As 
Griff Cashman  put it in 1977,  'The greatest achievement is that we  have 
survived.'  In fact,  they have  done  better than just survive.  1980 
was  Graphic Arts'  best year ever,  with profits of £11,000. 
The  co-operative has  100  shareholders who  have between them 
contributed share capital of £4,288 on which interest is paid at the 
rate of 5%.  All  except one  part-time member  of the workforce are 
shareholders by choice.  The  governing body is the management  committee 
of 12,  at least four of whom  must  be workers in the co-operative. 
Elections,  at which  each member  has  one vote regardless of the size 
of his shareholding,  are held at the Annual  General Meeting.  One 
third of the management  committee members  must  stand dc·wn  or offer 
themselves for re-election each year.  Amongst  the outsiders on the 
management  committee in 1981  were  a  retired worker,  the Chairman of 
the Crannac  furniture-making co-operative,  a  trade union secretary 
and  a  plumber and  an electrician both of whom  have given their services 
to  the co-operative free. 
Relations with trade unions at Graphic  Arts are good.  If any 
conflict does  arise the  shop  steward can ask to  see the management 
committee  and in practice problems  are quickly sorted out.  The  manager, 
Noel  Murphy,  chats with the workers  informally as often as he can and 
holds a  general meeting once a  month  to  discuss  the way  things are 
going.  There is no  clocking on at Graphic  Arts because there is no 
unpunctuality or absenteeism.  This may  be because the workers get 
better holidays and overtime pay than others in the industry but 
Noel  Murphy  is convinced that it is also because working at Graphic 
Arts is not  just an ordinary job. 5.6.  ~ewley
1 s  C~f.~ 
The  Bewley  Community  Limited is an example  of a  successful firm 
that has been handed over by its private owners  to its workers  and as 
such it is unique in Ireland although it falls into that category of 
common-ownership  companies  in Britain which Robert Oakeshott calls 
1high-minded1.*  Among  the  aims  in the  company's  constitution is 'to 
encourage  thinking in terms  of the welfare of the community in which 
we  live rather than a  desire for personal gain at the  expense of 
others'. 
The  firm's history goes  back to  the 1840s  when it was  established 
by a  family of Irish Quakers.  It owns  a  number  of coffee houses  and 
restaurants,  a  bakery and  a  farm  and  employs  400  people.  It has 
assets of about  £1  million and  a  turnover of £4 million.  In 1970 
the Bewley  family headed by Chairman,  Victor Bewley,  decided to vest 
ownership of the company  in the workforce.  A new  company  limited by 
guarantee was  set up  called Bewley  Community  Limited.  There is no 
individual ownership of shares which  are held in trust for all those 
working in the firm,  past,  present and future.  The  company is regis-
tered under the British Industrial Common  Ownership Movement  rules 
and because it is non-profit making  any surplus must  either be ploughed 
back into the firm,  distributed to  the staff in the form of a  bonus or 
used for some  social purpose.  If the company  went  into liquidation 
its assets could not be distributed but would have  to be used for 
social purposes or for co-operative development. 
Although ownership of Bewley  Community  Limited is .clearly vested 
in the people who  work  in·it, control is not nearly so  clear cut. 
A company  council consisting of the heads of departments  and  an 
equal number  of elected representatives meets once  a  month under the 
chairmanship of the company  chairman. .  But  the Board of Directors is 
still controlled by members  of the Bewley family who  may  fill vacancies 
by appointment rather than election.  Nevertheless the loyalty of the 
workforce has been amply  demonstrated on more  than one  occasion and 
reflects the  change  in attitude from  the traditional  'them and us 1 • 
*  Robert  Oakeshott,  op.  cit. 
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control<;  artd  at tho  name  time  decreed national wage  increar-:~en, 
Bewley's  found.  itself in a  dilemma;.  'l'he  Chairman,  Victor Bewley, 
was  convinced that the wage  increase should be paid,  but the company 
was  running at a  loss _and  could not put up prices to match  the increase. 
Although  the Board had the final  decision the matter was  put  to the 
Council.  Almost  unanimously they.agreed that the wage  increases should 
not come  into effect.  Their view was  apparently shared by the majority 
of \-rorkers.  When  it was  later announced that any  employee  who  felt 
that he or she really needed the  extra money  could take it as of right, 
only a  tiny minori-ty did so.  In the bakery,  where the wage  increase 
was  paid so  as  not to  cauGe  a  dispute vli th the ·u.nion,  many  of the 
workers  quietly loaned back  the extra money  to  the company. 
After a  loss-making year in 1974  when  Bewley's were not alone 
in facing financial  problems  they showed  small profits for  the rest 
of the  decade  and  in the last few  years  there has been a  steady improve-
ment.  It is ~unlikely that the  example of Victor Bewley giving away his 
company  to his workers will be followed by many  others but  the British 
Industrial Common  Ownership Movement  is currently negotiating with the 
Irish Registrar of Friendly Societies a  set of model  rules which would 
make  it easier for new  ccmmon-ownership  societies to be started from 
scratch.  Bewley's itself seems  set to stay. 
*  *  * 
6.  Irish Co-overative Law,  Taxation and Finance 
6.1.  Legislation 
There is no  distinct concept of a  co-operative in Irish law 
~1d in theory a  co-operative could  t~(e any of the following forms: 
legal partnership 
company  limited by shares 
company  limited by guarantee 
industrial and provident society. 
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with  the Registry of Friendly Societies under the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Acts which  date from  1893  and have been little 
amended  since.  The  only category of co-operative to have specific 
legislation is the credit union,  which  comes  under the Credit Union 
Act  of 1966.  However,  following a  submission by ICOS  in 1978  the 
government made  a  commitment  to introduce a  new  Co-operative Societies 
Act  enshrining co-operative principles. 
The  main  difference between a  co-operative society and  a  limited 
liability company  is that a  member's  shareholding may  not exceed certain 
limits- £10,000 in an agricultural society or £3,000 in a  workers' 
co-operative. 
6.2.  Registration and transfer 
A co--operative starting up  has  to register with the Registrar 
of Friendly Societies and  pay a  fee of £50  unless it uses model  rules 
(provided by  the Irish Co-operative Organization Society for agricul-
tural and community  co-operatives and  the Co-operative  Development 
Society for workers'  co-operatives).  In that case the registration 
fee is reduced to £10  although the sponsoring organization may  charge 
a  fee for its services.  It generally takes 4 - 8  weeks  to register a 
co-operative.  Conversion from  a  company  to a  co-operative is relatively 
simple.  A general meeting is called and provided a  resolution is passed 
by a  special majority of the shareholders of the company,  registration 
is made  on application to  the Registrar and  the company's  assets are 
automatically transferred. 
6.3.  Statistical information 
The  Registrar of Friendly Societies has  the power  to prescribe 
the form  of co-operative  soci~ies'  annual returns.  They  must  include 
income  and  expenditure accounts  and a  balance sheet.  Details of 
membership  and  shareholdings have  to be  given triennially.  Although 
these returns are not  published they are available for public inspec-
tion at the Registry and statistical information culled from  the returns 
is published in the Registrar's Annual  Reports. 
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No  maximum  is set on  the number  of members  a  co-operative society 
may  have  but there must  be  a  minimum  of seven.  Membership  of a 
workers'  co-operative is not confined to workers,  nor do  workers 
have  to  become  members  as  a  condition of their employment.  .A1 though 
the law makes  no  provision for membership applications,  in practice 
applicants have  to be  approved by the coiilmittee of management  before 
they -:;an  join a  co-operative.  It is common  for the number  of members 
to  exceed the number  of workers,  generally because of the difficulty 
of raising adequate  share capital where membership is restricted to 
workers.  If10st  outside members  are individuals but in two  of the workers  1 
co-operatives other co-operative societies or companies  are also members. 
6.5.  Shareholdings 
Interest payable on shareholdings is not limited by law but in 
·practice most  societies  1  rules set a  limit of between  5%  and 1  CJ>;6. 
Except in credit unions,  where members  are required to hold at least 
one  share each,  there is no  explicit provision in the  law governing 
the size of shareholding.  Again,  it is c:ommon  for the rules to set 
down  a  minimum  shareholding as  a  condition of membership,  although 
this may  be as low  as  £1.00. 
Societies'  rules generally provide .for the trans.fer of shares 
subject to  the approval of the committee of management.  In that case 
the person wishing to transfer his shares would have to find another 
member  prepared to  take  them  on.  There is no  legal provision for the 
amount  that may  be paid on the transfer of shares but in practice it 
is their nominal  value.  There is no  legal obstacle to increasing 
share capital and this is usually done  through reserves,  though non-
agricultural co-operatives must  seek the approval of the Minister to 
do  so. 
6.6.  Loan  capital 
There is no  legal limit to the amount  a  society may  borrow 
other than fixed in the society's own  rules nor is there any limit 
on the amount  of interest that can be paid.  However  workers'  co-
operatives in particular may  face legal difficulties in raising 
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seek  the Registrar's approval before taking on any loan which is over 
£10,000 or from  other than a  bank and it is not clear what criteria 
he adopts when  deciding whether a  workers'  co-op may  take on such a 
loan.  In the words  of the Industrial and Provident Societies Amend-
ment  Act of 1978  'The Registrar shall not give permission •••  unless 
he is satisfied that it is in the interests of the public or of the 
creditors of a  society or of the orderly and proper regulations of 
the business of the society to  do  so'. 
6.7.  Distribution of surplus 
There is no  law governing the distribution of surplus or profits 
in a  co-operative although provision has  to be made  for this in the 
rules.  Most  societies'  rules provide for the application of profits 
in any or all of the following ways  as  decided by the committee of 
management: 
to reserves 
to interest on  share capital 
to  a  bonus  to members  and  employees in such prop-
ortions as the members  see fit 
to  a  purpose connected with the society or the 
co-operative movement 
to  the issue of bonus  shares. 
In practice profits are generally put into reserves and it is 
rare for them  to be distributed. 
6.8.  Taxation 
Credit 11nions  are exempt  from all taxation and certain activities 
of agricultural and fishery societies are exempt  from  tax.  The  only 
other major exception to  the rules of taxation as they apply to ordin-
a-~ com,anies is that dividends or bonuses paid by a  co-operative 
society are deductible as  an expense provided that the payment of 
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such dividend or bonus  is in proportion to  the magnitude of the trans-
action and not in proportion to their shareholding. 
6.9.  Financial aid from  public authorities 
There  are  a  number  of state funding agencies whose  frmction is 
to provide financial  assistance to industry.  Co-operatives are 
judged by the same  criteria as  anY .other type of business.  The  main 
bodies are: 
The  Industrial Develo;ement  Authorit;z whose  primary 
aim is to  create employment  and much  of whose  work 
is devoted  to attracting foreign industrialists to 
Ireland.  However it does have  a  special scheme  to 
promote  small  industry,  and co-operatives engaged 
in manufacturing industry may  be  eligible for aid 
under this  scheme. 
The  Industrial Credit Cor:eoration is a  merchant 
bank providing long-term and other loan facilities 
to all forms  of business including service indus-
tries.  Co-operatives may  be at a  disadvantagfJ in 
fulfilling the criteria for loans which include the 
necessity for firm security. 
Foir Teoranta is a  government-funded body which was 
set up to help manufacturing industries that are in 
such difficulty as  to render them  incapable of obtain-
ing financial assistance elsewhere.  As  such it would 
be an obvious  source of help for any co-operative 
formed as the result of the failure of a  capitalist 
concern. 
Udaras na Gaeltachta,  formerly Gaelterra Eireann is 
an agency set up  to promote and finance  development 
in the Irish-speaking areas concentrated on  the Wes·t 
Coast.  It has given considerable help to the commun-
ity co-operatives. 
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for the  development of the Irish-speaking areas  and can 
make  gTants  and  loans  to  co-operatives although only 
on  the  same  criteria as  those applied to other types 
of business. 
6.10.  Management 
The  law merely requires  that provision be made  in a  society's 
rules to  deal with  'the appointment  and removal  of a  committee of 
management,  of managers  or other officers and their respective powers 
and remuneration'.  In practice the General  Assembly  of members 
elects the committee of management  which in turn appoints  the managers. 
In workers'  co-operatives it is common  for the manager  to be a  member 
of the co-operative bu·b  outside forces may  sometimes  force  the committee 
of management  to appoint a  professional manager - for instance as a  con-
dition of grant aid,  as happened at Crannac. 
Although the law does  not require the holding of annual  general 
meetings,  nor govern the voting rights of members,  in practice the 
rules of individual societ.ies provide for annual general meetings  and 
voting is on  the basis of one member,  one vote. 
6.11.  Liauidation 
Under Irish law a  co-operative is wound  up in the same  manner 
as  a  company,  which means  that any surplus assets are distributed to 
the members  in proportion to their shareholdings.  A special method 
of winding up is available to agricultural and fishery co-operatives. 
They  may  wind up by means  of an  'instrument of dissolution'  signed 
by  75%  of the members  and under this method  the distribution of 
surplus assets is in accordance with the members'  decision as set 
out in the instrument of dissolution.  Bewley's Cafes,  as  a  common 
ownership  company,  is an  exception.  If it ever went  into liquidation 
any remaining assets would have  to be used for social purposes or for 
co-operative development  with no  possibility of distribution to members. 
*  *  * 
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The  co-ope:rative movement  in Ireland can be  described as  strong 
in parts and vigorous in other parts,  but not both throughout.  The 
individual societies are either commercially strong or they have 
strong member  participation,  but in very few  cases are  the  two  elements 
combined  to create an image  approaching the co-operative ides.l.  The 
agricultural societies have won  cornmercial  success at the cost of 
declir_ing member  participation.  The  community  and worker co-operatives, 
on the other hand,  while exhibiting the vigour of youth,  are with 
isolated exceptions  commercially weak  or insignificant as  employers of 
labour,  or both. 
Workers'  co-operatives,  which are mostly small,  have  the best 
chance of running in a  truly co-operative manner.  Workers  who  provide 
their own  employment,  who  jointly own  capital and manage  themselveB 
are the ones  who  receive the most  tangible benefits from  the co-opera-
tive form.  In practice,  however,  such benefits have been realized only 
to  a  limited extent. 
The  workers'  co-operatives which have  succeeded have  done  so 
without the help of strong support organizations and against a  back-
grounll of public ignorance and even apathy.  Probably the main obstacle 
to  the development of workers'  co-operatives in Ireland is the unfam-
iliarity of the concept.  Any  attempt to  encourage their development 
would have  to start with an education drive directed not only at the 
public but at government  departments,  trade unions,  voluntary organ-
izations and the legal profession.  The  five existing workers'  co-op-
eratives have proved that it is possible for workers.to run their own 
businesses successfully and even,  in the case of Crannac,  Castle Shoes 
and Irish Springs,  to make  a  success where  capitalism had failed. 
Recession is a  good  time for co-operation to be tried,  when  people see 
their jobs at risk or actually disappearing.  With advice and support, 
other groups of workers  could follow the trail that has been blazed 
and experiment with the virtues of self-help.  It makes  sense to  tap 
resources  that lie fallow in the community,  and to promote  small 
ventures in which  those human  resources  can be liberated and  put  to 
work.  Though  contrary to the prevailing mood  of society,  in which 
l!i.L  4~ individuals wait upon  the big· corpora-bions  and the state to work out 
their salvation for them,  any initiative that demonstrates how  small-
scale self-help can produce benefits is wor~h exploring.  As  the com-
munity co-operatives have  shown,  the pride and self-confidence of'  a 
whole  commtunity  can be rebuilt even when  the circumstances appear 
almost hopeless. 
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The  story of co-operatives is in most  important respects 
the  same  as  that in most other EEC  countries.  The  Federal 
Republic of Germany  and Belgium have been sufficiently unusual 
to put themselves in a  category of their own.*  In all the 
other countries the old-established agricultural,  credit and 
consumer co-operatives have  been  joined by  an increasing 
number of worker co-ops.  These last are,  according to a 
German  legal term which has  the advantage of precision, 
Arbeiterproduktionsgenossenschaft. 
2.  Agricultural co-ops 
Before  coming to this most recent development  a  word 
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should certainly be  said about the other forms  of co-operative •. 
Agricultural co-operatives are as much  of long standing in the 
Netherlands  as  they are elsewhere.  The  first co-operative for 
the  joint purchase of artificial manure  was  founded  in 1877,  the 
first co-operative-owned dairy factory  in 1886,  the  first co-
operative vegetable market in  1887,  the first co-operative sugar 
factory in 1889,  and the first co-operative strawboard factory 
in 1900.  Since  then solid progress has been made  in farmer-
owned  organisations which were  initially financed largely out 
of capital supplied by their own  members.  Each  member  has his 
vote  and between  them the members  elect the boards  of management. 
· The  Common  Market has itself contributed to ti.e growth of agri-
cultural co-ops,  here as  elsewhere.  They havB quite deliberately 
expanded in sectors where  competition between dealers is far 
from being perfect and have  also co-operated between each other 
in a  manner·which  could be a  model  for workers'  co-ops.** 
Agricultural co-ops are  now,  quite apart  from  anything else, 
important e;ployers.  Between  them  they  employee!  80,000 workers 
in 1979.  The  main  sectors they operated in were  -
Purchasing co-ops 
Manufacturing  and processing 
of farm products 
Selling co-ops 
Farm services 
- 270 agricultural co-ops 
accounted for  60%  of all 
farmers'  purchases 
50 co-ops  accounted for 
85%  of the whole  sector 
- 90 co-ops accounted  for  70% 
of all the  farm products sold 
310 co-operatives provided a 
wide  range of services from  the 
hire of tools and equipment to 
book-keeping and  storage. 
The  combined turnover of the _.first ·three of these types totalled 
over ¢12  milliards. 
*  The  reasons  for  the  failure of worker  co-ops  to take hold in 
Germany  are well set out in H-H  MUnkner,'The Position of Workers' 
Productive Co-operative Societies in the  Federal Republic of 
Germany',  Review of International Co-operation,  Vol  72,  No  3,  1979. 
**F.Terlouw,  'The  role of co-operation in agricultural and  food 
ma!keting in the Netherlands',  National Co-operative Council for 
Agriculture and Horticulture,  The  Hague. 3.  Credit co-operatives 
Credit co-operatives are also strongly developed. 
The  first co-op banks  came  into existence towards  the 
end of the last century,  the Raffeisenbank being  formed 
as  a  unified affair in 1889  in Utrecht and the other, 
Creditbank,  for the  south of the  country,  in Eindhoven. 
The  members  of each were  themselves  independent co-op 
banks directly responsible to their own  individual members. 
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They  survived the depression and the war  and grew 
rapidly thereafter.  One  third of Marshall Aid was  allocated 
to the agricultural sector;  this helped to bolster not only 
agriculture but the banks  that more  and more  farmers  grew 
accustomed to using.  Then  early in the 1970s  a  fusion  was 
agreed on  and in 1979  the Central Rabobank  was  established. 
This is the  second  largest bank in Holland with a  balance-
sheet value of $43 millions.  Its members  are 990 local co-op 
banks with  3100 branches.  They have between  them  just under 
one million individual members  and  25,000 paid employees.  In 
banking·co-ops have  gone  from  strength to strength. 
4.  Consumer  co-ops 
Th:i.s  is not the same  success story.  Consumer  co-ops 
emerged in the  1860s not  long after the first one  of all was 
formed  in Rochdale,  and  from  that time  on for a  period enjoyed 
steady expansion.  By  about  1920 there were  700  local  consumer 
co-ops with  some  400,000 members.  At that time  the government 
was  prepared to advance  interest~free loans to co-ops  in order 
to keep prices down. 
Conditions have been far  from  so favourable  since the 
second world war.  Competition  in retailing has become  more 
intense.  The  economies  of scale,  reflected in purchasing and in 
the size of supermarkets,  have  been  considerable,  and the need 
for capital, if these economies  are to be realised,  has  become 
correspondingly great.  Consumer  co-ops have  not  found it as 
easy to raise capital as their competitors,  and have been fur-
ther hampered by  a  decline  in the co-operative spirit. 
The decline has been a  gradual one.  In  1959  a  powerful 
central body was  set up in the  form of Coop  Nederland.  In the 
1960s it still had  7%  of the national turnover in retailing, 
13%  of all the  supermarkets  that existed,  and  500 grocery shops 
in all.  But the  centralisation left very little scope  for 
member  participation.  Shares were  replaced by membership  cards 
until these too were  abolished.  Dividends were  replaced by 
trading stamps.  All this did little except,  perhaps,  to 
accelerate the decline.  Coop  Nederland was  finally dissolved, 
leaving behind only  five  regional co-operatives which  had  stayed 
out of the  1959  amalgamation.  In  1979  these  five  remaining 
co-ops set up  a  consultative body known  as  Coop  Holland. 5.  Worker  co-ops 
This  sketch is the background to the special interest of 
this  repo~in worker co-ops.  They have  an  even more  venerable 
history than the other three  forms  of co-ops  I  have mentioned. 
Dike-builders set up an organisation in 1825  and peat-cutters 
one in 1830.  But there was  no striking development until much 
later.  In 1901 the  Common  Land  Ownership Movement  was  founded 
on the initiative of the physician-poet-philosopher,  Frederik 
van Eeden.  His hope  was  that farmers would be persuaded to 
own  and work  the land in common.  Two  years  later some  800 
people had  joined the movement  and were  living on the  land in 
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the way  th~ir founder had proposed.  But the experiment was 
short-lived.  A  few  worker co-ops survived in printing,  cigar-
making  and construction.  The  numbers  were  small until well after 
the second war. 
Not until 1959 did the  federation for worker co-ops  come 
into existence in the  form of A.B.C.,  the Associatie van 
Bedrijven Op  Co8peratieve Grondslag.  This  can be translated 
in English as  the Association of. Businesses  formed  as Co-
operatives.  Co-operatives which satisfy the necessary conditions 
can become  members,  these conditions being broadly that they 
should conform  to the principles laid down  by the  International 
Co-operative Alliance.  At  ABC's  General  Meeting every member  co~op 
has  one  vote irrespective of the  number  of employees it may  have. 
Growth  in the  196os was  slow.  Only in the  1970s was  there 
a  spurt.  This was  facilitated by the help received from the 
Cc.nfederation Generale des  SCOP,  the  federal co-op organisation 
in France which is referred to at some  length in the comparable 
report to this that has been prepared by TEN  for that country. 
As  a  result,  a  publication was  prepared about the  constitution 
and potential of co-operatives which had a  wide  circulation in 
the  country.  Dutch trade unionists arid politicians began  to take 
an interest in what. for them was  the new  notion of self-management. 
Students made  enquiries about it.  Newspapermen wrote articles 
about it.  Self-management,  if not exactly at the centre of the 
news,  was at any rate on the  fringes of it. 
One  sign of the increasing interest was  a  decision by the 
two  most influential trade  union  federations  to set up  a  study 
project on  co-operatives.  The  enquiry moved  slowly  and did 
not in the  end issue its conclusions in pub.lic until 1979.  The 
report is the  fullest account yet given of the progress  made 
so far by worker co-ops in the Netherlands  and,  by way  of 
comparison,  in France  and England;  and also of the  steps that 
needed to be taken to promote  their further  growth.*  An  official 
interdepartmental committee was  also set up,  and this has  led to 
a  continuing interest being taken by the government.  In a 
general way,  all but one of the main political parties,  that is 
the Christian Democrats,  Socialists  and  Young  Democrats  (or D66 
as  they are called by way  of abbreviation)  are  favourable to 
worker  co-ops.  This does not mean  that any  affirmative action 
*  Werken  in Ko8peratie.  Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek 
Vakcentrales,  1979.  326 pages.  A 40-page  summary  with the 
same  title was  also published in November  1979.  The  report is 
also available in English translation. has yet been  taken.  It .does  mean  that there is altogether 
a  more  auspicious  atmosphere  and  a  much  better chance  of 
action being taken. 
Before the  trade  union  report was  published ABC  had 
already started its own  study.  This was  carried out on its 
behalf by Adviesgroep Mens  En  Organisatie  (Man  and Organisation 
-a consultancy group),  itself a  co-operative  and  a  member 
of ABC.  I  will come  back to the  outcome of that exercise a 
little later in this report. 
6.  Growth of ABC 
As  in many  other countries there can be no  authoritative 
figures  for the  growth in the  number  of co-ops.  This is 
because  co-ops  can be registered as ordinary companies  or as 
co-ops under  that name  if·there is any procedure  for  so regis-
tering them or not registered at all with any  formal  legal 
character.  The  best that .ABC  has been  able  to do is to collect 
as  full information as it can about existing and  new  co-ops  from 
newspapers  and other published sources.  On  this basis ABC 
estimates that the number of worker co-ops has  risen  from  So 
in 1978  to over  200 in 1981. 
By  no means  all these  are members  of ABC  for the simple 
reason that it does not as yet have  ~y full-time staff even 
to tackle  the work that the existing member  co-ops  give rise to 
without seeking out new  members.  For fear of adding to the  load 
on  the unpaid rrembers  of the  ABC  Board there has not even been 
any deliberate attempt to gain publicity,  at any  rate since  the 
pamphlet  I  have already  mentioned was  published early in the 
1970s.  As  it is, the  members  of the Board are kept extremely 
busy.  Amongst  other duties  they are very much  in demand to 
serve on  the Boards of individual co-ops which  cannot allow 
their own  memben~ to serve on  them.  This is because of the 
manner  in which the  law  on  social insurance discriminates against 
co-ops.  I  will come  back to this point later to explain it in  a 
little more  detail. 
But without  any recruiting drive the membership of ABC 
has  been  on  the  increase all the  same.  At  the end of 1975 it 
had eight member  soc,ieties employing  400 workers.  By  1980 there 
were  38  societies employing  1980 workers,  as  shown  by the table 
which  appears below.  on  1  January  1981  ABC  had  46  member-
societies.  30 co-ops started as  such,  six transformed  from  sound 
capitalist companies  and  two  from ailing capitalist companies. 
The  growth has been steadily upwards.  No  worker co-op in the 
Netherlands has yet collapsed or had to withdraw because of 
failure. 
N4 Growth  of Co-operative Societies affiliated to ABC 
1977  1978  1979  1980* 
Workers  1387  1666  1735  1980* 
Incl.  members  408  485  634  770* 
Turnover**  152  163  195  221* 
Member  societies  15  18  25  38 
*  Estimated  **  In Dfl. millions 
Worker  co-ops  are not distributed evenly between different 
industries.  The  majority are in or closely connected with the 
construction industry.  There  are six building contractors, 
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seven  firms  of architects  and seven others,  including civil 
engineers,  carpenters,  plumbers  and housepainters.  Several of 
them  are at work  in the building of public housing and in the 
renovation of old buildings,  neither of which are particularly 
profitable so that the competition is not very strenuous.  Their 
members  are also well motivated to the task of improving housing 
for specially needy people.  No  doubt the labour-intensive 
character of building also lends itself well to co-operative 
organisation.  Once  a  few  well-Ji.nown building co-ops have  shown 
that they can be  commercially successful that can act as  a  spur 
to others.  Also,  they can support each other within  the  same 
industry as well as being competitive.  Thus,  Werkplaats,  an 
architectural co-operative,  designed a  factory which is at present 
being built by  GCB,  a  straight building co-operative.  Another 
and larger co-op,  MOES,  recently built the extension to·the 
factory belonging to Artiplast,  a  plastics co-op. 
Another interesting feature of ABC's  membership is the 
sizeable number of professional practices which belong to it. 
Architects and civil engineers have  just been mentioned.  In 
addition,  there  are several advertising and publicity consultants, 
a  firm of accountants,  personnel consultants,  housing consultants 
and  Man  and Organisation which calls itse.lf not a  management but 
an organisation consultant.  It will not accept assignments unless 
it is able to consult people  at different levels in any hierarchy, 
not just the  'management'. 
Any  kind of professional is permitted to be  a  co-operative 
except for  lawyers.  In this respect Dutch  law is different  from 
that in some  other EEC  countries which require that professional 
practices  should have  the  legal form  of an unlimited partnership. 
In Holland co-ops  can themselves be set up with unlimited lia-
bility, restricted liability or without any .liability at all fall-
ing on individual members.  Prof~~sional practices are not compelled to be in the  firs.t of these categories.  The 
civil engineering co-op,  the Van  Steenis Coop,  which is 
led by  the President of ABC,  has restricted liability. 
Each member  is required .to have  a  share worth  f  4500 
and in addition to that would be  liable on  a  default for 
anothe.r  f.3000.  Five small case studies of co-ops are 
included in the Appendix: 
Moes  in building 
Artiplast in plastics 
Mens  en Organisatie in consultancy 
Ver  Nobel in children's clothes 
Sara in. feminist  pub~ishing 
Discrimination against co-ops 
The report compiled for  ABC  that I  have  already referred 
to pointed out that co-operative  law as it operates in the 
Netherlands was  drawn  up  wi,th the needs  of agriculture very 
much  in mind.  It is not nearly so suitable for worker  co-ops 
- this for three reasons. 
1.  Agricultural co-ops have as members  of their Boards 
farmers  who  are  not employed by themselves.  But is 
is intrinsic to the notion of a  worker  co-op that 
those  employed by it should also be  on its Board of 
Management.  The  Dutch practice over most but not.all 
of the  country is that if full-time  emplo~rees are 
al.so ,in  the position of employers,  that i:;  on the 
supreme  governing body,  then they are  self-employed, 
or employed by themselves.  Like other self-employed 
people they are not eligible for unemployment or 
sickness .insurance.  The .rates are substantial,  starting 
at a  level of 80%  of previous  income  for the first six 
months  of unemployment.  The  same  applies to sickness. 
So the right is not lightly to be  foregone  by  anyone. 
2.  An  agricultural co-op does not need to have  an  'open 
door'  in .quite the  same  way  as  a  worker  co-op.  Every 
farmer  living in a  certain place may  be eligible for 
membership.  But it may  not necessarily be known,  or 
be of great moment,  if all the eligible farmers  are in 
fact members  or not.  In the case of a  worker  co-op it 
is perfectly clear.  Either all the  employees,  that is 
all eligible people,  have  the right to be members or 
they do not.  According to the ABC  this right should 
be unequivocally written into the constitution of every 
worker co-op. 
3.  Agricultural co-ops have  employees  who  are not members, 
or not necessarily members.  For the same  reason that 
has  just been  given this is not acceptable  in a  worker 
co-op. 
N6 The  differences between agricultural and workP-r  co-ops 
are such that ABC  has  asked the government  for legislation 
that will be  tailormade  for their purposes.  This will require 
a  new  juridical form.  They  do not expect it to materialise 
for some  years yet. 
The  bottlenecks 
Legal reform is not the first priority being put to the 
government  as the result of the Man  and Organisation report 
and the  follow-up  symposium to it in April  1980.  This was 
addressed by Wil  Albeda,  the Minister of Social Affairs as 
well as the Vice-Chairman of the Federation of General  Unions, 
the Chairman of the Protestant trade unions and by Mr.  Provily. 
The  present priorities of ABC  are as  follows: 
1.  Amend  the social insurance  law to allow employee-
directors to be  covered for unemployment  and sickness. 
This point has  already been discussed. 
2.  Co-ops  are  liable to be chronically short of capital, 
including working  capital.  Banks  are usually sus-
picious of them.  Where  is the continuity of manage-
ment,  they ask,  when  members  of Boards are elected 
afresh each year,  or can be;  and when  employees 
through their Boards have  the power of appointment of 
the managers?  Since  they are  so suspicious,  guarantees 
are normally needed  from  the State before  any banks, 
including co-op banks,  will put up  money.  Until  recentl~' 
the Ministry of Economic  Affairs,  innnediately it received 
a  request for  a  guarantee,  consulted the very bank which 
had not been prepared to act on its own.  A recent and 
welcome  change  is that the Ministry has agreed to seek 
the views  of ABC  itself when it is ask;ed  for a  guarantee. 
It used to be  a  requirement that at least 10%  of capital 
should come  from the workers.  This  condition has been 
relaxed.  The present figure is 2%.  But even that limit 
puts  some  new  co-ops  in difficulties.  The  financial 
arrangements  for  co-ops undoubtedly need  a  thorough 
overhaul. 
3.  Co-ops,  like companies,  ordinarily have  to bear a  heavy 
tax charge if they acquire  from  the liquidator a  com-
pany that has  failed.  If,  for example,  a  company  shows 
in its books  that its stock  and equipment is worth 
f  100,000 as it has been written  down  over the years, 
but if the real net worth of the stock and equipment is 
adjudged to be  f  400,000,  then that company is deemed 
to have  made  a  'profit'  of f  300,000 on  which no tax has 
yet been paid.  The  tax on profits is 50%.  So  right away 
the  government  takes  f  150,000.  This is the amount·that 
a  successor co-op would have  to find.  In  the discussions 
with the  government it has been fully accepted by ABC 
N7 that if a  co-op were  not liable in this way  a 
restriction should be  placed on  the manner  in 
which  'profits'  are  disposed of.  There  would be 
no question of distributing them  amongst the members 
of the  co-op.  A change in the  law  in this respect 
could help to save  many  thousands more  jobs. 
4.  ABC  would greatly like it if the French practice 
prevailed and profits could be put before tax into 
indivisible reserves.  This  is an  important advantage 
enjoyed by  French co-ops which could well be made  more 
general. 
5.  The  books  of co-ops are  open  to all members.  There is 
full publication.  There is no hiding of figures  as 
there quite often is with capitalist companies.  This 
fact should be more  fully  acknowledged by  the govern-
ment when  possible concessions are being discussed. 
6.  ABC  has  asked  for  a  grant from  the  government  so that 
it can afford to hire some  paid staff - it has  none  at the 
moment  - and so help set up  more  co-ops which  could mop 
up  some  of the unemployment  in the country.  The  member-
ship  fee  for most member  co-ops is only nominal,  the 
fear being that many  of them would not be  able to afford 
more.  This  request was  resisted because  ABC  has been 
regarded by the  government  - for  reasons that are not 
altogether clear- as an  'employers'  organisation';  and 
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that has  in the past ruled it out.  ABC  is therefore setting up 
a  'self-management  foundation'  alongside itself which 
will not be debarred  from  receiving a  grant designed to 
advance  the central organisation of worker  co-ops  to the 
point where it can be self-supporting.  The  first step 
will obviously be to recruit membership  from  the many 
co-ops which are still outside its ranks  and  whose mem-
bers do not see the value of  joining unless  a  more 
effective support service  can be given. 
Worker  co-ops in Holland are very  far  from having devel-
oped  as  far as agricultural ones.  But they are clearly on the 
increase.  If the present rate continues  they are  going  in 
time  to amount  to an  important force  in the economy,  and will 
do  so the more  readily if some  of the problems  mentioned can be 
overcome. 
Addendum 
Since this report was  written the Netherlands  government 
has  announced that it will grant aid ABC  at the rate of 
D.fl 500,000 a  year for  the next four years.  This will enable 
ABC  to appoint a  permanent  full-time staff and clearly 
represents a  major step  forward  for  the  worker co-operative 
movement. APPENDIX 
Case  Study No.  1:  Moes  Co-operative Building Firm 
The  firm started in 1932  as ·a  small business.  It 
employed only about  20 people until 1945.  Mr.  Moes,  the 
founder,  was  a  carpenter and builder.  After the war  a 
great deal of rebuilding was  needed to make  good  war-damage 
and the  co-op expanded rapidly.  New  polders had to be  con-
structed to replace the  demolished ones destroyed by the 
Germans.  On  the polders  farm houses had to be built.  The 
firm  grew  as  more  and more  land was  reclaimed.  In  1967  a 
new  town,  Lelystadt,  was  founded  on one of the largest pold-
ers.  Now  it already houses  40,000 people.  Another new  town, 
Almere,  was  founded  in 1974  and is planned to have  240,000 
people by the year  2000.  The  co-op builds 600-700 houses  a 
year,  mainly rehousing people  from  Amsterdam  who  have  been 
displaced by their old houses  being pulled down  or rebuilt. 
The  co-op also builds offices and factories there.  They  have 
to compete  for each new  contract against keen  opposition. 
Price-cutting is continuous.  The  co-op specialises in build-
ing on  polders,  using  a  system of concrete-casting on  the site 
which enables  them to build very fast. •  They  can  complete 15 
houses  a  week  on  one site making up  a  total of about  700 in 
a  year. 
Their knowledge  of the building techniques  they special-
ise in stems  from  a  single individual,  a  civil engineer,  who 
became  very  important to the  firm  in 1969  when  he  was  appointed 
Director of the  company.  Mr.  Van  de  Graaf  came  from  a  company 
that itself specialised in concrete building and he  knew  about 
prefabrication and casting.  His  knowledge  and drive  gave  a 
new  impulse to the  company.  His  appointment coincided with 
the  firm's  need to move  to new  premises as they outgrew their old 
one.  In  1971. they made  the move.  All that time  the  firm was 
still owned by the  one  family.  Mr.  Moes  had one  son  and two 
daughters.  But he  knew  that none of them was  capable of lead-
ing the  company after his retirement.  Already,· too many  of the 
top managers  were  from  the  family,  which  accounted in part for 
the fact that to 1975 business was  very bad and they made  more 
losses than profits.  Mr.  Moes's  first idea was  to sell out to 
another large building company.  That  firm said they would o.nly 
buy if Van  de  Graaf came  with the firm.  Van  de  Graaf did not 
agree to this;  he wanted to remain with  a  smaller unit.  At 
that juncture the workers'  council of the  firm proposed turning 
the  company  into a  co-operative.  Many  of them had been  employed 
by the  same.firm for  a  very long time,  a  tradition in that part 
of the country.  They had  a  family  spi,ri t.  They  did not want 
the  company  sold to  a  larger one. 
Once  the  idea of the co-operative was  advanced the prob-
lem was  to clothe it with reality.  By  chance  a  sociologist was 
at the  time  studying how  the workers'  council operated.  Through 
N9 his connections  and knowledge  of the working  of government 
Mr.  Werkman  managed to put the workers'  council in touch 
with government officials.  Out of the discussions  came  the 
plan to transform the company  from  a  private  family business 
into a  co-operative.  Mr.  Werkman  was  supported in this by 
Van  de  Graaf who  wanted. to keep it as  a  separate entity. 
Once  Mr ..  Moes  realised that .he  could not sell the  firm 
without Van  de  Graaf he  was ready to accept the case  for  a 
co-operative.  Money  was  borrowed  from  the National Invest-
ment Bank.  The  capital had to be  'in a  dead hand',  meaning 
indiv~sible with no  single worker  able to run off with it. 
The bank  loan had to be  guaranteed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs.  Altogether  4,200,000 guilders was  paid over and 
Mr.  Moes  left 1,000,000 in the  company  without interest as 
his stake.  By  1981 he had been repaid this one million in 
full. 
The  co-operative was first set up in 1976  and  the workers' 
general meeting decided that no profits should be distributed 
to the workers  until at least 4  million guilders had been 
accumulated in the reserve  fund.  Thereafter one third of any 
annual profit could be paid out to workers,  one third put into 
the  reserve  fund and one  third used as  surplus tax to the 
government.  1981  is the first year that any money  can be paid 
out to the workers. 
The  co-operative has  400  m~mbers out of about 1,000 
employees.  Only  about  200  come  to the general meeting which is 
held normally  once  a  year in June unless there is an  emergency. 
Company  policy is made  by the Board of Directors who  put up 
proposals to the Board of Management which is in turn elected 
by the general meeting. 
Any  worker is entitled to become  a  member after having 
worked  for  the  company  for  one year.  All workers  are entitled 
to participate in profits,  not only members.  The  ca~culations 
to be made  this year will be very complicated because  some  of 
the members  and workers have  left.  But they are still entitled 
to their share of the profit calculated back to each of the 
years .during which they were  employed by the  company.  Only 
retired people  so far have  been given their share of profit 
at. the time of retirement.  This was  because  of the need to pay 
the  4  million guilders into the  reserve  fund. 
In the  company  there is a  high turnover of labour. 
People want to work near where  they  live;  depending  on  where 
the work sites are they  change  jobs.  Last year out of the 
1,000 workers  in the  company,  400 were  new  ones.  These  'casual' 
workers don't feel  the  same  commitment to the co-op as more 
permanent employees. 
.,:  ' 
NlO Mr.  Van  de  Graaf died of cancer in 1978.  This was  a 
great loss to the  firm.  They  knew  that his illness was  fatal 
for six months  beforehand.  It was  decided to set up  a  manage-
ment team of four people  to replace him rather than  appoint 
just one person. 
Mr.  Van  Veen,  the  Commercial Director whom  we  inter-
viewed,  came  to the  firm in 1977  from  another building firm, 
also a  family  firm,  where his  advancement was  blocked by the 
sons  of the  founder.  When  asked whether he thought a  co-
operative was  a  better system of organisation all he  would say 
was  that it was  not worse;  it was difficult to say whether it 
was  better.  He  thought the process of changing  over to co-
operative organisation had to be  long drawn  out.  'You have  to 
change people's mental attitude.'  Some  of the difficulties 
he mentioned were  the size of the co-op,  the fact that it had 
to work  on widely scattered sites and that consequently the ties 
between the different sections and between.workers were  not all 
that strong.  It was  hard to get them to work  together.  He 
also said that in Holland the  general attitude is acquisitive. 
The  members,  the  400 committed people,  believed strongly in the 
co-op and  some  of the other workers did too.  They enjoyed 
better working conditions and  felt they were all actively creat-
ing a  better company.  The  profit sharing was  also attractive. 
He  himself wanted to promote  the. co-operative but he  was  aware 
of needing,  as he said,  two legs on the ground.  With 1,000 
people in a  company you were  liable to get l,a>o different views 
of what  a  co-operative should be. 
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We  asked  about the attitude of government departments and 
local authorities who  gave  the co-op its orders.  He  said that 
some  firms  were  nervous  about giving them  orders because they 
were  a  co-operative.  Sometimes  these orders came  from  large 
insurance  companies  and pension  funds.  In order to convince 
them that the  company  was  viable he  had to take their accounts 
whenever he went to meet  a  new  client and go through the accounts 
with them.  He  felt very proud when  he did this.  Much  of their 
work is in public housing and other low-cost housing for local 
authorities,  also premium housing.  The  firm worked with teams 
of architects,  construction engineers  and housing corporations 
in order to build large low-cost estates.  About  70%  of their 
work  was  in public housing.  They also built some  private hous-
ing  (called premium housing)  which is cheap housing with  large 
government  subsidies.  Apart  from that,  they build factories 
and  shops  and restore old buildings. 
Many  other companies  started in the  30s were  now  in the 
same  position as  Moes.  The original founders want to retire and 
hand  over the  company  but without suitable heirs  from  the  family. 
Some  of these  companies  have  come  to Moes  for advice  on  how  to 
form  a  co-operative. Trades  unions 
Sixty percent of the workers  are  in unions,  either in 
the Christian Confessional Union  or in the General Workers' 
Union.  At first the  unions were  very happy that the  firm 
was  saved.  But since then they have to some extent lost power. 
When  workers  take part directly in making policy the old 
workers'  councils have  tended to lose power.  By  law every 
company  above  a  certain size in Holland has  to have  a  workers' 
council.  In Moes  the  union  members  are the most highly 
motiva~ed and involved people of all. 
The directors  of the  firm have  to persuade both the 
workers'  council and  the board of manag~ment of the rightness 
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of their plans.  The  workers'  council tends  to be  interested in 
short-term advantages  such as  wage  increases,  whereas  the  board 
of management is more  concerned about the  long-term prospects 
for  the  company.  If every worker in the  company  was  a  member  01\ 
the co-operative they would not then be obliged to have  a 
workers'  council which  in effect represents the union. 
The  wages  the  company  pays  have  to be agreed with the 
unions  in the normal way.  The  whole  salary structure of the 
firm is planned by the directors  and put to the board of manage-
ment,  who  if they agree,  take it to the general meeting~  The 
differentials are  on  a  scale of roughly not more  than  3  to 1,  1:he 
average salary of the manual workers being the base line.  On 
salaries they cannot move  far  from  the general norm or they would 
lose  good people to other companies.  At first all manual employ-
ees had equal pay.  They  then  found that among  the manual  work-
ers the less efficient stayed and the best left.  So equal pay 
was  abandoned.  Mr.  Van  Veen,  the Director, is often rur.gup by 
headhunters who  offer him double his salary.  He  has  not so 
far been tempted by these offers;  he has  seen people who  go  up 
high very fast  come  down  equally fast in other companies. 
'Stars fall as  fast as  they rise.'  If you lose capacity in any 
way  you can get kicked down  in an ordinary capitalist concern. 
He  felt that people were given too much  information to digest. 
He  used the analogy of the helicopter.  When  very  close to the 
ground the pilot can make  very little qf what  he  sees,  whereas 
once it rose higher  (like a  manager)  he  could see  a  bigger view 
and make  more  sense of it. 
In every section of the company  they have working  groups 
for discussion purposes.  Such  a  group may  meet  on  the site 
every week.  In the financial section at head office they may 
meet every month,  in the  commercial  section every two  weeks, 
depending on the need.  The  head of each of these discussion groups 
meets with the next section above him.  He  ~alled it the  lynch-pin 
system.  The  link person in these groups  is always  the supervisor 
or manager of the group.  If anyone below him is dissatisfied 
he  can  take his case to a  corr1plaints  committee. Case Study No.  2:  Artiplast Co-operative at Lelystadt 
Lelystadt is a  new  town  some  30 kilometres  from Amsterdam. 
It is built in a  polder.  Many  of the houses  there have been 
.built by the Moes  Co-operative. 
Our guide,  Hugo  van de  Zwaluw,  began almost  immediately 
by giving his views of the  co-operative  although he did stress 
his limited experience.  He  considered there were both disadvan-
tages  and  advantages to it. 
First, as to the disadvantages,  he  thought that relatively 
uninformed people had to make  decisions above  their competence. 
Nor  can decisions be  taken quickly.  For anything important he 
always had to wait until the Wednesday  management meeting.  He 
also thought there was  a  good deal of time wasted in discussion. 
On  the other hand the  advantage is that people do  seem to 
Nl3 
be  more  committed,  more  involved and work  harder than in ordinary 
companies. 
Hugo  referred to the director in his rather good English 
as  'the boss'.  His  name  was  Mr.  Stuifzand.  He  founded the  co-
operative  11 years ago.  He  had been in the same  line of business 
(plastic injection moulding)  in partnership with his brother 
before he broke  away  from  him  and  decided to start a  co-operative. 
He  provided all the initial capital. 
People have  to be members  of the workforce  for two years 
before  they are entitled to join the co-operative. 
One  man  in the workshop had ginger hair and  rather bright 
blue eyes.  It turned out that he  was  a  member  of the board. 
He  said it was  much  better to work  in a  co-operative than an 
ordinary company  because you have  a  say in what happens.  At 
the last meeting of the board they'd discussed whether to have  a 
new  management.  They  are  'walking warm'  on the question at the 
moment.  It will be  further discussed at the annual meeting of 
the co-operative which is on  Easter Friday,  the  'day when  Jesus 
came  up  from  the ground'. 
we  were  joined at the tea table by a  mould maker  called 
Theo Fleere.  Theo was  another member  of the elected board. 
Theo explained that Mr.  Stuifzand started the co-operative 
because that was his ideal.  He  still believes in it very 
strongly.  It's his style of life.  He  loaned 125,000 guilders 
to it as its initial capital.  25,000 were paid back to him 
rather recently.  Everyone calls him the boss  - he's the chief 
designer as well as being the director.  But he does not behave 
like  a  boss  so to his  face  they do not refer to him as boss but 
by his surname.  He  is not elected each year by the board or 
the general meeting.  It is taken  for granted that he will 
remain  the director as  long as he wants  to be.  He  has said that 
he  intends to leave  the co-operative in five to ten years  and 
start a  new  firm. Same  people are in positions where  they are really being 
asked to do more  and decide more  than they are capable of. 
Perhaps  the  firm has  grown  too fast.  When  Thea joined it, it 
only had 8  employees.  Now  it has  30. 
The  difference between the highest and  the  lowest wage 
is in the ratio 1:2.5 before taxes.  The  wages  of the shop 
floor workers are  somewhat higher than those that would be 
laid down  by trade unions.  Mr~  Smit is the highest paid.  Be 
~s the technical  mainte~ance engineer.  The  boss gets just a 
little bit less but then he only works  four  days whereas 
Mr.  Smit works  five. 
Thea was  in the  same  job before in Amsterdam.  He  wanted 
to move  out of the city because  he didn't think it was  a  good 
place  for  children to be brought up in.  He  moved  to Lelystadt 
for that reason. 
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Membe.rs  do  not put in any money  themselves but leave their 
profit-share in the  company.  Thea  thought that two years as a 
qualifying period may  be too  long although the difference in 
practice between members  and non-members  was  not very great. 
Non-members  can take part in discussions although they cannot 
vote.  The  statute which provides  for the two-year period could 
be  changed at a  general meeting if people wished. 
At the general meeting  of which there are four to five in 
a  year some  20 mertbers  attend.  They meet  in the evenings,  as 
does  the elected board of management which consists of only 3 
people.  The  boss is not on  the elected board but he does come 
to the meeting every alternate week.  They have fairly lively 
discussions  about finance  and  about the eventual withdrawal of 
Mr.  Stuifzand.  They have more  or  less decided that when  he does 
leave  they will replace him with  a  management  team rather than 
with one  person. 
The  only general meeting held in working  time is the annual 
one at Easter.  All other meetings  are outside working hours. 
The  last dismissals were  in  1973 when  two men  were  sacked 
after the oil crisis.  The director decided who  should. go. 
TWo  of the non-members  were the  ones to leave.  Members  ~­
selves can only be dismissed by the Board. 
They  had  a  good deal of discussion recently about one 
unpopular person in an  important  job.  The members  voted against 
him.  They did not want him to be in that job and he had to 
change  over to another.  There are only two trade union members 
in the whole  factory. 
'I want to say what  I  think and help decide things'. 
Thea said that he'd prefer to work  in a  co-op rather than an 
ordinary company  even  though he had to get less money  for it. Last year was  the first in which  there was  a  distribution 
of profits.  At  the general meeting they decided to put 40% 
into reserves  and  the rest into the distribution.  In previous 
years  they did not want to pay out profits because it would 
have meant people  were paying more  income  tax as well  as  tax 
for the co-operative itself.  But they had hit on  a  device  for 
at any rate cutting down  the  tax.  Before if the profits had 
been,  say,  100,000 guilders  50%  of. that had  gone  i.n  tax, 
leaving 50,000 guilders over.  If they put 30,000 into reserve 
that left 20,000 for distribution, all of that being taxed as 
it was  received by the workers.  The  new  system was  this:  out 
of the  100,000 the workers  gave  themselves  a  bonus  of 40,000  • 
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. This was  subject to tax.  After the bonus  was  paid,  60,000 was 
left.  50%  of this had to be paid to the government,  but it was 
only 30,000 instead of 50,000,  once  again leaving 30,000 guilders 
over for the reserve. 
Case  Study No.  3:  Advies  Groep  Mens  En  Organisatie 
Mr.  Cassee  is the Vice-President of the  ABC.  He  came  into 
his office in a  beautiful old house  on the canal in Amsterdam, 
one  of the many  with which the city is adorned,  just about the 
same moment  that we  did.  He  had been walking fast  from the 
central station.  It is about four minutes  from his office 
through the  'red light district'  as he put it.  He  is a  short 
man  with a  face  largely covered with beard.  Very energetic. 
Very forthright manner  of  speal~ing.  He  is a  former professional 
soldier who'd retired or at any rate resigned early, it seemed 
partly because he did not approve  of the involvement of Holland 
with nuclear weapons.  He  said,  that although the government 
denied there were nuclear installations on  Dutch soil, he knew 
there were  because he  used to be responsible  for  some of the 
stores that went  onto the sites ,.,hen  he  was  in the quartermaster 
general's office  •.  The  installations were all guarded by American 
soldiers,  not Dutch. 
He  said that the body he  worked  for was  very much  a  co-
operative.  They  do  not want to advise managements.  They want 
to advise people at every level.  As  an  example of the sort of 
work they did,  he said that  for  some  years  now  he  and his coll-
eagues have been  advising the Labour  Inspection Department of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs.  It's a  five-year project  •.  The 
Labour  Inspectorate have had  a  narrow view of their functions. 
He  and his colleagues had been trying to help them to take a 
wider view of the  influence they could have  on  the quality of 
work  in the places that they inspect as well as its safety. 
His body had been established with.eight members.  They  are 
all employees,  shareholders  and  members  of the board.  The 
legal constitution is that of a  company.  They  chose this in 
order to prove that self-government  can work in an ordinary 
company.  Only  wo~kers can  be  shareholders.  On  the board each man  or woman  has  one vote irrespective of the  amount of 
shareholding he  or she has.  That is in the constitution. 
In practice each one  has  the  same shareholding. 
The methods  they use  for their consultancy mirror their 
constitution.  They are different  from  other consultancies. 
They are well known  in their trade for their democracy. 
As  another example  of the work  they are doing  he 
mentioned the reorganisation of the Personnel Department 
of the Free University of Amsterdam.  Yet  another was  the 
construction company  known  as  GCB.  It's the oldest co-op in 
Holland.  They  go back to 1922.  It now  has  about 140 employees. 
He  and his colleagues had helped them to make  a  policy plan  for 
the next five years which could be,  and  indeed had to be,  dis-
cussed with all the members  of the group.  He  thought GCB  had 
a  good collective leadership and did not need  a  manager or 
a  clearly demarcated management of .any  sort. 
The  priority in most organisations is that the manager 
should have  the right  'f.eeling'  of responsibility about what 
decisions he  can take and what decisions he needs  to share with 
others.  The  elected members  of the board need to have  the right 
feeling too.  The  formal  constitutions do not matter  so much. 
What matters  always  is how  things really work  in practice.  He 
in.stance.d  a  ;firm he  knew  well which was  started by one  man  and 
now  has 120 employees.  It is really a  democr;:.tic  firm,  much 
more  so than some  of the  co-ops  he  knows.  The  employees have 
a  real feeling of  'we' ;  he knows  co-ops with no  feeling of  •we 
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at all.  In that firm the profits are distributed just as they 
would be in a  co-op with  the  same  amount  going to each person 
irrespective of his salary or what he has contributed during 
the year. 
All this is not to say that legal ownership does  not 
matter.  It matters for instance that in a  co-op it is not 
possible to sell out.  The  whole  'company'  cannot be  sold out to 
some  other larger or different firm or taken over without the 
workers themselves wishing it. 
'You can't set up  a  co-op  for  anyone  else.  You  can perhaps 
help with advice,  that's  all~  Generally people  are much  too 
keen  on rules. • 
One  advantage of  co~ops is  that they  are much  cheaper to 
set up than an ordinary company.  There has been a  rash of very 
small companies  set up in the  last years made  up of one or two 
people which  are expressly concerned to avoid taxes.  In order 
to prevent that the State has  laid it down  that a  new  company 
has to issue at least 35,000 guilders in shares.  There was  no 
such provision for co-ops.  There are virtually no  costs in 
setting them up.  .:r  ..  1 
Nl6 Ordinarily a  trade unionist is not the right person to 
advise in a  time  of crisis for a  commercial organisation. 
He  does not have  the right frame  of mind.  And  he does not 
feel altogether happy when  people work  far beyond  the 
ordinary trade union hours at less than trade union wages. 
But it may  be quite essential that people should be willing 
to work  for  70 hours a  week  at any rate for  a  period in order 
to preserve their jobs.  The  willlngness ·to work  hard is a 
great asset.  In times of crisis people are  able to change 
their attitudes more  readily than at ordinary times. 
He  said about GCB  that they probably have kept on more 
people than they should.  It was  easy to see that co-ops could 
save some.  ailing firms.  It is also clear that because they 
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are  committed to the maintenance of employment  they avoided 
sacking people when  a  capitalist firm in similar circumstances 
would have little compunction about doing so.  Sane of them may 
have rules about not being able to dismiss  any member.  'Who 
is firing who?'  is a  very important question in a  co-op.  If it 
has to be  don~, people like to make  the directors 
responsible for it instead of taking responsibility themselves. 
No  co-op has  collapsed in the last ten years to his knowledge. 
His consultancy firm was  started in 1974.  They were almost 
immediately in difficulties.  The  eight founders  came  from  a 
large management  consultancy firm whose  methods  and  attitude 
they did not really approve of.  They  came  with rather high 
salaries.  He  himself had  a  salary of 3,300 guilders  a  month 
when  the new  co-operative was  formed.  He  had to reduce it to. 
2,500 to make  it possible to survive.  Other people took similar 
cuts.  One  member  borrowed money,  or at any·::tate:was  ~illing 
to on  the security of his car in order to put it into the 
co-op. 
They  decided early on that everyone would  have  the same 
salary.  As  a result of this,  over  the  \'years  something like 
five people had  left them.  There is only one  exception to the rule 
of equality.  They do allow older people to get larger salaries 
than younger,  although the difference between the top and the 
bottom is only about. 15%. 
He  thought that it should be  laid. down  in the constitution 
of any co-op that every worker  should have  the right to be a 
member  from  the very first day.  There should be no probation 
period and no conditions.  This is psychologically very important. 
A co-op should not have  any employees.  The  present constitutions 
of many  co-ops have too many  loopholes in them  instead of making 
it absolutely clear that every worker has  a  right to be a  member. 
Also the  law should provide that once  a  co-op has been created it 
cannot be  transformed into a  capitalist or other organisation  • 
.... Then  again' back to his own  Consultancy.  He  said the 
seven members  there are at the moment  meet every  Monday 
morning.  There  are  two sociologists,  one psychologist, 
one  technologist,  one  economist  and one  former  army  officer, 
namely himself.  The  Chairman  changes  each week  and  the 
Chairman does  the minutes  on his own  meeting.  The Chairman 
has  to lead the discussions  and  stop them when  he  l~kes. 
Everyone is equally but informally responsible  for the 
management. 
On  the question of size he  said this is a  matter of 
organisational philosophy.  He  thinks people  ought to be able 
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to meet each other.  But you  could sustain a  fairly  large under-
taking if it was  imbued with  'small thinking'. 
He  recognised that not everyone could work  in the way  that 
they do.  They had chosen out of the  100 or more  staff of the 
consultancy  firm  from which they sprang the eight they thought 
would be especially suitable for it.  Even so they had lost 
five.  Given  the way  people  are brought up and given the way 
that most organisations operate, it is perhaps not surprising 
that so few  people are able to  op~rate a  genuine co-operative. 
The  most  important file of all in the office is the day 
report.  This is contributed to by all members  of staff. 
E•1eryone  has· a  duty to write in it and  other people have  a  duty 
t~ read it.  'Sometimes people say to me  that I  am  only writing -
I  don't put enough in.  I  say that I  am  only writing for myself. 
It's of no general interest.  But they say we'd like to know 
about it.'  The minutes  of the weekly meeting also matter. 
Everyone has their own  copy. 
Ca~e Study No.  4:  King.  Nobel Co-operative 
This  co-operative in Zutphen makes  clothes for babies  and 
young  children.  It employs  25  people.  Five of these are part-
time.  we  talked to Freek Clappers,  who  described himself as 
the overall manager in charge of finance,  planning and the 
co-ordination of work.  The  sales manager is Mr.Nobel himself,  a 
third man  is the works  manager  and another man  was  the maintenance 
man.  The rest of the employees are all women.  The  most important. 
of them is probably the designer who  works part time.  Mr.Clappers 
described her as  'not an expensive designer'.  It must be in part 
due to her that they are  now  looking as if they are going to 
make  a  success. 
This co-op started as  a  result of a  business failing.  It 
was  a  family  firm  owned entirely by Mr.  Nobel  who  founded it. 
About  a  year ago he had such a  problem of debts that he  could not 
pay his workers.  The whole  factory was  about to close down.  It 
could not compete with Hong  Kong  and Taiwan.  These problems  had 
oean evident for about  3 years and  they  ha~ brought in a  designer 
as a  part-time worker for  3  days  a  week.  But this cost money 
and Mr.  Nobel did not have  enough  money  to pay  for the changes he  wanted to make.  They had decided to go up-market and make 
mor.e  luxurious clothes.  The problem was  now  how  to sell 
these clothes  and to.find a  secure market for them. 
When  the  firm was  on  the verge  of going into liquidation 
the suggestion that they should turn it into a  co-op came 
from  Mr. Ad dink,  who  was  the union organiser for the Jf.·NV  to 
which the workers  belonged.  The  sequence of events was  as 
follows.  In May  23  people were  employed by the old.factory. 
on  the 14th May  the old firm went into liquidation and  the 
factory closed.  Of  the 23,  five left because  they did not 
believe in a  co-operative,  while  two were.unwell and therefore 
decided not to stay on.  The  16 others opened the  new  co-op on 
the 19th May.  Nine  new  workers  joined them.  On  the  3rd June 
they became  a  legal co-op.  The  new  co-op bought the old company 
from the liquidator.  There was  no tax paid on the  changeover. 
The  local government helped them with  finance  by offering a  loan 
at 10%  interest to be  repaid out of the profits when possible. 
This  loan was  50,000 guilders.  They  also bought the machines 
from  the old company  on  HP  terms  and  had to pay 59,000 guilders 
for those.  They were  the first factory to apply for a  loan to 
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the local authority.  Within a  week  47  others had  asked for similar 
facilities.  There  is now  a  development board to help small 
businesses as part of the local authority. 
The  workers did not put in any money  themselves but they 
offered to work  more  hours than they had before for the same 
wages,  so that in effect they were  contributing a  certain amount 
of free  labour.  They did this for three months until the company 
got onto a  better financial  footing.  Each  worker did 6  hours 
a  week  unpaid. 
Mr.  Clappers said that there had been many  problems at 
the beginning.  He  himself had been  financial  administrator 
in another factory previously and  then worked as  a  social worker 
with young people.  The  trades union organiser had asked him to 
take on the  job because he had many  connections with members  of 
the  ABC  and was  very interested in co-operatives.  He  said that 
at first none.  of the workers  knew  what  a  co-op was.  Everyone 
wanted to be  a  leader.  He  said  'Practice isn't like theory. 
In the beginning it's difficult to get started.  There are many 
ideas.  People  have  to try it in practice.  It takes a  long time 
to grow  up in the  co-~p movement.' 
He  said it took three months  to develop. a  proper managerial 
system.  The  factory workers  do not have  any managerial know-how 
or sales experience.  They  have  had to learn it all from  scratch. 
They had  five advisers as  follows: 
1.  The  Trades Union organiser 
2.  A representative  from  ABC 
3.  A  repr~entative from  the local Chamber  of Commerce 
4.  The  local authority specialist adviser on  textiles 
5.  Someone  from  the small businesses development board Three  of these  five  advisers  (numbers  2,  3  and  5)  form the 
board members  of the  co-op.  Because of the  problems we  had 
been told about previously to do with social insurance, 
workers  cannot yet both be on  the board and  receive social 
insurance.  So they have  no elected board as yet.  The 
existing three-persons  are unpaid.  They have  open meetings 
to which  anyone  in the  company  can  come.  Membership of the 
co-op is open  to all workers  after they have worked  for  two 
Lvnths.  At the moment  all are members.  Most are  also union 
members.  There is no workers'  council as there are under 
100 people employed in the factory. 
They  work  a  five-day week  from  7.30 to 4.30 on  a  shift 
system.  They don't need more hours than that to keep up with 
their orders. 
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The  setting up  of the co-op was  done as  a  crisis measure. 
They  only had two-three  days  to prepare this.  Nobel himself 
could not get a  loan because of the bad state of the company's 
books.  He  owed  too much  money.  A new  company  had to be started. 
The  advisers  listed above persuaded the local government to 
make  the  loan and local MPs  to ask questions in Parliament. 
The  actual negotiations for the  loan were  conducted by adviser 
No.3.  The  bank allowed an overdraft while  the. loan was  being 
arranged.  In order to set up  a.  co-op the  ABC  needed to send 
one person full time  for four \'reeks  to help them.  This posed  a 
great problem because the ABC  has no full-time staff as yet. 
Cash  flow is a  headache.  Because of the firm's bad repu-
tation they cannot obtain credit for raw materials.  There is a 
three-month  gap between the orders'  payments being met and the 
time when  they are delivered.  There is also a  problem about the 
timing of the new  designs.  The  ;ummer  collection is ready in 
January but they cannot get any  cash back until September.  So 
it is with the winter collection.  In spite of these difficulties 
Mr.  Clappers  thinks  they will survive.  They  now  have orders  for 
four months  ahead which is good  for the textile industry at this 
moment.  This  is why  the bank is allowing  them to have the 
necessary overdraft.  In the past they had sold 80%  of their 
production to one  firm,  C  & A.  Now  they only sell them 60%  and 
the other 40%  to other outlets.  The old owner,  Nobel,  was  kept 
on because of his contacts  and know-how  about the whole business. 
Now  he  specialises in sales instead of trying to cover the whole 
management.  In the financial year 1979,  the  loss under the old 
management  was  150,000 guilders.  The  current loss,  between  May 
1980 to December  1980,  was  35,000 guilders.  He  thinks they may 
break even by August or September and then make  a  profit in the 
following year if things continue  as  they are. 
we  asked what difference the changeover had made  to the 
workers.  The main one  he  could point to was that the sickness 
rate was  10%  less than before.  ,.  ~e thought there would be  a problem in getting the workers to take an interest in 
management  since most of them were  young girls who  had 
left school at 15  or  16 years old.  However,  when  we  spoke 
to one  of the older women  she said she liked the  co-operative 
system better - it gave you  a  feeling that you were working 
together and for yourself which was  not there before.  She 
said she herself would be interested in discussions about 
future planning. 
Case  Study No.  5:  Twee  Jaar Sara  (Two  Years  - Sara - taken 
---------~--------~-------------~~  from  a  repo~t produced by 
the co-op itself) 
Why  a  feminist publishing house? 
1.  To  control the profits made  from  feminist books 
2.  To  eliminate the alienation one  finds  in most  jobs 
3.  To  create  jobs  for women  - particularly those with skills 
in publishing,  but who  had become  disenchanted with 
that field 
The  co-operative began with women  who  had worked  in pub-
lishing.  All participants would  attend meetings  and work in 
diverse ways.  Everyone would  share in both management  -
intellectual - tasks as well as manual  work.  The  group should 
not be  too big so that decisions could be made  ~~ffectively. 
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Most  women  taking part described themselves  as  socialist-feminists. 
They wondered if they would have  the energy  and finances to start 
an  independent publishing house,  or whether it would be wiser to 
join an existing one.  They  contacted the small publishing house, 
Bold  Mina,  and  found their ideas so similar that they decided to 
become  one  house.  They had difficulty deciding on  a  name,  then 
when  after a  meeting Sara the cat walked in they named  the house 
after her. 
One  of the first problems was  money.  They  applied and 
secured a  grant  from  the Ministry of Cultural Recreation and 
Social Work  for Fl 200,000 with the condition that an  independent 
accountant would control their books.  They were  also supported 
by the feminist movement.  They  accepted many  small  loans offering 
6%  interest with promise to repay in 5  years.  They  collected 
Fl 150,000 in this way,  and decided that was  enough to start. 
They also started a  foundation  in order to apply for grants. 
The wider aims of the  foundation,  Sara's Mother,  is to stimulate 
women  to express their thoughts  in writing. 
They  agreed to work  on  an equal basis.  They  did not want 
a  company  with  a  director at.the top,  a  group of stockholders 
who  make  decisions  simply because they have  money,  then employees 
at the bottom.  They  wanted to have  approximately the  same  income 
for'everyone with consideration for personal situations,  e.g. 
children,  also distance  from work.  The  in:i.tial  group consisted 
of 13  women  all of whom  would be equally responsible for  the collective.  Evaluated later on,  this decision turned out 
to be  naive  for  some  were  far  more  energetic and motivated 
than others.  They were  too accepting  and not sufficiently 
critical of each other.  gowever,  they wanted to avoid a 
role structure, hiring procedures with fixed selection 
criteria, etc.  as in normal  companies.  They  found  that 
the most important thing working in such  close collaboration 
was  that they personally like each other. 
They decided that the collective would make  ail import-
ant decisions  such as which books to publish and how  to 
N22 
divide up the work.  They  agreed that one member  should be 
full-time employed,  the others began  on  a  freelance basis or 
worked voluntarily.  There were  many  tasks  to be done  - reading 
of manuscripts,  translating,  editing,  typing,  packing,  cleaning. 
They felt that all women  should be paid properly for the 
work  they do,  but in starting out it was  clear that they would 
need many  volunteers.  As  time  went on  they  reached a  decision 
as to which tasks specifically should be  done  on  a  freelance 
basis,  which  ones voluntarily,  and which ones by a  full-time 
employed person.  They were  able  to provide more  full-time 
employment  and paid themselves  a  basic wage  of Fl 1,700 per month 
after tax,  a  relatively  low  income. 
At present five  women  are on a  regular salary.  Packing, 
reading manuscripts,  attending conferences and  book  fairs,  and 
arranging meetings  are done voluntarily.  Writers,  translators, 
and illustrators are paid on  a  freelance basis.  They are 
reluctant to employ more  women,  for that might  force  them into a 
purely commercial operation,  and  too many people would be depend-
ent on  the house. 
In the beginning everyone shared in all areas of work.  Thfs 
was  a  good  arrangement to cover  absences  through illnesses and 
holidays,  but it was  found better to take into consideration each 
person's skills and preferences.  So same division of labour has 
evolved.  The  five  employed women  ~otate the secretarial work; 
and each spends  one  day  a  week  doing unpopular odd  jobs.  The 
work is discussed regularly at a  weekly meeting.  Once  a  fortnight 
the entire collective gets together,  and every year  they spend 
a  weekend  reviewing the entire business. 
A problem arose  in that the  law  governing  foundations for-
bids that employees are also directors of their company.  The 
employees  reluctantly resigned,  but feel that this severely com-
promises the whole point of the co-operative.  They are trying to 
get around this ruling. 
The  collective has established  'workgroups'  made  up of 
members  as well as outsiders.  They propose  ideas for books and 
run associated activities, e.g.  a  children's group  and  an art 
group. li 
The  collective is reviewing the voluntary situation and 
may  have  to put packing  and  cleaning on  a  freelance basis. 
The  first pressures really began as members  started to 
notice differences in commitment.  They  have  found  that 
regular meetings are essential and as  important as office 
work.  If members  miss meetings,  decisions have to be dis-
cussed all over again. 
Much  time  and energy goes into personal relationships. 
They  have learned that they must be clearer in what they want 
from  each other.  Criticism should be expressed before it turns 
into personal conflict.  However,  so much  time  is. spent in dis-
cussing internal workings  that essential tasks do not get done. 
The  original group has held together - only three have 
left of the 13  founding members.  The  co-operative has become 
firmly established. 
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1.  The  Mondragon  Group  of Co-operatives  - Overview 
It is difficult to resist the  conclusion that 
the  industrial enterprises which are at  the  heart  of 
the  varied  group  of  co-operatives centred  on  the  small 
town  of Mondragon  in the  Basque  provinces  of Spain are 
qualitatively different  from all similar ventures else-
where.  Over  a  period  of  roughly  25  years  their total 
individual  employment  has  grown  from  a  score  or  so  to 
18,000 and  the  number  of  industrial enterprises has  grown 
from  one  to ej_ghty-three.  Moreover with  only  a  small 
minority  of exceptions we  are  dealing with  new  co-operative 
yentures  started from  scratbh rather  than with  the 
conversion  into co-operatives  of pre-existing capitalist 
undertakings.  Even  the critics of Mondragon  must 
acknowledge  that  the  group  has  been quite  exceptionally 
successful  in that  most  difficult of all entrepreneurial 
tasks:  the  formation  of new  and  durable  businesses. 
This.job creation achievement is worth highlighting 
at the  outset  of  any  discussion of  the Mondragon  group. 
It is also important  to be  clear that despite  the  ferocity 
of  the  current recession,  which  is especially severe  in 
Spain's Basque  provinces,  the  group  remains  committed 
to sustained further  job creation in the  future.  Its 
latest five-year plan foresees  the  creation of new  jobs, 
through  the  expansion  of existing industrial  co-ops  and 
the  start-up of  new  ones,  at an annual  rate  ~f 1,000. 
Of  course  the actual  outcome  may  fall  below  the  target. 
But  there  is no reason to doubt  that  the  group remains 
genuinely  committed  to what  it calls its  'open door policy': 
the policy of expanding  industrial employment  in co-
operative ventures. 
But  the  qualitative aspect  of  the  group's  job 
creation achievement  is worth at least as  much  attention 
as  the  numbers.  Two  points  stand  out.  The  first is 
that  unlike  the  vast majority  of industrial  co-ops else-
where  in the world  and  in past history these Mondragon 
enterprises are  characteristically not  engaged  in petty 
artisanal activities.  We  are dealing rather with a 
group  of manufacturing businesses.  There  may  be  no 
examples  of  the  highest,  or  the  most  capital-intensive 
technologies  - no  computer manufacture  and  none  of  the 
new  biology-based  industries.  But  we  are nevertheless 
dealing with high quality manufacture  in consumer  durables, 
in capital goods  and  machine  tool  building,  and  in a  wide 
range  of electronic  and  other  components.  Broken  down 
by  sector at  the  end  of 1980  the  largest  sub-group  among 
the  industrial  co-ops was  engaged  in component  manufacture: Sector 
Capital  goods  (including machine  tools) 
Consumer  durables 
Foundries  and  forges 
Components  (intermediate  goods) 
Building materials  (and  construction) 
No  of  co-ops·* 
24 
18 
7 
29 
5 
~ 
Second,  and  at least  up  to the  middle  of 1981, 
the  failure rate  of  the  new  businesses  launched  under 
the  auspices  of  the  Mondragon  group  has  been virtually 
zero.  The  only actual failure  occurred  not  among  the 
industrial  co-ops  but  when  a  co-operative  of fishing 
boats was  ill-advisedly encouraged  to  launch itself. 
Among  the manufacturing co-ops  there has  been no  case 
of actual failure ..  But  perhaps  it would  be  truer to 
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say  that none  of  these  ventures  has  been allowed  to fail. 
Where  failure  has  thre~tened recourse  has  been  had  to 
more  or less drastic remedial  measures.  Frequently  the 
top  management  of  the  threatened  business  has  been 
replaced.  In at least  one  case  an entire product line 
has  been discontinued  and  new  products have  been supplied 
to new  mq.rkets. 
I  shall  look briefly in a  later section at  the 
key  supporting institutions which  the  group has  developed 
and  which  hq.ve  clearly been crucial  to its success.  I 
shall also glance at the  non-manufacturing  co-ops  in the 
group,  its chain of  consumer  stores,  its co-operative 
schools  and  housing  organis?-tions,  its agricultural  co-ops. 
But  none  of  that  should  detract attention from  what  is 
the  group's main and  outstanding achievement  over  the 
25  years  since  the first manufacturing venture,  Ulgor, 
was  established  in 1956:  the  creation of  a  dynamic  and 
highly successful  cluster of  med.ium-sized  industrial 
ventures. 
*  *  * 
.2.  Short early history 
There  is no particular controversy,  either ideo-
logical  or  otherwise,,  about  the  main facts  in  the group's 
history.  The  following account  is drawn  from  various 
sources.  The  direct quotations are  from  a  paper  by 
Sr Antxon  Perez  de  Calleja who  was,  for ten years  or  so 
up  to  the  end  of 1980,  chief executive  of  the  'Empresarial' 
*  Caja Laboral  Popular,  Annual  Report 1980 (or  management  services)  division of  the  Caja Laboral 
Popular  (CLP)  - the  bank which was  established in 1959 
to cater for  the  financial  and  technical assistance  · 
needs  of  the actual  production co-operatives. 
"Formally~  the  Mondragon  experience  began  in 
1956  when  Ulger~  the first and still the  most 
. important  of  the  co-operatives,  came  into exis-
tence.  But  to understand why  the  movement  was 
born  one  must  go  back another  15  years. 
At  this period the Basque  country was  in ruins 
having  supported  the  losing side during  the 
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Civil War.  Politically and  economically broken, 
individual  suffering was  acute:  death,  exile 
and  imprisonment  had.  taken their toll,  particularly 
among  the natural leaders  of'  the  community. 
Such was  the position when  a  priest  (Fr  Jose  Maria 
Arizmendiarrieta),  who  had himself fought  in the 
Civil War,  arrived  in the  small  town  of Mondragon. 
Much  influenced  by  the  social doctrine  of  the 
church,  he  sought  to heal  the  wounds  inflicted 
by  the  war  by  ministering to the  social  and 
cultural needs  of  the  suffering population  ••• 
Fifteen years went  by  before it was  decided  to 
set up  the first of  the co-operatives.  These 
years were  nevertheless essentially devoted to 
a  preparatory co-operative endeavour:  training 
the  managers  of  the future.  These  men  were  busy 
acquiring university degrees  in engineering. 
Following  the reformist doctrine  of  the  church, 
their first efforts to bring about  social  change 
were  channelled into pressing for  an internal re.,. 
organisation of  the  firm  for which  they worked. 
(This was  the  Union Cerrajera,  a  steel-making 
firm  and  then easily the largest enterprise in 
Mondragon).  Having  tried in vain to persuade 
the  Union  Cerrajera to change  its capital structure, 
they finally decided  (in 1956)  to leave  and set 
up  their  own  enterprise.  Up  to a  point it was 
pure  chance  that this enterprise became  a  co-operative. 
A co-operative was  the  only type  of legal entity 
recognised under Spanish law  which corresponded at 
all closely to.what  they wanted  to do  and  the basic 
social principles which  they wished  to build  into 
the enterprise structure".  · 
Several  more  general  background factors  need  to 
be  taken into account  if we  are  to understand  clearly 
what  made  possible  the  establishment  of Ul?or  and  the 
earlier development  of Fr Arizmendiarrieta  s  technical 
school.  The  town's  industrial tradition is of cardinal 
importance  in this respect.  "··  The  Mondragon  experiment 
has  taken place  in a  highly developed  region with a  long 
. . industrial  tradition."  The  tradition can  be  traced 
back  to mediaeval  times  when  furnaces  in Mondragon 
produced  much  of  the  steel which was  subsequently beaten 
into  swords  in the  famous  workshops  of Toledo. 
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It is also worth emphasising  that  in the fifty 
years  which preceded  the  outbreak of  the  Civil War  trade 
union activity had  grown  strongly in the  town.  There 
was  a  tenaciously  fought  strike and  lock-out at the  Union 
Cerrajera in the  early 1900s;  and  the  Mondragon workers 
sent  a  contingent  to support  the rebellious miners  of 
the  neighbouring Asturias region during their short-lived 
revolt in the  early 1930s.  The  international  trade  union 
left has,  with  some  notable  exceptions,  been more  suspicious 
of  than enthusiastic  about  the  Mondragon  group  in recent 
years.  But  there  should  be  no  doubt  about  the  fact  of 
the  town's  impeccably  'working class record'  from  the 
arrival  of  industrial capitalism in the late 19th centu1y 
to  the  start of  the  Civil War. 
Chris  Logan,  in a  forthcoming  book which  he  has 
jointly written with Henk  Thomas,  draws  attention to  the. 
fact  that  the  Basque  trade  unions  - and  the region's 
labour  movement  more  generally  - showed  an unusual  interest 
in the possibility of  co-operative  ventures  in the 1920s 
and  1930s.  On  the  other hand  there  is no  very clear 
evidence  about  the  extent to which this earlier co-
operative  thinking was  an  important  influence  on Fr  Jose 
Maria Arizmendiarrieta  or  on  the  founders  of Ulgor..  It 
is also unclear  to what  extent  the  traditional values 
and  practices  of pre-industrial Basque  society should be 
seen as  contributing to  a  pre-disposition towards  co-
operative ventures.  Peasant  thrift has  doubtless been 
an  important factor  behind  the  group's  success  in mobilising 
local  savings.  It is perhaps also plausible  to suggest 
that  there  is some  congruence  between the  combination 
of rugged  individual  ism  and  small village solidarity,. 
characteristic  of  traditional Basque  agriculture  and  the· 
combination of values which underlie  the  Mondragon  co-
operative structures.  But  the  precise nature  of any 
direct linkages  - assuming  that there are  some  - is another 
matter. 
Two  further  sets of points  must  be  included  in 
any  summary  of  the relevant background.  The  first is 
in some  sense  negative.  At least in private  conversation 
the  founders  of Ulgor will readily concede  that  the 
absence  of any  developed  welfare  state in Franco's Spain 
of  the  1940s and  1950s  and  the  outlawing  of  independent 
trade  unions  under  his regime  was  more  helpful  than 
~  unhelpful  to the  early development  of  the  Mondragon  group. 
Second  the  group  has  undoubtedly benefitted  from  the 
excellence  of Franco's  co-operative  laws  and  from  the 
favourable  tax arrangements which  such enterprises enjoy. 
In a  sense it matters not  that  the  intended  beneficiary of 
this legislation and  those  tax arrangements  was  agricultural 
tnd  not  industrial  co-operation.  For  the  benefits to. Mondragon  have  been both real and large.  Unlike  co-
oprative  law  elsewhere  in Europe,  Spain's legislation 
effectively insists that  there  should be  an  identity (or 
near  identity)  between  those who  work  in a  co-operative 
on  the  one  hand  and  those who  own  and  control it on  the 
other.  Spanish co-operative  law  is superior  in other 
more  detailed. respects as well.  It is also true  that 
co-ops enjoy a  complete  holiday  from  corporate  taxation 
over  the first ten years. 
Common  sense  suggests  that it would  be  methodo-
logically wrong  to seek out  in a  disc~ssion bf the 
relevant background  one  factor  or set of factors as 
pre-em.inently  important  in explaining the  formation  of 
the first co-operatives at Mondragon.  For what it's 
worth,  on  the  other hand,  Fr Arizmendiarrieta himself 
used  to place  the greatest emphasis  on  just two:  his 
own  insistance  on  the  need for  high quality technical 
education and his  own  commitment  to the progressive 
social doctrines  of his church. 
*  *  * 
3.  From  the  late 1950s  to the middle  1970s 
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By  1960 there were  a  to':;al  of eight  industrial 
co-ops,  including Ulgor,  and  th~y employed  together between 
300 and  400  people.  The  subsequent  growth  of the  co-ops' 
industrial  employment  down  to the middle  1970s  shows  a 
sustained and  dynamic  upward  trend. 
· Industrial Em;elo;yment  b;y  Mondragcn Co-o;eeratives  1261-1972* 
1961  395  1969  ~,945 
1962  520  1970  ,570 
1963  1,780  1971  9,416 
1964  2,620  1972  10,055 
1965  3,395  1973  11,621 
1966  4,202  1974  12,491 
1967  5,082  1975  13,169 
1968  5,981 
There  is a  similar growth  over this  same  15 year 
period in the  number  of  ind.ustriai  enterprises and  once 
again it needs  to be  stressed that,  with a  small minority 
of exceptions  these were  new  start-ups rather than conver$ions. 
*  Robert  Oakeshott,  The  Case  for Workers'  Co-ops, 
R~utledge & Kegan  Paul,  1978 s  6 
Nos.  of Monc,lragon  Industrial  CO-O;t2S  1261-19'[5* 
1961  12  1969  46 
1962  18  1970  46 
1963  29  1971  48 
1964  32  1972  49 
1965  36  1973  52 
1966  40  1974.  59 
1967  43  1975  60 
1968  44 
Ulgor,  the first co-operative,  has  been  throughout 
and·remained  far  and  away  the  largest of  these enterprises. 
By  the  middle  1970s  its employment  total was  already 
close  to 3,500.  Employment  in none  of  the  other  co-
operatives has  ever reached four  figures.  A breakdown 
by  employment  totals early in 1974 was: 
Em;t2loyment  numbers 
0 
100 
250 
500 
1,000 
100 
250 
500 
1,000 
plus 
Numbers  of co-o2eratives** 
26 
14 
11 
6 
1 
It is worth emphasising that had it not  been 
for  a  policy of hiving off detachab;Le  parts  of Ulgor 
its total  employment  by  the  middle  1970s would  have  been 
not much  less  than 1,000 larger.  Two  of  today's larger 
co-ops;  Fagor Electronic  and  Fagor  Industrial,  were 
originally part  of Ulgor.  Together with Ulgor  and 
three  other co-operatives  they  now  form  the  sub-grouping 
Ularco which has  developed  an array of  common  services 
and  has established a  set of tight links between its 
member  enterprises.  The  rationale  of Ularco  is clear: 
it aims  to enjoy  the  economies  but  to avoid  the  diseconomies 
of  scale. 
In their forthcoming  book,  Henk  Thomas  and 
Chris  Logan are able  to  compare  the  performance  of  these 
Mondragon  co-ops  in the late 1970s with the  performance 
of  a  control  group  of  conventional  capitalist firms. 
rrheir results suggest  that by  most  measures  of efficiency 
the  co-ops  have  been  out-performing their competitors. 
The  performance  of  the  co-ops  has  been especially 
impressive  in the  sectors  of  domestic  consumer  durables  -
in which Ulgor  has  achieved  a  leading position in the 
Spanish market  (and  increasingly,  as  we  shall  see  in 
export markets)  - and  in machine  tools. 
*  Robert  Oakeshott,  op.  cit. 
**  Alastair Campbell,  Charles  Keen,  Geraldine  Norman 
and  Robert  Oakeshott,  Worker-Owners:  The  Mondrason 
Achievement,  Anglo-German Foundation,  1977. 4.  From  the middle  1970s  to the  end  of 1980 
Ignoring for  a  moment  the  current recession and 
its effects,  the record  of  the  industrial  co-ops  over 
the last five  years can be  most  simply presented in 
statistical form. 
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Employment  nos.  Sales  Exports  Investments* 
Pesetas  m  Pesetas  m  Pesetas m 
1976  14,510  24,833  3,007  3,578 
1977  15,716  34,119  4,115  3,977 
1978  16,230  43,753  5,884  3,671 
1979  17,128  57,099  9, OllO  4,262 
1980  18,058  68,705  13,504  4,251 
Perhaps  the  most  impressive  aspect of this 
record  of  the last five  years  is the  expansion of 
exports as  a  percentage  of total sales.  From barely 
12%  in l9r(6  these  had risen to  over 18%  by 1980.  The 
current group  assessment  is,  of  course,  that  impressive 
as  this expansion has  objectively been,  it is going  to 
be vitally necessary  to achieve  much  higher  export 
percentages  in the  future.  The  current five-year  plan 
sets a  target figure  of  25%  of total sales by  the  middle 
of  the  decade.  Given  the  amount  of work which is being 
devoted to the  development  of promising new  markets  -
in Mexico,  Venezuela  and Algeria,  for  example  - it is 
not altogether unrealistic to suppose  that this target 
will  be  met. 
The  total working population of the three 
provinces  of  the  autonomous  Basque region,  rogether with 
the  semi-Basque  province  of Navarra,  amounted  to  some 
800,000 people at the  end  of 1980.  Thus  even if the 
non-industrial  employment  of  the  group is taken into 
account  - in the  consumer  stores,  in the  schools,  in 
the  agricultural  co-ops  and  so  on  - Mondragon  currently 
provides  employment  for not  much  more  than  0.25%  of  the 
total Basque  labour force.  On  the  other  hand its 
percentage  share  of Basque  manufacturing employment  is 
more  than double  that.  And  in those  sectors in which 
it is most  developed  - domestic  appliances  and machine 
tools for example  - Mondragon's  share  of output  and 
employment  is significant not  only within the Basque 
country but within the  Spanish economy  as  a  whole. 
Two  final  points-are worth making  about  the  state 
of  the  key  industrial enterprises in the  Mondragon  group 
in the  middle  of 1981.  The  first is that while  unemploy-
ment  across  the Basque  region averages  15%  the  industrial 
co-ops have  so far managed  to avoid declaring a  single 
redundancy.  They  have  done  this partly by cutting profit 
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margins  almost  to nothing,  partly by redeploying labour 
between different enterprises and  partly by  persuading 
themselves  to make  additional  capital contributions  to 
their  own  enterprises  and  to accept  increases  of nominal 
income  which fall  below  the rate of inflation.  Moreover 
the  view  of  senior  management  is that  though  there may 
have  to be  temporary lay-offs  the recession will  be 
weathered without  any  permanent redundancies.  So it 
seems  that the  co-operatives enjoy a  comparative  advantage 
when  it comes  to preserving existing  jobs as well  as  in 
the  creation of  new  ones.  As  to the latter,  the  target 
of 1,000 extra  jobs annually  over  the period  of the 
current five-year plan has  already been mentioned. 
But finally the  proper statistical and  quantitative 
emphasis  in any account  of  the  Mondragon  industrial  co-ops 
in 1981  must  not  allow  the  quality  of  the  whole  operation 
to be  obscured.  By  comparison with all or almost all 
jobs  in industrial co-ops  elsewhere  the  quality of those 
in  the  Mondragon  group  is in a  different league.  To 
understand why  we  must  look first at the  key  supporting 
institutions which  the  group  has  created:  the  bank with 
its management  services division,  the Polytechnic  and 
professional training school,  the  social welfare  organi-
sation LagunAro  and  the research agency  Ikerlan. 
*  *  * 
5.  The  Caja Laboral  Popular 
The  dynamism  and  the  success  of  the  Mondragon 
group  cannot  be  understood without  taking full  account 
of the  contribution which has  been made  by  the  CLP. 
According to Sr.  Perez  de  Calleja it has  three main roles: 
"The  Caja is the  headquarters  of  the  movement, 
the  centre round which  the  group  of enterprises 
is organised.  This  means  that  the  Caja gives 
cohesion to the  movement  as  a  whole;  it lays 
down  rules  and  co-ordinates both the  activities 
of existing co-operatives  and  new  initiatives .••. 
Even with the  individual enterprises that are 
autonomous  and  self-governing,  it is important 
to see  that they remain committed  to  the  same 
social principles;  the maintenance  of  these 
principles is a  condition of association with 
the Caja.  The  group  must  have  fixed  guidelines 
and  objectives;  this is the  very reason for  the 
movement's  existence. "The  Caja,  as  a  financial  institution,  is 
responsible for finding  the  :funds  required  to 
sustain and  extend  the  co-operative experiment. 
It became  apparent at a  very early stage that 
the  do-operatives were  not  themselves  capable 
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of raising the  finance  to back future  development, 
their  individual  investment programmes,  let alone 
handle·the equally acute problem  of'  day-to-day 
liquidity.  Without  the Caja  the  group could 
not have  expanded  so rapidly.  It has  become 
an instrument for  channelling local. savings  towards 
an end  eminently desirable  from  the  point of  view 
of  the  community,  namely  the  creation of  jobs. 
To  those  two  roles,  overall direction and 
banking  services,  a  third was  added.  in 1960  -
management  consultancy and  promotion.  This 
embraces  advising existing co-operatives  on 
the whole  range  of management  problems  and  helping 
to launch new  enterprises.  · 
Financial  support,  however  indispensable,  is 
not  enough to ensure  the continuity and healthy 
expansion  of  the co-operatives.  For this, 
technical assistance,  promotional  and  organisational 
advice  must  be  c.onstantly available.,  the  object 
being to  gu~rantee the  optimum  use  of resources 
and.  to  see  that the  Caja's objectives,  specifically 
the  creation of new  jobs,  are not forgotten. 
Further since risks cannot  be  spread  (the Caja 
having  only a  small  number  of active clients) 
members  have  to be  carefully watched.,  their 
informal  guarantee  to  operate  on  a  profitable 
basis in the  only security against which loans 
are made." 
The  headquarters role  of  the  Caja needs  no  special 
description.  But  it is worth making  clear that the  main 
instrument  by which  commitment  to the group's basic  principles 
is maintained is the  Contract  of Association which  the 
Caja  signs with all the directly productive  co-ops. 
The  Contract  of Association spells out,  among  other  things, 
the  key  organisational,  financial  and  other  guidelines 
with which  the production co-ops must  conform.  They 
will  be  considered  under  the  heading of structural 
features  below. 
Turning to its financial role,  essentially as 
a  mobiliser  of local  savings for  investment  in  co-
operative.  employment~  there  can be  no  doubt  that  the 
Caja has  been an  enormous  success.  A useful  proxy for 
its overall  growth is provided  by  the  increase  in its 
own  resources,  capital and reserves,  over  the fifteen 
years  to end 1980. s  10 
CLP  Ca:2ital  and Reserves  l;t66-1980  in millions  of 2esetas* 
1966  60.5  1974  1,069.3 
1967  73-1  1975  1,519.5 
1968  151-3  1976  1,982.2 
1969  236.9  1977  2,612.7 
1970  311.9  1978  3,377.2 
1971  415.8  1979  4,991.2 
1972  572.2  1980  6,117-9 
1973  778.0 
During  the  same  fifteen-year period  the  number 
of the  bank's  branches  has risen from  26  to 103 while 
the  number  of its savings  accounts  has  grown  from  just 
over  20,000 to roughly 300,000.  More  important perhaps 
are  two  points  of  a  rather different kind.  First, 
since  the  early 1970s,  the  bank's resources available 
for  new  investment  have  consistently exceeded  the  amount~; 
required by the  group's development  programme.  Secondly, 
all  through the  inflationary years  of  the  1970s,  total 
deposits with  the  CLP  have  grown  faster than the rate  of 
inflation and  the  bank has  increased its share  of total 
Basque  savings.  In effect the  success  of  the CLP  as 
a  mobiliser  of local  savings  and  thus  as  a  source  of 
investable finance  has reversed the  normal  comparative 
disadvantage  of  industrial  co-o:r:s  in the matter  of· access 
to capital.  Both  in today's world  and  for  most  of 
their history,  industrial  co-opB  have  been at a  disadvantage, 
compared  with conventional  business,  in their access  to 
new  capital.  At least since  the early 1970s  the  opposite 
has  been true  of  the Mondragon  co-ops. 
It is tempting to make  a  similar  judgement  in 
relation to professional  manageme:.1t.  Partly because  of 
the high-level  team which has  been built up  in the 
Empresarial  (or  management  services)  Division of  the  CLP, 
partly because  of  the  place assigned to management  in 
the  co-ops'  structures,  there  is little doubt  that 
Mondragon management  is now  superior to that of its 
conventional  competitors.  Here  again we  have  the reverse 
of what  has  been and  remains  normal  in the  experience  of 
industrial· co-operatives.  By  the middle  1970s the staff 
of  the  CLP's Empresarial  Division totalled well  over  one 
hundred  of whom  roughly  two  thirds were  professionals. 
There  were  accountants,  economists,  architects,  industrial 
psychologists,  experienced managers  and.  engineers.  But 
undoubtedly  the  key  section of  the whole division consisted 
then,  as it still does  today,  of its  'promotion and 
intervention'  staff.  This  is the  group which has  main 
responsibility for  the  launching of new  enterprises  and 
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for  the  mounting  of rescue  operations when  danger 
threatens an existing one.  The  group  is small,  currently 
no  more  than eight people.  They  are all engineers  by 
training and  they all have direct management  experience. 
Their role  in Mondragon's  success  story cannot  be  over-
estimated.  Evidence  for it is the record  of high-level 
job creation and  the absence  of failure which we  have 
already considered. 
*  *  * 
6.  LagunAro 
Under  Spanish law worker  members  of  co-operatives 
are  treated as if they were  self-employed  and  are  there-
fore  not eligible to  come  under  the state's normal  social 
welfare  arrangements.  Thus  the  Mondragon  group  has  been 
forced  to establish its own  social security organisation, 
LagunAro,  which was  ori·ginally a  subdivision of  the  CLP 
but has  operated  independently since  the middle  1970s. 
LagunAro  is described.  and  examined  in some 
d.etail  by Henk  Thomas  in the forthcoming  book previously 
mentioned.  What  apparently emerges  from  this study is 
that  both in terms  of its welfare benefits  a~d in terms 
of its unit costs  LagunAro  is superior to  thE:  Spanish 
state's social security organisation.  Assuming  that 
the  evidence for  these  judgements  is soundly based 
LagunAro  clearly makes  a  most  valuable  contribution both 
to the  cost-effectiveness and  to the  morale  of  the  group. 
*  *  * 
7.  Ikerlan 
The  research and  development  agency,  Ikerlan, 
is the most recently formed  of  the  supporting organisations 
which  the  group  has  created.  It started in business 
only  in 1978 and currently has  a  staff of  about 30. 
The  prevailing view at Mondragon  is that it is too early 
to  judge what  its long  term contribution is going to be. 
One  key area in which it is concentrating attention is 
robotics.  The  group's  top  managers  are  inclined  to 
argue  that the  scope  for  humanising  the repetitive  tasks 
of manufacture  is rather limited.  They  are looking 
rather to  the  replacement  by robots  of  human  labour. 
But  the  time  scale  of  any  such  changes  is still far  from 
clear. 
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8.  Escuela Professional  Politechnica  (EPP) 
If Inkerlan is the  newest  of  the  group's  supporting 
organisations  the Escuela Professional Politechnica is 
the  oldest.  It has  developed  out  of Fr Arizmendiarrieta's 
original apprentice  scnool  foundation  in the early 1940s. 
Today it includes  among  its courses all levels  of technical 
education from  craft apprentice  programmes  to top 
engineering degrees.  · 
The  doors  of  the EPP  are  open  to young  people 
with no  connections  to the Mondragon  group.  Its part-
time  courses are  open  to  the  employees  of capitalist 
firms  as well  as  to co-operative  members ..  On  the  other 
hand  for  our  purposes  here  its main  importance  is that 
it enables  the  co-operatives  to be  largel'y self-sufficient 
in the  supply  of high-level  manpower.  This near self-
sufficiency is,  of  course,  achieved.as  much  through the 
retraining of existing workers  as  through  the  training 
from  scratch of new  recruits. 
Alongside  the EPP,  though  since  the  early 1970s 
formally  separated  from  it,  is  a  co-operative  (Aleco-op) 
in which,  from  their third year  onwards,  the EPP's 
students  may  work part-time.  Aleco-op  produces  components 
as well  as  various final  products  - including equipment 
for  teaching electronics  - of  i·~s  own.  It also sub-
contracts labour  to the  industrial  co-ops  in the  group. 
To  the  students it offers  the  opportunity of paying 
their EPP  fees,  including fees  for  board  and  lodging, 
and  of earning a  little pocl{et  money  on  top.  It also 
offers  them  an  introductory experience  of co-operative· 
working.  It is clearly a  most  remarkable  and  original 
organisation.  Though  not  centrally germane  to this 
study,  Aleco-op  might  perhaps  be  one  of  the  best starting 
points for  Mondragon  building initiatives elsewhere. 
All  these  supporting organisations,  the  CLP~ 
LagunAro,  Ikerlan,  the EPP  are,  in technical  language, 
'co-operatives  of  second  degree'.  That  means  that 
their structures differ from  those  of  the  'base  co-ops'. 
I  shall  look at the  structures  of  the latter first; 
and  then return to those  of  the  co-ops  of  second degree. 
*  *  * 
9.  The  structures of  the  base  co-operatives 
9.1  Control,  organisation and  management 
Central  to any  underntanding  of  how  Mondragon's 
base  industrial  co-ops  are formally  organised  is the 
crucial distinction between overall policy making  and 
final  control  on  the  one  hand  and  executive  management 
on  the  other.  The .former  is  seen as  an essentially 
political task which  must  therefore  be  based  on  a  democratic system  of  one  member  one  vote.  The  latter is seen as 
a  quite  separate  and  essentially professional  task. 
Management  is,  of  course,  constitutionally subordinate 
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to  - and  answerable  to  - the political democracy.  But 
within its own  professional  sphere it is free  to  manage  -
to carry  out  the  democratically agreed policies of  the 
co-ops  - without  undue  interference. 
Ultimate  sovereignty  in Mondragon's  base 
industrial  co-ops rests,  of  course,  with an assembly  of 
all the  co-op's worker  members  in which all decisions 
are  reached  on  the basis  of  one  member  one  vote.  This 
assembly  elects a  control  board  (Junta Rectora)  which 
can be  thought  of as  roughly similar to the  board  of 
directors  in a  share  company.  The  Junta Rectora  in turn 
appoints  - and  may  dismiss  - the  chief executive,  or  in 
the  case  of  some  of  the  larger co-ops,  the  top management 
team.  Both  the  members  of  the  Junta Rectora  and  the 
top managers  are  to  some  extent formally protected against 
the risks  of anarchic  or  demagogic  uprisings  - and  of 
stasis  - in the  sovereign assembly.  The  former  are 
elected for periods  of six years with  one  third of  the 
membership retiring every  two  years by rotation.  The 
latter must  be  appointed for  minimum  periods  of five 
years. 
It is true  that the  sovereign assembly is free 
and  mu~t be  free  - to overrule  these  provisions. 
Managers  can be,  and  are,  dismissed before  the  end  of 
their appointed  term  and  directors can be  subject to 
votes  of  no  confidence and  be  forced  to resign.  Never-
theless the existence  of  these  quite  long  terms  of 
normal  appointment  clearly acts as  a  check  on  irresponsible 
decision:3  by  the  democracy.  Though  there  is no  question· 
about  the  constitutionally subordinate position of  the  · 
top  management  as against the  elected board,  in practice 
the relationship between  the  two  varies  from  co-op  to 
co-op.  On  the  whole  the  prevailing view  in the  CLP 
is that a  base  co-op will function better if the  board 
is relatively stronger vis  a  vis  the  chief executive  and 
top  management  team.  On  the  other hand  it is worth 
emphasising that  only  the  chief executive  is precluded 
from  being elected  to  the  board.  Other  senior managers 
may  be  and  quite  frequently are.  So  it would  be  a 
mistake  to see  the  two  groups,  the  top  management  and 
the  elected  board,  as  quite distinct and  in some  sense 
necessarily opposed. 
But,  of  course,  the  democratic  involvement  of 
co-op  members  in the  control  of their working lives is 
bound  to be  rather limited if it consists mainly  of 
electing board  members  every  two  years.  To  fill this 
gap 'the  larger industrial  co-ops  introduced  in the early 
1970s  an additional  set of elected representative  bodies: 
social councils.  The  social councils  are  elected  by s  14 
'constituencies'  ~f around  200  members  each.  These 
councils3  in Antxon Calleja's words  "can resolve  such 
questions as concern  them directly as workers,  or  groups 
of workers  (hours  worked,  wages,  conditions  of work etc). 
Not  only are  problems  discussed  and  formulated  in a  manner 
suitable for passing up  to  the  control  board  for decision, 
but  certain executive  powers  are also delegated  to  these 
councils  so,  at their  own  level,  they  have  a  real decision 
making role." 
In the  early 1970s  when  the .social  councils 
were first  introduced  the  formation  of  independent  trade 
unions  was  still illegal in Spain.  ·  To  some  extent  they 
can be  seen as  playing the  part assigned to trade unions 
in conventional  firms.  The  fact  that  trade  unsions  have 
since  become  legal  has  so far not affected  Mondragon's 
social  councils  and  has  had  only  indirect effects  on 
the  co-operatives more  generally.  However  that  issue 
is discussed at  the  end  of  this report. 
Two  final  points are  worth making  about  these 
control  and  organisational  arrangements  in the Mondragon 
base  co-ops.  The  first is that rights  to membership 
of  a  co-op's sovereign general  assembly are  explicitly 
stated to derive  from  the  fact  of working  in it.  Though, 
as  we  shall  see,  all worker  members  must  also be  share-
holders their  'political' rights in the enterprise 
derive  from  their  s•:;atus  as workers  and  not  from  their 
status as  shareholders. 
Finally it is worth emphasising that,  with  two 
minor qualifications,  the  base  co-ops  are  so structured 
that  there  is an  identity between  those  who  work  in them 
and  those  who  control  them.  All  workers  must  be  members 
and  only workers  can be.  The  only  two  qualifications 
to this fundamental  rule are  that there  is an initial 
period of probationary  employment  and  that,  in order to 
provide  some  flexibility in relation to  sudden fluctuations 
in labour demand,  the  co-ops  may  hire  non-member  employees 
up  to a  maximum  of 5%  of  their total workforce.  With 
these  minor  qualifications  the  fundamental  'identity rule' 
applies.  This  is perhaps the  single  most  crucial  difference 
between  the  Mondragon  structures and  those  of most  industrial 
co-ops  elsewhere  in today's world  and  in the  past. 
g.2  Ownership  and  participation in profits and  losses 
Just as  the  'identity rule'  applies  in the  case 
of  the  control  of  the  base  co-ops  so it does  too  in the 
case  of  their ownership.  No  outsiders may  participate. 
in ownership as  share~olders;  all workers,  with the  same 
exceptions as for  me~bership above,  must  do  so. The  second  point to grasp about  the  ownership 
of  the  base  co-ops  is that it is split between  the 
ownership  of  individual  members  on  the  one  hand  and 
indivisible  ownership,  vested  in the  co-op  as  a  collec-
tivity,  on  the  other.  Profits  (or losses)  are split 
each year as  between  the  individual  owners  and  the 
collective  owner.  A part  of  each new  member's  initial 
shareholding is immediately transferred to collective 
ownership. 
The  third key  point about  these  ownership 
arrangements  is that  the  annual  prof·it  shares  of  the 
individual  members  must  normally  be  reinvested.  An 
individual  member  may  not  normally withdraw  his or her 
shareholding except  on departure  (through retirement  or 
for  other reasons)  from  the  co-op  and  its membership. 
These  arrangements  ensure  a  very high degree  of re-
investment. 
A member's  ownership  starts when,  following  the 
successful  completion  of  a  probationary period,  he  or 
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she  is admitted  to membership.  He  or  she  must  then put 
up  a  capital  contribution which,  after 20%  of it has 
been  transferred  to  the· co-op 
1 s  indivisibly owned  funds, 
forms  his  or her  initial shareholding.  This  capital 
contribution may  be  subscribed  in a  lump  sum,  or it may 
be  paid in instalments  over  a  maximum  period of  two  years. 
Currer.tly  the  amount  to be  subscribed for  those  joining 
established co-ops  is the Peseta equivalent  of roughly 
£1,500.  For  those  joining new  start-up co-ops  the 
figure  is approximately  twice  that.  Thereafter an 
individual's shareholding is adjusted upwards  or downwards 
at the  end  of each accounting period depending  on  the 
co-op's  ~esul  ts.  If these are positive  then not less 
than  20%  of  the profits must first be  transferred  into 
the  co-op's collective funds  and  a  further 10%  must  be 
allocated  outside  the  enterprise  - to social  orroucational 
projects  in the neighbouring  community. 
If the results are  not  only positive but if 
profits also exceed  a  certain level  in relation to 
members'  direct monthly earnings,  then the  proportion 
which must  be  transferred to the  co-op's collectively 
owned  funds rises above  20%.  This  happens  according 
to a  precise  formula  which  is available in the  main 
published  sources.  On  the  other hand  if the results 
. are negative  then the  obverse  of  these rules apply. 
Not  more  than 20%  of  these  losses may  normally  be  dealt 
with by writing down  the  co-op's collectively owned  funds. 
The  balance  of  the  losses must  be  absorbed  by  the writing 
down  of the  shareholding accounts  of  individual  members. 
The  participation of  individuals  in these  profits or 
losses is not  on  a  basis  of Equality.  As  with  the 
traditional  'patronage dividend'  of  the  C;onsumer  co-ops 
it is differential.  Members  participate differentially 
according to  the  sum  of their work  earnings  in the  co-op 
or  the  interest due  on  their accumulated  shareholdings. 
The  maximum  interest payable  is 6%  and this will normally 
be  paid  in cash.  Finally,  as  a  protection against inflation members'  shareholdings are  adjusted  annually 
accordtng to a  set  of  indices  compiled  by  the  CLP. 
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The  two  most  measurable  effects of  these 
arrangements  are,  first,  a  very high degree  of re-invest-
ment.  Normally at least 90%  of annual  profits are 
re-invested.  Secondly it is easy to  see  that if a 
co-op  can maintain reasonably profitable operations  then 
individual members  will  accumulate  quite substantial 
sums  in their personal  shareholding accounts.  Over  a 
25  year  pEriod  these  shareholdings  could  easily be,  and 
have  been,  built up  to  a  level  such that  they may  be 
equivalent  to half a  dozen years  or  more  of work earnings. 
At  the  end  of this report a  number  of  criticisms 
and  question marks  about  these  membership  arrangements 
will  be  examined.  But here it is worth  emphasising their 
motivational  benefits.  These  and  other features are 
well  brought  out  in a  short discussion by Antxon Calleja. 
"Many  people,  even  economic  theorists,  are 
convinced  that loan capital  is preferable  to 
the  ownership  of  capital  by workers.  As 
far as this argument  concerns  us  we  are 
opposed  to loan capital,  not  only  because  we 
have  not  ourselves  adopted  that route,  but 
because  WfJ  consider it to have  many  negative 
implica  ti,ms. 
In the first place  the worker's capital  stake 
is not  just a  means  of financing enterprises; 
above all it is a  means  of  involving workers  in 
the  success  of their  own  enterprise.  The 
psychological  attitude of a  man  who  has  invested 
capital,  thus putting his  own  financial  position 
at risk,  is radically different from  that  of  a 
man  who  has  kindly granted a  loan;  the latter 
rarely completely identifies with the  success 
of  the  enterprise  he  works  for. 
Furthermore  ••.  the  experience  of Mondragon  is 
clear:  the  15,000 million  or  so pesetas which 
worker  members  have  invested.,  both  through initial 
capital  contributions and  through  the  annual 
investment  of profits over  25  years,  have  played 
a  crucial role 'in  the  development  of  the  c.o-
operative  experiment  and  in bringing it up  to 
its present size.  If the  workers  had  not  made 
this contribution,  and  capital had  been provided 
by  a  bank  or  outside  agency,  the Mondragon  group 
could  only have  grown  to half its present size  -
if the  experiment  had  succeeded at all. s  17 
"It is altogether  more  logical  that workers 
themselves  should  put  up  most  of  a  co-operative's 
working capital,  calling on  outside resources 
only during start-up or  periods  of  very rapid 
expansion.  In a  non-Socialist  country it is 
difficult to find  financial  institutions which 
are  prepared to put  up  capital for  a  co-operative 
without having a  say  in management.  This 
seems  to us  to  mean  that loan capital,  which 
makes  things  so easy for  the  co-operatives but 
gives  them  no  financial  motivation,  is a 
mistaken course.  Quite apart  from  the fact 
that it is often an alternative which is not  even 
a  real possibility."  · 
9.3  Solidarity  - inside  the  co-operatives  and with 
the  community 
We  have  seen that participation in profits (and 
losses)  is differential and  linked to monthly earnings. 
The  maximum  permitted differential  of  these  earnings is 
in turn strictly limited.  Up  to the  early 1970s  the 
differential limit was  3:1.  More  recently the larger 
co-operatives have  allowed  themselves,  in a  few  exceptional 
cases,  to raise  the  upper limit to 4.5.  But  less· than 
1%  of  those working  in the  industrial co-ops receive 
incomes  at the  top limit of  thE- scale,  four  and  a  half 
times larger than the  lowest  paid.  And  at  the  bottom 
end  the  gre~t majority  of  new  recruits rise rapidly from 
the  lowest  income  defined as 1.0 to 1.2 or 1.3.  Overall 
the  incomes  of more  than 80%  of  the workforce fall  between 
1.3 and.  2.6  on  the  scale.  Antxon Calleja's discussion 
of  these arrangements  is once  again worth quoting: 
11In choosing a  4.5:1 ratio we  have  tried to hold 
a  balance  between  the  desirability of worker 
solidarity  (implying the  minimum  variation in 
levels  of pay)  and  the  need  for  managers  and 
technicians  of  a  high  enough  calibre  to ensure 
dynamic  growth  of  the  co-operative  (implying 
that they must  not  be  paid  too far below  market 
rates)." 
Current  market rates are,  in fact,  such that 
Mondragon's  top  managers  could  expect  incomes  at least 
· twice  as large as  those which  a~e paid  in the  co-operatives 
if they worked  for  capitalist firms.  On  the  other 
hand,  at the  other  end  of  the  scale  the policy is that 
the  incomes  of  the  co-ops  must  not  be  lower,  and nor 
must  they be  substantially higher  than those  paid in 
the  neighbouring capitalist world.  Calleja explains 
the rationale behind  these policies: 
"In the first place wages  should  not be  lower 
than elsewhere  because  this would.  reduce  the 
earnings  and  standard  of living of  the rest of the  community.  At  the  same  time  they should 
not  be  higher  because  this would  set  them 
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apart  from  workers not  involved  in the  co-operatives." 
These  wage  arrangements  can be  seen at  one 
level  as  a  form  of  consensual  incomes  policy within a 
local  economy.  But  they can  als.o  be  seen as  an expression 
of  the  determination of  the  co-ops  to maintain solidarity 
with their local  community and,  more  widely,  perhaps with 
the  Basque  people  as  a  whole.  The  10%  allocation from 
the  co-ops'  profits to social  and  educational  projects 
in the  local  community  is,  of  course,  a  further  expression 
of  commitment  to that  same  solidarity.  And  so,  for 
example,  is the policy of welcoming part-time  enrolments 
by workers  in neighbouring capitalist firms  for  technical 
and  other  courses at  the EPP. 
9.4  Structures  of  the  co-operatives  of  second  degree 
As  noted earlier the  key  supporting institutions 
of the  group,  the  CLP,  the  EPP,  Ikerlan and  LagunAro 
are all structured as  'co-operatives  of  second degree'. 
As  such,  and  essentially because  of their group-wide 
functions  and responsibilities  they are  owned  and 
controlled not exclusively by  those  who  work  in them  but 
by  a  combination of their  own  workers  and  e~ected repre-
sentatives of  the  base  co-ops.  For  example  half  the 
members  of  the CLP's  control  board are elected by  the 
base  co-ops  and half by its own  staff.  Similarly the 
CLP's  sovereign general  assembly  contains representatives 
of the  base  co-ops  as well  as  its own  workers. 
It is worth  emphasising,  on  the  other hand, 
that  those  who  work for  these  co-operatives  of  second 
degree  are required,  in the  same  way  as  their fellows 
in the  base  co-ops,  to make  a  capital contribution on 
admission  'co  membership.  This  applies  just as  much  to 
the  technical  instructors and  professors  in the  techni-
cal  school,  to the  actuaries and  others who  work for 
LagunAro,  to  the researchers  in Ikerlan,  as it does  to 
the  CLP  staff. 
But  there  is an  important difference  when  it 
comes  to the profit  (and  loss)  participation of  thae 
who  work  in the  co-operatives  of  second  degree.  Their 
shareholdings  are adjusted annually  by  the  amount  of 
the  average results for  the  base  co-operatives  concerned 
with direct industrial production.  These  arrangements 
may  be  seen as reflecting a  commitment  to what  Fr  Jose 
Maria  Arizmendiarrieta  used  to call  'the  primacy  of 
production'.  They  also clearly reflect a  commitment 
to group-wide  solidarity.  Thirdly,  for  those·· who  work 
for  the  bank,  they  mean  substantially lower profit shares 
than  they would  receive  if their  own  shareholding adjust-
ments  were  based  on  the results  of  the  bank  itself. In all other respects  the position of  those  who  work for 
the  co-operatives  of  second  degree  is the  same  as  that 
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of  those  who  work for  the  base  co-ops.  In particular 
they are  subject to precisely the  same  earnings differen-
tials. 
*  *  * 
10.  The  other  Co-o~ratives in the  Group 
To  complete  this description of  the  Mondragon 
group,  the  other  co-operative  undertakings,  those  which 
are neither  industrial nor  co-operatives  of  second  degree, 
must  be  mentioned briefly.  At  the  end  of 1980 the 
numbers  of  these  by different  sec.tors  of activity were: 
Schools  40 
Housing  co-ops  14 
Agricultural  co-ops  6 
Chain  of  consumer 
stores  1 
Services  and  other  5 
Total  66 
Since  the  end  of Franco's regime  the  group has 
become  increasingly and  openly  involved  in the  promotion 
of  schools  in which  the  medium  of instruction is the 
Basque  language.  These  are  characteristically controlled 
by  a  combination of  their  own  teaching staffs,  the  parents 
of their students  and  elected representatives  of  the  co-ops. 
It is notable  that Basque  parents  seem ready to send 
their children to these  schools  and  pay fees  for  doing 
so notwithstanding the availability of free  places  in 
Spanish speaking schools. 
The  group's  interest in the  promotion of housing 
co-ops  is again a  fai~ly recent  development.  ~f reflects 
in part a  strong dissatisfaction with the work  of 
private housing developers  in the area during  the  1960s 
and  early 1970s.  However  given  the  group's continuing 
commitment  to the  creation of new  productive  jobs it is 
unlikely that the resources which it is able  to devote 
to housing will  ever  be  more  than modest. 
The  same  is probably  true  of  the  agricultural 
co-ops.  As  compared  with their industrial  counter-
parts  these  have  been  only moderately successful  and 
moderately dynamic.  It seems  that,  anyway  for  the  moment, 
a  career in farming  is not especially attractive to the 
more  energetic  of  the  Basque  country's young people. s  20 
On  the  other hand  the  group's  chain of  consumer 
stores~  Eroski~  seems  to have  performed with exceptional 
dynamism  especially during  the  current recession.  It 
has  considerably  increased  its membership  over  the last 
few  years.  By  the  end  of 1980 the  total was  105~000, 
representing some  15%  of all households  in the Basque 
country.  Market  share has  increased in parallel:  sales 
rose  by 38%  between 1979  and  1980,  well  ahead  of  the 
rate  of  inflation.  This  is in marked  contrast to the 
recent experience  of  consumer  co-ops  in the  U.K.  and 
elsewhere.  It may  be  due  in part to the fact that 
those  who  work  in the Eroski  stores participate directly 
in their control  and  in the  ownership  of their profits. 
That  has not,  of  course~  generally been  the  case  in the 
traditional  consumer  co-ops.  In today's world it seems 
plausible  to  suppose  that it is the workers  in~  rather 
than the  customers  of,  a  consumer  store who  have  the 
greatest real  interest in its success. 
Finally,  among  the  co-ops  classified  under 
services,  it is worth mentioning Auzo-Lagun.  This 
enterprise provides  catering_,  cleaning and  similar 
services,  to the  co-ops  in the  group.  All  or almost 
all its members  are  part-time women.  By  all accounts 
it works  well. 
*  *  * 
11.  Criticisms  and  Question Marks 
To  begin with there  is,  of course,  no  shortage 
of cri  t~_cism from  the  bureaucratic and  collectivist left. 
These  critics,  whose  thinking has recently been reflected 
in a  Labour  Party discussion  pamphlet~  tend to focus 
their objections  on  the degree  of  individual  ownership 
i.n  the Mondragon  structures which  they affect to find 
unacceptable.  In many  cases  of criticism from  this 
quarter  unspoken  objections are  probably even  more 
important;  they  can be  boiled down  to the  point that 
the  success  of  the  group weakens  the  forces  working for 
the  overthrow  of capitalism. 
A  second  set of criticisms has  come  to the fore 
lately as  the  success  story of  the  co-operatives has  been 
drawn  to the  attention of  a  wider public  and  in particular 
to established trade  union hierarchies in the  U.K.  and 
elsewhere  in Europe.  With  some  notable exceptions  the 
trade  union response  has  been more  suspicious  than 
enthusiastic.  It would  be  surprising if it were  other-
wise.  For  independent  trade  unions  have  played  no part 
in the  b'uilding  of  the Mondragon  group.  More  important, 
the  'free collective bargaining'  activities of  independent 
trade  unions  are  clearly incompatible with the  successful 
operation of  the  co-operatives as  they are at present 
structured.  It is  important  to be  clear about  this s  21 
point.  Certainly the  senior Mondragon  managers  are 
in no  doubt  about it.  And  it is very  much  a  topic 
for  debate  in the  co-operatives at the  moment.  The 
probability is that  sooner rather than later those 
standing for  elections  in the  co-operatives will  have 
the right  - which  they  do  not  enjoy at present  - to 
declare  their affiliation either to a  trad.e  union  or  to 
some  other  : 'interest group 
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•  An  example  of  the latter 
would  be  the affiliation to an ecological  grouping. 
But  the  key  point is rather different.  Whether  or not 
these  changes  would  constitute  'trade union recognition' 
it is clear that  they would  not  introduce anything 
analagous  to  'free collective bargaining'  into the 
group's  operations. 
A third set of criticisms  comes  from  a  combi-
nation of libertarians  on  the  one  hand  and  those  especially. 
concerned with the  'quality of working life'  on  the  other. 
The  creation of  the  social councils  should,  of course, 
be  seen as  one  of  the  steps which have  been  taken to 
meet  these  criticisms.  Experiments  which  have  now  been 
going  on  for  several  years  and  which  seek,  following 
Volvo's  example,  to replace  the  assembly line  by  group 
working,  are  another.  There  should be  no  question about 
the  group's  commitment  to develop  more  participatory 
arrangements  and  nE:w  methods  of working which  are less 
repetitive,  less mtndless  and  less boring than those  of 
traditional  manufa~ture.  Yet  this commitment will,  it 
seems  certain,  continue  to be  tempered  by  a  hard-headed 
realism and  by  giving top priority to the  maintenance 
of existing employment  and  the  creation of new  jobs. 
In this context  the research and  development work  of 
Ikerlan in the area of robotics probably offers  a  better 
clue  to the  long-ter·m future  than the  Volvo  type  experi-
ments.  · 
Finally there  is the  criticism that while  the 
degree  of industrial  ownership  embedded  in the Mondragon 
structures has  so far worked well,  it contains  a  risk 
of decapitalisation in the future.  The  argument  is 
that  the  success of these  arrangements  when  the  workforce 
is young  and  the  gr·oup  is expanding tell us  nothing about 
what will happen when  large numbers  of people start to 
retire and  when  the  co-ops  stop growing.  When  that 
happens,  so  the  argument  runs,  the  co-ops will  be  paying 
out much  more  to those retiring than  they  can hope  to 
recoup  from  the capital contributions  of  new  members. 
So  their financial  base will  be  undermined.  There  are 
several answers  to  these  criticisms.  The  first is 
straightforwardly arithmetical.  So  long as it can 
avoid  contracting and  so long as it can move  towards  an 
even workforce distribution by age,  the  group  need  not 
be  over-concerned  about decapitalisation.  For it can 
be  demonstrated  arithmetically that in a  steady state, 
wi.th  even numbers  of people  leaving and  joining each 
year  and  with an even  age  distribution in between,  the individual capital base  of  the  group will not diminish. 
It will  remain  the  same. 
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The  second  and  more  important  answer  to these 
criticisms has  two  parts.  The  first is that so long 
as  the  co-operatives  can remain profitable  then any 
problems  of their capital base  mu~t be  seen as essentially 
secondary  and  soluble.  Secondly we  can be  confident 
that if there were  ever  to be  a  serious risk of decapi-
talisation the  co-ops would  modify  their structures to 
take  account  of it. 
*  * 
12.  Conclusions 
It seems  perverse not to acknowledge  that  the 
Mondragon  group  of  industrial enterprises  offers  a 
success  story without parallel  among  co-operatives  in 
today's world  and  in history.  They  have  outperformed 
their capitalist counterparts  in Spain first when  the 
local  and  national  economy  were  growing  and  now  when 
they are  in deep recession. 
It seems  perverse  too not  to relate this 
astonishing comparative  success  story with the  insti-
tutions  and  structlJ,l>es  which  the  group  has  developed. 
By  their institutions they have  overcome  the  management 
and  financial weaknesses  so characteristic of traditional 
co-ops.  By  their structures  they have  secured a  much 
greater  identity of interest between  the worker  and his 
or her  co-operative  than has  been achieved ever before. 
Of  course  there  is not  much  that  can be  done  about  those 
whose  objections  to  the  Mondragon  model  are  ideological. 
But  for  others it can hardly fail  to  compel  attention 
and  to raise questions  of replicability. 
There  is no  theoretical way  of settling these 
questions  of replicability.  That  issue will  only be 
resolved  if there  are real  attempts at replication 
elsewhere.  But it is worth highlighting in conclusion 
that  the  balance  of  evidence  J:a  s  lately shifted against 
those  who  see  Basque  cultural  and  solidarity factors  -
rather than the  group's  structures and  institutions -
as  the  crucial  ingredient  of  success.  This  is because 
recent  studies  have  shown  that a  majority  of  those 
working  in the  co-ops  value  the  fact  that  they are 
·co-operatives more  than  the  fact  that they are  Basque. ,· 
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PD 1.  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 
1.1  Reaction to Industrial Revolution 
It is no  merit in the United Kingdom  that Co-operatives,  in 
their modern  form  with a  capital C to denote a  distinctive form  o£ 
organisation,  should have  developed there first.  The  country was 
first in the fully fledged  Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th 
century.  The  new  industrialism which Karl Marx  described in such 
painstaking detail in Book  1  o£ Das  Kapital also produced its stock 
antidotes other than the critics like Marx  himself.  It produced 
labour laws  to prevent the extremes o£ exploitation; it produced 
trade unions and it produced co-operatives.  Both trade unions  and 
co-operatives were  to begin with expressions o£ working-class 
solidarity,  were  efforts by working people to protect themselves and 
enhance their interests in a  largely hostile environment  through mutual 
aid and  support o£  one  kind and  another.  They both preceded the  mo~e 
or less benevolent welfare state which  has appeared throughout most  o£ 
Europe  in the  second hal£ o£ the 20th century.  Consumer  co-operatives 
were  the means  whereby  workers  could assure themselves o£ supplies of 
unadulterated food  and  other well-made goods  at reasonable prices 
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instead of being dependent  for them upon  employers or shopkeepers  who 
were  none  too  scrupulous.  Producer co-operatives were the means  whereby 
they could stop themselves-being exploited not as consumers but in thei~ 
capacity as workers.  Both forms  were  also inspired in part by  the desire 
to preserve the co-operative spirit which  had been a  feature in the life 
o£  the villages from  which  the new  townspeople came. 
1.2  From  Rochdale 
Historians disagree about  the originators of this particular 
reaction to the new  capitalism.  There were  many  Who  could lay claim 
along with the first great figUre,  Robert  Owen.  His Owenite  communi-
ties were  not  just single purpo·se  co-operatives:  co-operation embraced 
every facet  o£ life in the communes  he started in ~ritain and  in the 
USA.  They  lasted only a  short time in practice and  a  very long time 
in their reputation.  They  have continued to enjoy the opposite of a 
succes d'estime.  Owen's  influence has been long-lasting: it has been 
felt once  again in the last few  years when  a  co-operative for  ~isabled 
miners in a  valley in.Neath inS. Wales  was  called ROWEN  after him. 
He  is one  o£ the founding fathers.  But it is perhaps  inappropriate 
that a  single individual should be allowed to claim the credit for a 
movement  which  stresses the values of the community  rather than the 
individual.  :tt is more  £ftting that a  collective should be  given 
responsibili-ty for forming a  collective.  The  group of working men 
who  created the Rochdale  co~operativee were  the ideal founders.  As 
the Rochdale Pioneers they have  been honoured far beyond the  shores o£ 
Britain, all the more  so because they created both a  consumers' 
co-operative and,  in their textile factory,  a  workers'  co-operative 
as well.  · 
1 .j  .fu;:.owth  of consumer co-operatives 
From  its modest  beginnings in Rochdale,  the consumer  co-operative 
movement  expanded  steadily for over a  century.  Over much  of this time 
consumer co-operatives operated on  a  much  larger scale than most  other 
">IV retailers.  Though  its market  share was  and is less than that of some 
Scandinavian co-operatives,  the British consumer co-operative movement 
was  larger absolutely than that of any other country in Western 
Europe  and  dominated  the co-operative movement  as  a  whole  to a  greater 
extent than in any other country.  Co-operation was  very much  identi-
fied with retail trading.  · 
Consumer  co-operatives grew partly because until the  1930's 
their trading surpluses were  not liable to tax.  It was  argued that 
dividends  on  purchases were  a  rebate on price and not  an addition to 
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income  and that ploughed-back surpluses should,  therefore,  also be  exempt 
from  tax.  Only  interest on co-operative shares and interest on co-operative 
investments were  liable to tax.  In the first half of the 20th centur.y 
many  societies paid substantial dividends on purchases and tended to 
measure their success by the size of their dividends.  There  was  a 
tendency to plough back a  lower proportion of earnings than private 
retail chains  and  to seek high margins rather than large volume. 
Managers  were  often appointed from  inside the movement  and paid 
somewhat  less than their counterparts employed  by private retail 
chains. 
The  impressive achievements of the British consumer co-operative 
movement  were praised by economists;  Professor Alfred Marshall served 
for a  year as President of the Co-operative Congress.  In the years 
after the Second World  War  consumer co-operatives in Europe  pioneered 
self-service which had developed in the trSA  following an experiment 
by Mr  Clarence Saunders in Memphis,  Tenessee,  in 1912.  However,  the 
consumer  co-operatives had difficulty in maintaining their lead in 
this more  capital-intensive type of retailing.  Private chains ·were 
able to build self-service supermarkets and hypermarkets  on  a  larger 
scale and achieve greater economies  of scale.  MOreover,  they were 
able to buy  on  a  larger scale and  on more  favourable  terms.  The 
abolition of retail price maintenance in 1964 intensified competition. 
The  1958  Independent  Commission  (whose  secretary was  Tony  Crosland) 
recommended  amalgamations  between retail societies in order to achieve 
economies  of scale; ·  s~nd. the number  of retail consumer co-operatives 
in Britain declined from  918  in 1958  to  170  in 1981.  It is the poliny 
of the Co-operative. Union to encourage  a  further reduction in the number 
of retail societies until there are only 25  large regional retail 
societies.  Co-operative Retail Services,  the organisation that rescues 
retail co-operatives in difficulties,  took over the Dondon  Co-operative 
Society in 1980.  CRS  now  has  something like  200fo  of the turnover of the 
British consumer co-operative movement.  The  consumer movement  had 1.75 
million members  in 1901,  6.5 milTion in 1931,  nearly 13 million in 1961 
and  10.2 million at the end of'1980.  By  1980  its market  share had 
declined to 6.4%.  The  movement  has been on  the defensive and it is 
difficult to know  what  it can do. 
1.4  Agricultural co-operatives 
Agricultural co-operatives are not as strong in Britain as in 
some  other European countries,  partly because a  high proportion of 
agricultural marketing is undertaken by public boards  such as the Milk 
Marketing Board.  Agricultural co-operatives in Scotland,  Wales  and 
Northern Ireland are associated in Agricultural Organisation Societies; 
the Agricultural Organisation Society for England  collapsed in the 1920s and  was  succeeded by Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Services 
Limited which is closely associated with the National Farmers'  Union. 
These  four promotional organisations come  together in the UK  Federation 
of Agricultural Co-operatives which is based at the BFU  headquarters in 
London  and is represented on  COGEXJA  in Bru;ssels.  British agricultural 
co-operatives increased their trade significantly during the  'seventies. 
Their market  share for the sale of fari:n  products was  nearly 14%  in  . 
1979-80  and in the same  year they had a  100,6  share o:f  farm purchases 
of feed,  fuel,  fertilisers and other farm supplies.  ~ere were  some 
546  agricultural co-operatives in the United Kingdom at the end  of 
1980.  They  had 329,528 members,  sales of £1,699 million and  employed 
17,395 people. 
Like  consumer co-operatives,  agricultural co-operatives have 
had to face tough competition from  large companies  and have had to 
plough back a  high proportion of earnings.  Between 1969  and  1978  the 
share capital of agricultural co-operatives doubled from £21.4 million 
to £43.8 million and loan capital increased more  than three times  from 
£14.1  million to £45.9 million;  their reserves increased more  than five 
times  from £8.2 million to £43.7 million.  Though  sales of the UK 
agricultural co-operatives are only about half those of retail consumer 
co-operatives,  sales per member  are about thirty times as great as 
those of the consumer co-operatives.  UK  agricultural co-operatives 
have a  considerable trade with the Co-operative Wholesale Society. 
The  Plunkett Foundation for Co-operative Studies in Oxford keeps  a 
close watch on the progress and  problems of UK  and other agricultural 
co-operatives. 
1.5  Worker  co-operatives 
The  self-governing workshops  of the Christian Socialists in 
the 1850s were  not much  more  successful than.the Owenite  communities 
had been.  It was  the difficulty of forming industrial co-operatives 
that could compete  successfully with private enterprise that led to 
the gradual identification of socialism with state enterprise.  Many 
of the early leaders of the co-operative ~ovement such as G J  Hoiyoake 
and Edward  Vansittart Neale,  the first General Secretary of the Co-op-
erative Union,  were  advocates of co-operative production and of worker 
participation in consumer co-operatives.  E V  Neale was  happy to sit 
on the same  platform with Karl Marx in advocating socialism through 
co-operative production and was  at the same  time a  life-long Conservative. 
The  most  ambitious attempt at co-operative production in the 
19th century was  the formation of the Ouseburn Engineering Society at 
Newcastle in 1873  by Dr  John Rutherford.  He  was  a  Congregationalist 
Minister and  a  Doctor of Medicine,  though quite inexperienced in 
industrial management.  High quality marine  engines were produced. 
They  were•priced too  low  and  the co-operative collapsed in 1875. 
The  co-operative and  trade union movements  lost a  great deal of money; 
and the collapse of the Scottish Co-operative Ironworks at about the 
same  time cost the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society about  1o% 
of its capital.  In spite of these setbacks co-operative production 
continued to be widely advocated and  the Co-operative Productive 
Federation (CPF)  was  founded at the Co-operative Congress in Derby 
in  188~.  Many  new  productive societies were  formed,  especially after the appointment  of Thomas  Blandford as Secretary.  But  there 
were  also strong opponents of co-operative production and of workers' 
participation in consumer co-operatives,  most  notably J  T W Mitchell, 
the redoubtable President of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, .and 
Miss  Beatrix Potter,  iater Mrs  Sidney Webb,  who  published her bpok 
The  British Co-operative Movement  in 1891.  She  argued that productive 
societies were  inherently unstable. 
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Productive societies nevertheless continued to be formed  and 
there were  more  than a  hundred by  1900,  of which  a  respectable number 
survived.  In the early 1920s Building Guilds were  organised as · 
productive societies and  one  of them,  Chesham Builders,  survived for 
fifty years.  Other productive societies were  also successful and well-
managed  enterprises.  Equity Shoes  Limited,  formed  after a  strike at a 
Co-operative Wholesale Society shoe  factory in 1887,  still employed  200 
people in 1977  and paid a  bonus  on wages  of 20%.  Walsall Locks,  founded 
in -1873,  had sales of more than £1  million in 1978.  Nevertheless, 
there has been a  steady decline in the number  of productive societies 
in the second half of the 20th century and by  1981  there were  only nine 
traditional productive societies affiliated to the Co-operative Union. 
The  previous year the Co-operative Productive Federation,  with only 
eight members  left, amalgamated with the Co-operative Union. 
*  *  * 
2.  NEW  WAVE. OF  WORKER  CO-OPERATIVES 
· 2.1  The  worker co-operative movement  today 
Though  there were  only so  few  CPF  societies left in existence 
in 1980,  an extraordinary development  had  taken place in the preceding 
twenty years.  Before explaining the. background it IDalf  be as well to 
give  some  of the figures for the worker co-operative movement  tod~. 
The  fullest list, covering 329  worker co-operatives,  was  given in the 
Directory of Co-operatives published by the Co-operative Development 
Agency  in September 1980.  This total compares  with the  200  enumerated 
a  few  months  before in the Directory of members  of the Industrial 
Common  Ownership Movement.  The  figures  suggest that between 1976  and 
1980,  250  new  worker co-operatives ,.,ere  ..  established in the UK.  This 
is even more  than the  139  which are reported to have been started in 
France during the same  period.  In fact,  the latest ICOM  figures which 
have not yet been published suggest that a  further 138  new  worker 
co-operatives have registered since September 1980 bringing the total 
to 467  at the end of 1981.  For this report we  have used the numbers  in 
the  CDA  survey which were  analysed as follows: 
a)  Distribution by size of workforce 
Over  500  1 
250  - 500  2 
100  - 249  7 
50  - 99  8 
20  - 49  25 
10  - 19  54 
Under  10  234 
'The  great majority of new  start co-operatives are very small businesses 
- some  operating only on  a  weekend  or part-time basis.  The  Rochdale 
Pioneers'  Society started in this way. b) m.stribution by  turnover 
10  had a  turnover in excess o£ £1  million 
12  between £500,000  and  £1  million 
12  between £250,000  and  £500,000 
16  between £100,000  and  £250,000. 
The  remainder had a  turnover o£ less than £100,000 per annum.  This 
includes many  recent  formations  that had not completed a  full year's 
trading. 
c) Distribution by sector 
Retail,  distributive,  catering and £ood 
producing 
Printing and publishing 
Building,  house renovation,  house decoration, 
cleaning and  waste recycling 
Record,  film and  music  making,  theatre 
(includ.ing actors'  agencies) 
Engineering,  electronics and  chemicals 
Advisory,  consultative and  educational 
(including computer software,  insurance and 
language  schools) 
Footwear,  cl)thing and textiles 
Craft,  carpentry,  furniture making and 
joinery 
Provision and hire of transport,  bicycle 
and motor vehicle repairs 
112 
61 
33 
28 
26 
21 
19 
19 
11 
Distribution stands out.  The  great majority o£ co-operatives in 
retailing are part of the whole£ood  network,  which is itsel£ part 
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of the  'alternative scene'  associated with the ecological movement 
although in many  cases the  demand  for workers'  control is the principal 
aim and  whole foods  simply the means  of achieving it. The  main  ecological 
groups - the Ecology Party,  Friends of the Earth,  SERA  - all £avour 
co-operatives as decentralised,  democratic,  responsive and responsible 
organisations which  are likely to have  social objectives consistent with 
ecological principles.  The  position of printing and publishing as the 
second largefSt  group is also a  creation of the alternative movement.  Many 
co-operatives belong to a  radical publishing network involved with 
community,  £eminist  and  other alternative groups. 
The  third category - building and house renovation - shows  more 
of a  parallel between French and British experience.  The  construction 
trade unions in Britain have  alw~zy"s been favourable  towards co-operatives 
which have been seen as a  means  o£ de-casualising the building industry 
by putting construction workers in control o£ their own  employment. 
Co-operatives would  be a  responsible alternative to  'lump'  labour 
taking on  labour-only contracts in order to avoid tax. UK6 
Among  the other groups  the record,  film,  music-making and  theatre 
sector is growing because  these ventures appeal to professionals Who 
want  the structure of their work  to be  a  way  of life,  accordin~-to a 
new  style.  The  other sectors are more  traditional and  include the 
largest co-operatives  such as Scott Bader,  Trylon and  the Metropolitan 
Cab  Co-operative.  The  latter is a  flourishing co-operative of taxi 
drivers in London. 
d)  Geoea:aJ2hical  Distribution 
Greater London  85 
North East  47 
South Midlands  30 
Nor.th  West  21 
West  Midlands  19 
Scotland  18 
East Midlands  16 
South West  14 
Wales  11 
South East  8 
Northern Ireland  8 
Some  500/o  of co-operatives are located in only three areas,  namely: 
Greater London 
North East  (Yorkshire and  Tyneside) 
South Midlands 
Within each of these areas of relative concentration are to be found 
national and  local promotional agencies.  On  a  county basis the greatest 
concentrations are: 
Northamptonshire  14 
West  Yorkshire  19 
North Yorkshire  10 
Strathclyde  10 
Lancashire  13 
In Northamptonshire is located the headquarters of the Industrial Common 
Ownership  Finance,  the nearest British approximation to the Caja Laboral 
Popular in Spain.  In Leeds,  at the  junction of West  and North Yorkshire 
is the Industrial Common  Ownership Movement  and Beechwood  College,  the 
co-operative training centre.  Strathclyde has  the very active Scottish 
Co-operatives Development  Committee  with highly committed fUll-time 
and voluntary workers.  London  has  the national Co-operative Development 
Agency  and  also a  high proportion of the active local Co-operative 
Development  Groups  with fUll-time staff, notably in Brent,  Hackney, 
Islington,  Lambeth,  Lewisham  and Wandsworth.  The  latest figures  from 
ICOM  show  that 40  worker co-operatives registered in Greater London  alone 
in 1981,  the majority of them in areas  such as these where  there are local 
Co-operative Development  Groups  with paid staff. 
2.2  .The  Scott Bader Commonwealth 
How  did this sudden spurt of development  come  about?  Its origins 
can be  traced to a  strike in 1949  at a  small  chemical  company  in Northamptonshire.  The  Scott Bader Company,  which manufactured  (as it 
still does)  polyesters,  resins and  intermediates,  was  owned  by Ernest 
Bader and his family.  He  had come  to Britain from Switzerland in 1912. 
When  faced with a  strike,  Mr  Bader called in Robert Edwards,  then 
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General  Secretar,y of the Chemical  Workers'  Union  and  later a  Co-operative 
Member  of Parliament.  Mr  Edwards  suggested that Mr  Bader should get to 
the roots of industrial conflict by handing over the factor,y  to the workers 
and letting it be  run democratically on. a  basis of common  ownership. 
Mr  Bader,  a  Christian and  a  pacifist,  agreed.  So  in 1951,  900fo  of the 
shares of the company  were  transferred as a  gift to a  company  limited by 
guarantee without  share capital,  the Scott Bader Commonwealth  Limited. 
The  workers became  members  of the Commonwealth  company;  they were 
entitled to elect a  Community  Council which appointed some  of the members 
of the board of the operating company.  In 1963  the remaining  100fo  of the 
shares were  transferred to the Commonwealth  company  and Mr  Ernest Bader 
was  succeeded as Chairman by his  son,  Godric.  After conversion to  common 
ownership  the company  prospered,  employing some  450  people most  of whom 
became  members  of the Commonwealth.  The  achievements of the Scott Bader 
Commonwealth  are described by Susanna Hoe  in her book  The  Man  Who  Gave 
His Company  Away,  published in 1978. 
In 1958  Mr  Bader convened  a  meeting in London  with Mr  Harold 
Farmer,  a  printer,  to  form  the Society for Democratic  Integration in 
Industry.  Mr  Farmer had converted his small printing company,  Farmer 
and Sons  Limited,  to  common  ownership by transferring all ·the ordinary 
shares of the company  to a  co-operative society of which  the workers 
beaame  members.  Mr  Farmer described his experiment  in the booklet 
Christian Principles Practised in Industry. 
The  success of the Scott Bader Commonwealth  attracted considerable 
interest,  and  while the Society for Democratic  Integration in Industry 
made  limlted progress,  a  number of other companies  converted in a  similar 
w~  and l)ecame  practising members.  Among  these were  Landsmans  (Co-Ownership) 
Limited of Huntingdon  (1964);  Rowen  (Onllwyn)  Limited,  of Neath  (1965); 
Trylon Community  Limited of Wollaston  (1968);  Michael Jones  Communit~ 
Limited of Northampton  (1970);  Share Community  Limited,  London  (1973); 
Sunderlandia Limited of Sunderland  (1973);  Bewleys  Cafes Limited of 
Dublin  (19'73)  and  KER  Plant Limited of Moulton,  Northants  (1974). 
Some  of these companies  were  organised in the same  w~  as the Scott 
Bader Commonwealth  with a  company  limited by guarantee holding the 
shares of a  conventional company.  Some  were  organised differently, 
such as Landsmans  in which the workers held shares carr,ying a  limited 
return but with voting in proportion to shares.  They  were all 
incorporated as companies  and run in the in1erests of the worker members. 
One  famous  'near co-operative'  which  chose a  dif.ferent legal form 
if the John Lewis  Partnership,  a  highly successful cbain of department 
stores employing about  25,000 people.  As  in a  workers'  co-operative,  the 
return paid on  share capital is limited but the Chairman has  the right to 
name  his successor and  to appoint half the members  of the Central Board. 
It is difficult to know  quite how  to describe organisations such as  these 
which  are ver,y  like co-operatives wi.thout  quite being so.  Some  of them, 
like  JolL~  Lewis~ are clearly too hierarchical to be  regarded as co-operatives, 
especially where  members  have voting powers  in proportion to their share-
holdings.  Nevertheless these new  enterprises paved the ~  for a  remarkable 
development  of more  genuinely co-operative enterprises in the second half 
of the 1970's. 
~.- l  (' 2.3  The  Industrial Common  Ownership Movement 
In 1971  the Society for Democratic Integration in Industr,y 
changed its ~e  to  the Industrial Common  Ownership Movement.  It 
published a  series of pamphlets  about  'common  ownership',  one  of 
which discussed the advantages of registering in accordance with the 
Companies  Acts  compared with registering in accordance with the 
Industrial and .Provident Societies Acts under which most  co-operati~es 
in Britain are registered.  In September 1975  a  Special General Meeting 
approved  some  Model  Rules  for registering common  ownership enterprises 
as  co-operative societies under the Industrial and Provident Societies 
Acts.  These model  rules were  as short and  simple as the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies was  prepared to accept  and much  simpler than the 
conventional 1969  model  rules of the Co-operative Froductive Federation. 
They differed from  the latter in a  number  of important respects. 
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In the first place· shareholdings were  limited to one  £1  share 
per member  so  that the share became  a  kind of membership certificate 
instead of a  source of capital.  In eliminating personal share  capit~ 
as far as possible the Industrial Common  Ownership MOvement  was  to  some 
extent following the  example of the Scott Bader Commonwealth  where  there 
are no  personal shareholdings.  The  Registrar,  however,  insisted that 
each member  should hold at least one  share.  Under the conventional 
model  rules of the CPF  there was  no  maximum  shareholding other than the 
legal maximum  which in 1981  was  £5,000.  Though  there is  nothip~ unusi.la.l 
about  the  ICOM  rule of a  minimum  shareholding per member,  a  maximum 
shareholding of £1  per member  is ver,y unusual  indeed.  Most  co-operatives 
need as much  capital as they can raise and  the  ICOM  rules effectively 
mean  than co-operatives are completely dependent for their capital on loans, 
some  of which m~  be  short  term.  Though  loans provided by members  of ICOM 
co-operatives may  be  o~ a  semi-permanent kind and ~  be  subordinate to 
other loans both for t:J.e  payment  of interest and for the repayment  of 
principal,  it.is nevertheless likely that a  very high proportion of loan 
eapital will have  an adverse effect on a  co-operative's borrowing capacity. 
The  second way  in which  ICOM  model  rules differed from those of 
CPF  was  that they insisted that only workers  should be members  and  that, 
apart from probationary arrangements  and provision for seasonal workers, 
all workers  should be members.  With the capital contribution set at such 
a  nominal  level,  workers  were  expected to become  members  after an approp-
riate probationary period.  Membership  was  considered to be  b~virtue of 
work  done,  not by virtue of capital contributed.  ~  contrast,  the model 
rules of the CPF  allowed outside shareholdings and many  of the old 
productive societies had found  outside shareholders - consumer co-operatives, 
trade unions or others - necessary in order to raise sufficient capital. 
CPF  critics argued that such shareholdings undermined the cohesiveness of 
worker co-operatives and  CPF  bowed  to  them  in 1978  by producing an 
alternative set of model  rules in which  shareholdings are restricted to 
workers.  These  have  since been approved by the Registrar uf Friendly 
Societies. 
The  third main difference between the two  sets of rules was  that 
ICOM  model  rules prohibited the distribution to members  of any 
residual assets on  winding up  and  said that instead they should be 
transfer~ed to another common  ownership organisation,  to  a  central 
fund or to a  charity.  It was  claimed that there is an inherent weakness 
in the CPF  model  rules in this respect.  So  long as  a  CPF  co-operative is 
trading,  the shares of its members  are worth no  more  than their ~aminal 
value.  But if the co-operative winds  up  they ~  become  worth ver,y  much more  so that outside shareholders,·in particular,  m~  be tempted to 
wind  up  the co-operative for the sake of capital gain.  This 
'un-co-operative'  behaviour is exactly what  took place in the case 
of Wigston Hosiers in the 1950s,  later at Cardiff Printers and, 
in 1977,  at Bristol Printers. 
In line with its policy on  the distribution of residual 
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assets,  ICOM  recommends  that saving by  a  common  ownership co-operative 
should be  'collective saving'  without  a:ny  memb.er  participation in the 
growth of assets.  This means  effectively that saving by  the 
co-operative is sacrifice by the members  and,  although such collective 
saving increases the capital of the enterprise, it ~  mean  that too 
much  money  is distributed and  too little ploughed bacl,<:.  The  same 
danger exists in ordinar,y companies  where  trade union pressure for large 
wage  increases may  result in too little being left over for investment, 
for the provision of new  jobs and even,  perhaps,  for the survival of the 
company.  Governments  and  employers may  appeal for restraint, but trade 
unions know  that what  is distributed in wages  belongs to the workers 
whereas what  is ploughed back belongs to the shareholders.  Since 
co-operatives inevitably find it harder than companies  to raise share 
capital, it is even more  important for them to accumulate capital out of 
earnings.  Provision for some  measure of workers'  participation in 
the growth of assets when  earnings are ploughed back ~an be an important 
wa;y  of ensuring that investment will be adequate.  In CPF  co-operatives 
provision is made  for the issue of bonus  shares to workers,  just as in 
consumer co-operatives dividends on purchases may  be credited to share 
accounts.  There is nothing against this in co-operative principles 
and it may  be a  weakness  of the  ICOM  model  rules that they make  no  such 
provision.  / 
The  two  sets of rules differ in a  variety of other w~s.  For 
example,  the CPF  model  rules are much  longer than those of ICOM  and 
43  of the first 78  rules are about the management  and administration of 
the co-operative,  l~ing down  the powers  and  dutie.s of the President, 
the Management  Committee,  the Secretar.y and  the Chief Executive or 
General Manager.  The  ICOM  model  rules,  on the other hand,  have only or..e 
rule out of twenty-one about management.  Some  of the smaller rOOM 
co-operatives dispense with formal management  altogether and instead 
have  frequent meetings of all the members. 
It is fairly plain that there are advantages  and  disadvantages 
on both sides: neither the  ICOM  nor~the CP.F  model  rules can be said 
to be perfect.  But  the fact remains  that the vast majority of new 
co-operatives which have been formed  in the past decade have  done  so 
with  ICOM  model  rules,.  even though these have  sometimes  been modified 
to meet  their special needs.  B,y  the end of August  1981  there were 
350  worker co-operatives,  forming at the rate of two  a  week,  affiliated 
to the Industrial Common  Ownership Movement.  The  striking difference 
between the energy and  dedication of ICOM  and  the apparent lethargy 
and  apathy of the CPF  Ina¥ derive from  the fact that  ICOM  is more 
than a  federation of co-operatives; it is a  movement,  an association· of 
individuals convinced of the importance of promoting co-operative 
p:r.oduct'icn on  a.  common  ownership basis.  The  Federation,  on  the other 
harids  was  an organisation of established co•operatives more  concerned 
with what  the Federation could do  to help existing·enterprises than with 
t·  ·.  promoting new  onE•s.  The  more  succes~ful societies did not really need1  ~; 
the holp of the Federa·bion and  the Federation was  not able to do  very 
much  to help the less successful. UK10 
2.4  Inspiration from Mondragon 
In the last couple of years a  third set of model  rules has 
been produced by  a  new  co-operative support organisation,  Job Ownership 
Limited  (JOL).  It was  set up  in 1978  with the purpose of promoting in 
Britain industrial co-operatives like those radiating out from 
Mondragon  in the Basque provinces of Spain.  JOL  argues that neither 
the CP.F  nor the ICOM  model  rules are conducive to the ploughing back 
of a  high proportion of earnings Which  is one of the distinctive features 
of the MOndragon  co-operatives,  enabling them to develop in capital-
'intensive forms  of production.  JOL  has chosen not to embrace  the 
existing co-operative legislation,  whether the Industrial and  Provident 
Societies Acts or the new  Industrial Common  Ownership Act,  but to use 
'instead the Companies  Acts.  It has drawn up special articles of 
association for what it calls a  'Job Ownership Company'.  These articles 
do  not  exactly conform to the Mondragon model  because they allow workers 
to be  issued with ordinary shares which appreciate in value with the 
growth of the enterprise.  However,  since-these shares are held in 
proportion to pay members  effectively participate in the changing net 
worth of the company·on  the basis of the amount  of work  done  rather than 
merely by virtue of their shareholding.  So  far only two,  Manchester 
Cold Rollers and Bourlet Frames,  have been formed,  although JOL's 
consultancy work  has  included advising a  number  of groups of workers 
considering the possibility of  'workforce buy-outs'  in both privately 
and publicly-owned enterprises. 
Another initiative prompted by the MOndragon  co-operatives 
has come  from  a  someWhat  surprising quarter,  the Wales  TUC.  A visit 
by a  dele:gation of Welsh  trade unionists to Mondragon  early in 1981 
led to  p:!~oposals to create 20,000  new  jobs in co-operatives in Wales  over 
the next ten years.  The  plan for achieving this was  drawn up  with the 
help of a  firm of management  .consultants,  Logica,  and  government grants 
of £45,000.  The  first co-operative to be  formed  as  a  result is · 
Aberystwyth Engineering.  The  eleven workers are each putting up  £500 
and will each take the  same  wage  of £80  a  week.  Grants of £45,000 
~ave been :?ut  up by the Rural Development  Board for Wales,  the local 
authority and the Dyfed  Industrial Agency.  A rather unusual source 
of finance is the Granada Television Company.  The  new  co-operative 
won  a  £7,000 prize in a  competition for the best plan for a  new 
co-operative. 
2.5  Job  saving and co-operative rescues 
The  traditional worker productive co-operatives were  concentrated 
for the most  part in three industries:  clothing,  printing and  shoes. 
The  new  wave  of ICOM  co-ops,  while somewhat  more  diverse,  has  shown  a 
marked propensity for retail distribution and printing,  in both closely 
associated with the  'alternative movement'.  A case  stu~ of one 
wholefood distribution co-operative is given in the Appendix. 
Another type of worker co-operative Which  might  be accorded the 
status of a  sub-sector of its own  is that which is set up  to provide 
jobs for a  specific group  of people who  are at a  disadvantage  on  the 
labour market.  Two  case studies,  one  of a  cleaning co-operative set up 
by and for a  group  of women  and  one  of a  restaurant set up  and  run by 
a  group of'Bengali workers  (both of which have beell helped by local 
authorities)  are also given in the Appendix. 
Apart  from  the spate of conversions of traditional companies  to 
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in Britain since  ICOM  came  into being have been started from  scratch. 
There have,  however,  been attempts by workers  whose  jobs were  under 
threat to take over their companies  and run them as co-operatives.  Their 
success rate has been sporadic,  as it has been in other countries and 
as,  perhaps,  is to be  expected when  workers,  unfamiliar with management, 
attempt to make  a  success where  capitalist enterprise has failed.  All 
too often,  survival has been achieved at the cost of subsistence wage 
levels and it is little wonder  that trade unions have been less than 
enthusiastic. 
Job saving co-operatives ~  have  even more  of a  struggle 
to become  acceptable to public opinion in the United Kingdom  than in 
other countries because of the relatively poor Showing of three highly 
publicised co-operative  'rescues.'  in the mid-1970's.  Of the three -
Meriden MOtorcycles~ Kirkby Manufacturing and  Engineering and  the 
Scottish Daily News  - only the first remains in existence and it is still 
struggling for survival.  Though  they are by no  means  the only examples 
of attempts by workers to save their jobs by forming a  co-operative 
they are the best-known and perhaps the most  infamous.  Mr Antony 
Wedgwood  Benn,  Industr,y Minister in the then Labour Government,  championed 
all three and  without his support it is doubtfUl whether any of them would 
have received the substantial government  grants and  loans they did. 
The  shortest-lived was  the Scottish Daily News  which rose 
from  the ashes of  the Scottish Daily Express after it was  closed down  earl1 
in 1974.  600  redundant workers put up  a  total of £200,000  from their 
redundancy money;  the Department of Industr,y added £1.2 million and  further 
fu:ads  were  provided by Robert Maxwell,  ex-Labour MP  and owner of 
Pergamon Press.  Within six months  the paper had folded and the co-operative 
with it.  Whether or not its co-ope~ative structure waE  to blame for 
the failure,  the fact that it was  a  co-operative and  that it had received 
large amounts  of public money  stuck in the minds  of the public. 
Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering started as a  co-operative 
with some  800  members  in 1975.  It lasted just four years,  in the course 
of which it received more  than £4  million in government  grants and loans. 
It must  be said,  however,  that KME  started life as a  co-~perative with 
all the odds  against it.  Four successive capitalist owners had been 
beset by problems,  the last of them being forced into receivership in 
1974.  When  the shop  steward convenors of the two  trade unions  involved, 
the Amalgamated  Union of Engineering Workers  and  the Transport  and 
General Workers'  Union pressed the government  to help the proposed 
co-operative to get off the ground,  opposition from government  advisers 
was  strong.  In the end their advice was  not heeded and a grant of 
£3.9 million was  made  on condition that the co-operative would  not 
be  allowed to borrow against its assets.  That condition was  later 
relaxed and,  in addition to the money  that the co-operative was  thereby 
able to borrow from banks,  the government  came  up  with a  further 
t:a66·,ooo.  Productivity and  output had been increased by dint of much  more 
flexible working arrangements than would  ever have prevailed under the 
old system.  It was,  for  inst&~ce, agreed that when  skilled work  was  not 
available,  skilled men  would  turn to unskilled work  instead;  lunch and 
te~ breaks were  reorganised so that the production process was  not  interrupted. 
It .is  highly unlikely that the trade unions would  have agreed to either 
of these measures under the old regime  •.  But  the end  when  it came  was 
swift enough.  At  a  closed meeting in Februar,y  1978  the local Labour MP, 
l"'r  Robert Xilroy-Silk1  announced  to ·the  assembled members' of the co-operative 
that no  more  government  money  would  be  forthcoming.  Two  of the co-operative's 
loss-making lines were  immediately discontinued.  Voluntar,y  redundancies 
ware  accepted.  But  it was  already too late; the co-operative was  forced 
to close in April 1979. UK  12 
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Meriden Motorcycles Limited came  into being after workers 
at Norton Villiers Triumph,  itself already subsidised by the government 
to the tune of nearly £5  million,  announced that all 1 , 750  workers at 
their Meriden plant were  to be made  redundant in 1973.  The  workers 
responded with a  sit-in;  they occupied the plant for eighteen months 
and,  although they continued to produce motorcycles,they would  not 
allow the finished product to leave the premises.  ~  March  1975  a 
new  co-operative had been formed  with the help of the trade unions 
involved.  Help was  also forthcoming in the shape of government 
grants and loans totalling £5  million.  The  constitution of the new 
co-operative was  somewhat  unconventional with all the shares being 
held by a  trust and no  individual ownership.  The  co-op lost money 
in its first three years after which it had to turn for help with 
both management  and  finance to the giant General Electric Company. 
Within a  year Meriden was  back on its feet to such an extent that 
GEC  had been able to recoup the money  they had put in and pull out 
its management  team in favour of the co-op*s  own  team. 
The  motorcycles produced at Meriden are hand-madP  quality 
products at quality prices.  They  are in a  small specialist market 
competing against cheap,  mass-produced motorcycles  from Japan and 
elsewhere.  To  have  survived so far is in itself something of an 
achievement.  And  the co-operative has  proved itself in other w~s 
too:  productivity is higher than it was  in Norton Villiers Triumph, 
its capitalist predecessor.  This has been achieved under a  system 
where skilled and unskilled men  alike have been paid the same  basic 
rate,  the only exception being the fully professional management 
team which the members  of the co-operative themselves decided to 
appoint at competitive rates of p~. 
2.6  Community  co-operatives 
These are a  relatively new  phenomenon  in the United Kingdom. 
The  impetus  came  from  Ireland where multi-purpose community  co-operatives 
have grown up  in mainly remote,  declining areas since the 1960s.  Their 
objectives are both economic  and  social;  attempting to reverse the 
decline in rural economies,  to halt migration and to revive local 
language and  custom.  The  Irish example  was  followed when,  in 1977,  the 
Highlands  and  Islands Development  Board launched a  programme  to establish 
community  co-operatives in the Western Isles and other parts of Scotland. 
In these community  co-operatives members  of the local community contribute 
between £10  and £50  in share capital.and the Development  Board then matches 
whatever they have managed  to raise with a  grant.  The  Board also makes 
loans of up  to  5~  of the capital needed by the new  community  co-operatives 
and will pay the salary of a  professional manager for three years. 
The  first to be established was  at Ness  at the northern tip of the 
Outer Hebrides  and others  followed at Park,  Scalpay,  Harris,  Lochdar, 
Erisk~, Barra and Vatersay as well as one  at Papa Westray in the Orkneys 
and one at Archaracle in Argyll.  In the spring of 1981  others were in the 
process of formation at Great Bernera on Lewis,  and at Eday  and Hoy  on the 
Orkneys.  The  Board developed its own  model  rules for the community  co-op-
eratives which  launched a  variety of projects to provide employment 
including catering7  machinery hire,  market  gardening,  knitwear,  farm 
supplies,  workshops,  fish processing,  craft shops,  fuel  supply,  retail 
.ng•,  stores,  bakeries,  building,  communi +,y  centres, hotels,  peat  . '.tli:. 
cutting,  transport and  fishermen's  supplies.  As  workers'  co-operatives 
these could have been separate undertakings with only the workers as UK  13 
members.  With community  co-operatives all are involved and  any  surpluses 
go primarily to developing new  projects and new  jobs. 
In Wales,  community  co-operative projects have involved 
furniture production,  food  distribution,  hand knitting and pottery with 
support from  the Special Temporary  Employment  Programme  of the Manpower 
Services Commission,  local authorities and  the Development Board for 
Rural Wales.  In Northern Ireland ~he achievements of the Newry  and 
Mourne  community  co-operative have been impressive and in England 
community  co-operatives have been set up  in Devon,  Norfolk and  Oxfordshire. 
Mention should also be made  of the community  development  co-operative, 
·craigni.illar Festival Enterprises in Edinburgh.  The  Festival Society 
employs  150  people and has been supported by the Manpower  Services 
Sommissi.on  and  the EIDC  through its Anti-Poverty Programme. 
*  *  * 
3.  CO-OPERATIVE  LEGISLATION  AND  TAXATION 
3.1  The  Laws 
Co-operative law in the United Kingdom  can be traced as far 
back as 1799  to the passing of the Friendly Societies Act.  The  first 
of the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts,  under which  the majority 
of co-operatives in Britain are registered,  was  passed in 1852.  It 
gave  co-operatives legal status for the first time although it was  another 
decade before they were  also accorded limited liability.  Four fUrther 
Industrial and Provident Societies Acts have been passed in the present 
century,  the last in 1978.  The  Acts  do  not attempt to define a 
co-operative but leave it to the Registrar of Friendly Societies to 
decide what  is and is not  a  bona fide co-op·erative.  All three main 
types of co-operative - consumer,  agricultural and worker - Ill8\Y'  register 
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts and of the others 
only credit unions and housing  co-ope~atives are subject to special 
legislation. 
A second option open to new  co-o:;>eratives is to register under 
the Companies  Acts.  They  can do  so  either as  companies  limited by shares 
or as a  company  limited by guarantee without share ca.pi tal.  MOre  than 
150  agricultural co-operatives in Brita.in.have been formed as companies 
limited by shares.  This is also the form  favoured by Job Ownership 
Limited.  The  drawback  of this form until recently was  that because 
company  shares are irredeemable,  co-operatives had to raise most  of their 
capital in the form  of loan capital.  That has changed since the 1981 
Companies  Act  which allows  companies  to buy  their own  shares.  The  form 
of a  company  limited by  shares can be particularly valuable for co-operatives 
which are being created by conversion from  a.  traditional company.  If 
the shares of the old company  are transferred into a  Trust for the 
benefit of the employees  of the new  company,  neither Capital Gains  Tax 
nor Capital Transfer Tax  are incurred.  Even  so,  this legal form is 
regarded by  some  as unsatisfactory because workers  are unable to participate 
in the growth of assets when  earnings  alr:'e  ploughed back.  Another 
method  of conversion is for the new  co-operative to set up  as a  company 
limited by gaa:r..·a.ntee.  Although there is no  individual shareholding in 
such a  company  there is nothing to prevent  a.  company  limited by guarantee 
holding the shares of another company,  in. this case the one  which is 
being converted to a  co-operative.  One  disadvantage of companies  limited 
by guarantee,.  whether they are started from  scratch or by  conversion, 
is  tl~t the absence of personal shareholdings means  that a  high proportion 
of capital has  to be in the form  of loan capital. UK  14 
One  advantage for co-operatives which register in either 
form under the Companies  Acts is that most  solicitors and  indeed moat 
providers of finance understand them  a  good  deal better than they do 
the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts. 
A third option for co-operatives is not to register under any 
of the Acts  described above  but  simply to form themselves into an 
unlimited company  or partnership.  It is one  that is rarely taken up 
for the good  reason that the members  would  have unlimited liability 
although there can be little doubt  that unlimited liability can be good 
for credit and helped to make  the Dutch one  of the strongest agricultural 
co-operative movements  in Europe. 
In 1976  a  new  Act  of Parliament was  passed which was  designed 
specifically for worker co-operatives as its long title shows: 
'An  Act  to further the development  of enterprises controlled by people 
working in them,  and for purposes  connected therewith'.  The  Industrial 
Common  Ownership Act,  which had the support of all three major political 
parties,  defined 'a co-operative enterprise'  and  'a common  ownership 
enterprise'  for the first time.  A co-operative enterprise was  defined 
as a  body  controlled by  a  majority of the people working for it whose 
income  was  applied for the benefit of its members.  A common  ownership 
could take the form of a  company  or a  co-operative society registered 
under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts.  In either case it 
too had to be controlled by a  majority of the people working for it. 
The  Act further said that in a  common  ownership enterprise only workers 
could be members,  that all members  should have  equal voting rights, 
that the assets could only be applied for the purposes of the object of 
the body  and that any assets remaining on winding up  had to be transferred 
to some  other common  ownership enterprise or fund or Lsed for 
charitable purposes.  Critics have said that the definition of a 
co-operative enterprise is insufficiently precise in that any company 
which issues shares to its workers  could call itself a  co-operative and 
also that it makes  no  mention of co-operative principles so that no 
limit need be set on the return on  shares,and voting cou.ld be in 
proportion to shares instead of being equal. 
a)  Cotporation Tax  When  this tax was  first introduced in 1965, 
co-operatives paid it at the same  rate as  companies.  In 1972  the classic 
system of corporation tax was  replaced by the imputed system under which 
companies  are allowed to credit a  proportion of corporation tax paid 
against the personal tax liability of their shareholders.  Co-operatives 
stood to benefit nothing from this change  because interest on co-operative 
shares were  already deductible for corporation tax purposes.  They  were 
therefore allowed to carry on  p~ing corporation tax on undistributed 
profits at 40%  while the rate for large companies  was  increased to 
5~fo.  The  rate for small companies  was  fixed at  4~fo but has  subsequently 
been reduced to  40%,  the same  rate as for co-operatives.  A co-operative 
registered unde~ the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts Which  made 
profits of £50,000  or more  would  p~ substantially less Corporation Tax 
than conventionaT·companies,  but since the vast majority of co-operatives 
are small they are treated in exactly the same  way  as  compaQies  in this 
respect. 
b)  Tax  on  interest  Interest on co-operative shares is taxed 
in exactly the same  w~  as interest on any other investment  income  and 
is deductible for corporation tax purposes.  The  Co-operative Union  has 
long argued that there should be allowances  similar to those 11sed  to UK  15 
encourage other small savings.  However,  the  1981  Budget did give 
members  of I&PS  co-operatives relief from tax on the income  they use to 
pay interest on  money  they borrow to invest in their co-operatives 
whether in shares or in the form  of a  loan. 
c)  Tax  liability on bonus  share issues  Although bonuses 
distributed to worker members  of co-operatives are deductible for 
corporation tax,  workers are liable to  p~  income  tax on  such bonuses 
at their full personal rate.  This applies even if the bonuses are 
paid in the form of shares.  In this respect co-operatives ~  be at 
a  big disadvantage compared with companies.  Company  shareholders who 
are issued bonus  shares do  not have  to p~  any tax at the time;  capital 
gains tax only arises when  the shares are disposed of which ~  be fifty 
years later.  Moreover,  under the Finance Act,  1978,  companies  have been. 
able to issue bonus  shares to their employees  which are free of tax as 
long as they are held for at least seven years.  Co-operatives have  so 
far been unable to take advantage of this tax concession because as  the 
law stands at the moment  it only applies if shares are irredeemable. 
Although the Treasury has  said that the concession can. apply to 
co-operatives and  the Registrar of Friendly Societies has said that 
co-operatives can issue irredeemable shares if they want  to,  co-operative 
shares,  in the UK  as in most  other countries,  have  alw~s been redeemable. 
Since the whole  purpose of the tax concession was  to encourage workers 
to identify with the enterprise for which  they work,  it seems  rather 
hard that worker co-operatives should be forced to change their rules in 
order to benefit.  Unless  a  change is made  in the law,  co-operatives 
will be discouraged from  issuing their members  with shares to enable them 
to participate in the growth of assets when  earnings are ploughed back; 
they will be discouraged from ploughing back as high a  proportion of 
earnings as the  c·ompanier~ with which they compete. 
).)  Proposals for change 
There is a  great variety of laws  and model  rules under which 
co-operatives can register in the United Kingdom.  But  that is not to 
s~ that any of them  are ideal.  There are a  number of changes that could 
be made  to improve  the chances of worker co-operatives competing 
as effectively as possible against their capitalist counterparts.  Many 
of the proposals for change have  been made  by the Co-operative 
Development  Agency  which  I  shall look at more  closely in the next 
section.  They  can be summarised  as follows: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
that co-operatives should not be treated differently 
from  companies  in respect of tax· p~able on bonus 
shares issued to worker-members  and in particular 
that they should be  allowed to issue redeemable shares 
and still qualifY for the 1978 tax concessions. 
that provision should be made  for the effect of inflation 
on members'  shareholdings,  for instance by allowing 
the issue of bonus  shares in proportion to shareholdings 
to the extent necessary to offset inflation 
that provision should be made  for statutory indivisible 
reserves ;-1hich  cannot be distributed to members  in the 
event of winding up  and that allocations to such  · 
reserves  should be deductible for corporation tax 
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(iv)  that distribution of residual assets of a  worker 
co-operative to shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholdings  should be prohibited by  law but that 
distribution of such residual assets to worker-members 
in proportion to work  should be allowed 
(v)  that worker co-operatives should be  required to 
allocate a  proportion of their surplus earnings to 
reserves 
(vi)  that worker co-operatives should be able to issue 
non-voting preference shares to enable them to raise 
outside share capital without losing democratic control 
by workers 
(vii)  the creation of a  special class of co-operative 
company  to facilitate the conversion of conventional 
companies  to co-operatives or common  ownerships 
(viii)  that there should be  no  liability to Capital Transfer 
and·Capital Gains:Tax when  a  proprietor gives his 
firm to a  co-operative comprising the workforce;  and 
that there should be no  Capital Gains  Tax  liability 
if he sells to it 
(ix)  a  new  Industrial Common  Ownership Bill which would 
provide a  broader definition of a  common  ownership 
enterprise and would also require that enterprises 
certified as  'co-opere.tive enterprises  1  should observe 
the co-operative principles of equal voting and a 
limited return on capital.  · 
*  *  * 
4.  CO-OPERATIVE  SUPPORT  AGENCIES 
4.1  Multiplicity 
I  have  already described the role of the two  main  federal 
bodies for worker co-operatives,  the Co-operative Productive Federation 
and the Industrial Common  Ownership Movement.  I  have also looked 
briefly at the new  Job  Ownership  Limited.  They  are by  no  means  the 
only support organisations operating,  some  would  e~ competing,  in 
this field.  The  list is impressive: 
Beechwood  College 
Co-operative Bank 
Co-operative Development  Agency 
Co-operative Development  groups 
Co-operative Party 
Co-operative Union 
Council for Small  Industries in Rural Areas 
Highlands  and  Islands Development  Board 
Industrial Common  Ownership  Finance 
Labour Party Local Authorities 
Local Enterprise Development  Units 
Manpower  Services Commission 
Plunkett Foundation 
Scottish Co-operative Development  Committee 
Trade Union movement 
4.2  The  Co-operative Development  Agency 
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The  chief_na~ional promotional agency for worker co-operatives 
in the United Kingdom  is the statutory Co-operative Development  Agency. 
The  Co-operative Party proposed it to begin with,  and it was  included 
in the Labour Party Manifesto for the 1974 General Election.  The  proposal 
was  that the Agency  should be endowed  with substantial funds  and provide 
finance for the development  of-industrial and other co-operatives.  B,y 
1978  when  the Bill to establish such an Agency  was  introduced,  the 
Labour Government  was  dependent upon the support of the Liberal Party 
and the Bill as it was  introduced to Parliament proposed an advisory, 
promotional  and  research body  with funds  of £300,000  a  year for three 
or five years but with no  power to finance individual new  co-operative 
enterprises.  The  Bill was  supported by all political parties and the 
Agency  began work  in September 1978  with a  staff of twenty and  a  board 
of nine people representing different sectors of the co-operative 
movement,  appointed by  government.  Its first chairman was  Lord Oram, 
a  former  C~-operative MP. 
'J'he  Co-operative Development  Agency  was  set up' with a  mandate 
which  extonded to all co-operative sectors but it has  from the outset 
concentrated its attention on  the growing sector of industrial and 
service co-operatives.  The  first report of the Agency  was  a  guide to 
the conversion of a  company  to a  co-operative with minimum  tax 
liability,  .i.ts  second a  guide to the formation of.: industrial co-9peratives 
from  scratclt.  It is preparing reports on co-operative legislation 
and  financing which it hopes  to put to the Government  early in 1982. 
The  CDA  has published model  rules for a  'neighbourhood service' 
co-operative,  a  kind of community  co-operative in which membership  is 
not restricted to workers  and is shortly to publish new  model  rules 
for workers'  co-openatives which will allow members  a  substantial 
personal stake in their co-operative and make  provision for a  limited 
management  structure.  These  rules are. designed to meet  the needs of 
all types of co-operative which do  not want  to use the collective model. 
The  CDA  has  taken an interest in the formation of' supply and 
marketing co-operatives by  small producers and it has worked  close~ 
with a  number of local authorities,  notably Lambeth  and Lewisham, 
making detailed proposals about the scope for development  of 
co-operative enterprises to increase local employment.  It has also 
worked with the Runnymede  Trust and  the Commission for Racial Equality 
on the role of co-operatives in rehabilitation.  It has had discussions 
with more  than twenty companies  about  w~s and means  of conversion 
to  co-opera~~ves and has prepared proposals under which  company  employees 
could acquire shares in a  co-operative in order  tha~ the co-operative 
in turn should gradually acquire shares in the company. 
One  fairly recent development  has been the setting up  with UK  18 
EEC  funding of a  pilot Co-operative Training and Enterprise Workshop 
to train unemployed young people in tradeskills and as members  of a 
co-operative with the intention that the co-operatives will carry on 
after funding is  ended.  If it is successful it is hoped that similar 
workshops  will be set up  throughout  the UK. 
Between April  1979  and  January 1981,  the CDA  had 911  enquiries, 
328  of them  from people wanting to form co-operatives,  117  from people 
interested in neighbourhood service co-operatives,  87  from  local 
authorities interested in co-operative development,  100  from other 
enterprises interested in co-operatives and  31  from  existing co-operatives. 
In  ·~he summer  of 1981  the CDA's  life was  extended for at least two 
more  years,  though with reduced funding which led to cuts in staffing. 
The  CDA  ha.~ been involved in carrying out consul  tancy work  for a  number 
of local authorities but even the small amount  of income  derived from 
this source has more  or less dried up  with cuts in public expenditure. 
It seems  clear that the  CDA  will never be able to finance itself and 
must  continue to rely on government  grants if it is to continue in 
existence. 
4.3  Scottish Co-operatives Development  Committee 
The  Scottish Co-operatives Development  Committee  was  formed 
in the mid-1970s.  Its objectives were  to encourage the growth 
of worker co-operatives by providing practical advice and  assistance 
to new  and existing co-operatives;  publicising the concept of worker 
co::-operation and providing a  pool of specialist resource people who 
would  be able to assist worker co-operatives with their business 
development.  The  initiative was  taken by the Co-operative Union, 
the Scottish Council of Social Services,  the Scottish TUC,  local 
authorities, universities and interested individuals.  When  the first 
full-time staff were  appointed in 1977  there were  only four worker 
co-operatives in Scotland.  With  the exception of Bradrec,  a  mechanical 
engineering co-operative which had been set up  after the failure of 
a  capitalist company,  the others were  'non-businesses'  set up to create 
jobs f0r young people with Manpower  Services Commission  funding.  All 
three collapsed when  MSC  fund  in~  was  withdrawn. 
SCDC  found  that its most  difficult job was  convincing ordinary 
working people that worker co-operatives were  applicable to them.  This 
was  partly because the movement  had become  so  closely identified with 
the  'alternative scene'  - wholefoods,  crafts and  radical bookshops -
and partly because of the need for business and  entrepreneurial 
skills and adequate finance.  SCDC  set out to prove that it was  not 
beyond the grasp of ordinary people to run their own  businesses 
co-operatively and  that their lifestyles need not automatically become 
'alternative' in the  process.  They  did this by employing development 
officers who  themselves  act as the co-operative entrepreneur in establishing 
new  co~operatives.  The  high level of assistance they provided during 
the vulnerable early stages of development  proved  ext~emely successful. 
There are now  25  worker co-operatives in Scotland,  employing over 250 
people and with a  combined  turnover of around  £2. 5 million.  Man,y  o:f 
them are involved in main line business activities and  one has 
recently won  an export contract for the Scandinavian market  which is 
estimated to be worth  oveQ~' £2.5 million over the next ten years.  During 
1980  SCDC  published a  handbook  on  worker co-operatives which was  widely 
commended  and it has also produced a  number  of discussion documents 
including one  which outlines a  way  of helping to create new  jobs by the 
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4.4  Local Enterprise Development  Unit 
The  Northern Ireland Local  Enterprise Development  Unit has 
the task of helping to create new  jobs and persuade new  firms to set 
up in a  part of the United Kingdom  which,  in January 1980,  was 
approaching twice the average rate of unemployment  f'or the UK  as 
a  whole.  With unemployment  at  50%  in some  places it is ver,y difficult 
to get any kind of enterprise started.  Nevertheless,  by the end of 
1980  there were  eight established worker co-operatives in Norther Ireland, 
many  of which had been helped by the half-time Co-operative Liaison 
Officer appointed by the Local Enterprise Development  Unit.  The 
advantage of the  LEDU  approach is that the co-operative liaison officer 
is in touch with .the whole  spectrum of business activity; he is employed 
half-time on developing co-operatives and half-time on developing 
conventional businesses.  He  is thus well placed to find commercial 
backers for co-operative enterprises.  An  example is a  textile co-operative 
in the Shankill Road,  Belfast,  where  the co-operative undertook sub-
contract work at the cut and trim stage of manufacture with the help of 
loan funding and  a  guarantee to take all the products of the co-operative 
so  long as they met  specified quality requirements.  The  contacts 
available to the  LEDU  co-operative officer gave him a  vital intermediary 
role. 
4.5  Co-operative development  groups  and local authorities 
The  Scottish Co-operatives Development  Committee  and,  to a 
lesser extent,  the Local Enterprise Development  Unit in Northern 
Ireland are regional variants of the CDA.  There are also local CDA's 
with the job of promoting co-operatives locally.  B,y  March  1980  there 
were  23  local or regional CDA' s  in operation.  Eight of them have  ful~.­
time staff and a  further 21  are in the process of appointing staff. 
Funding for staff appointments comes  from  a  variety of sources but mainly 
from  local authorities who  can use their powers under the Inner Urban 
Areas Act,  Section 3 or the Local Government  Act  1972,  Section 137,  to 
provide funding and other support.  The  truly local  CDA. 1 s  operate in 
relatively small areas such as the London  boroughs of Hackney,  Lambeth, 
Wandsworth  and  Islington where  taey can develop an intimate knowledge 
of the local  econo~ and local needs  and where all the nearby co-operatives 
can participate in the work of the local development  group  without 
excessive expenditure of time or money.  The  local CDA.'s  have  set up  a 
steering committee  to help them  exchange  information and offer one another 
mutual  support.  Given the limited resources of the national  -
Co-operative Development  Agency  the local CDA 1s  can be an important 
source of support.  A properly funded  and comprehensive network could 
be a  major force in the development  of workers'  co-operatives. 
4.6  .The  Co-operative Union and  the Co-operative Party 
The  Co-operative Union was  formed  in 1869  as a  federation to 
represent all kinds of co-operative although its links with the 
agricultural co-operative movement  have  long been tenuous - at the 
end of 1979  only one  agricultural co-operative remained affiliated.  The 
statistics of fourteen productive societies were  shown in the Co-operative 
Union statistics for 1979  but their trade and that of the one  agricultural 
,,,r,  co-operative represented less than half of one per cent of the trade  'l'J" 
of the retail consumer co-operatives.  Though  the Co-operative Union is 
effectively a  federation of consumer co-operatives, it has  been taking 
an  inc~easing interest in worker co-operatives.  It merged with the 
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concerns itself solely with productive societies. 
The  Co-operative Party,  based in London,  is  ao~nistered. 
by the Co-operative Union  although societies in membership  of the Union 
do  not have to be members  of the Party ~d indeed a  number  are not. 
The  Co-operative Party,  which was  set up  in 1917,  has traditionally 
been allied to the Labour Party a;p.d  has  a  number  of members  in both 
B:ouses  of Parliament.·  It has  reC:ently called for evidence on the contri-
bution worker co-operatives might ·make  towards  solving the problems of 
structural and other employment. 
4.7  The  Co-operative Bank 
The  Co-operative Bank  is a  wholly owned  subsidiary of the consumer 
co-operative-controlled Co-operative Wholesale Society.  It has full 
clearing bank status and provides a  fully comprehensive banking service 
for its customers.  Traditi0nally its main customers have been co-operative 
societies,  trade unions and co-operative society members.  In July 1978 
it announced  a  new  scheme  for lending to worker co-operatives {as part 
of a  wider programme  to help small businesses).  The  bank offered to 
match pound  for pound  the  joint investment of members  of new  co-operatives. 
Overdrafts,  loans over thre·e to seven years and other forms  of finance 
are available on terms  slightly better than those generally available 
for new  business ventures.  An  average loan might be  about £5,000  and a 
maximum  overdraft facility £25,000.  Though  figures for Co-operative 
Bank  lending to co-operatives have  not been published, it seems  that the 
take-up has not been high.  Lack of collateral at the disposal of the 
would-be  co-operators is probably the major constraint and it 
has been suggested that some  sor.t  of loan guarantee scheme  should be 
introducEld.  Feasibility studies would  have to be carried out to show  that 
the market  and  other prospects for the new  co-operative were good  and 
the worker members  would  have  to undertake to reinvest an agreed proportion 
of future  earnings.  The  Co-operative Bank  estimates that it holds 
probably in excess of 500;6  of the accounts of existing industrial and 
service co-operatives. 
4.8  I~dustrial Common  Ownership  Finance 
Alongside the Industrial Common  Ownership Movement,  though no 
longer directly linked to it, is Industrial Common  Ownership Finance 
Limited.·  It was  set up  by  ICOM  in 1973  as  a  revolving loan fUnd  for 
worker co-operatives and  common-ownership  enterprises.  Its first main 
source of finance was  the Scott Bader Commonwealth  Development Fund. 
Individual well-wishers also lent or gave money  in the early years and 
are still an important  source of investment.  But  the most  significant 
move  forward for both ICOM  and  ICOF  was  the passing of the Industrial 
Common  Ownership  Act  of 1976  which'provided both with government  funding. 
£150,000  was  made  available to organisations such as  ICOM  which promote 
industrial co-operative and  common  ownership enterprises and £250,000 
for investment in them.  In 1977  ICOF  was  recognised by  the Department of 
Industry as the relevant body  to administer this loan fund.  ICOF  loans 
are typically for amounts  between £2,500  and £10,000  and  are short 
to medium  term,  from  six months  to six years.  Co-operatives have  to 
satisfy ICOF  that they are in practice as well as in structure a 
co-operative.  Between 1973  and  1979,  ICOF  made  49  loans totalling 
£256,975.·'- 'Th.ese  loans were  generally at rates of l.nterest 4-5%  below 
those charged on  comparable  loans by  banks  and  the track record of the 
co-operatives to which  ICOF  has granted them has been good.  However, 
by November  1981  it looked as though  ICOF 1s  days  might  be numbered. 
The  five years for which  funding had been made  available  el~psed in that 
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continuation of funding was  that  ICOF  had had its dowry  and that it was 
now  up  to the co-operative movement  to support it.  If that were 
impossible then it would  have  to increase its funds  by normal  commercial 
means.  Since that would  mean  interest rates ·Of  between 20  to  25%  -
compared  with the  14%  ICOF  is currently charging it seems  unlikely that 
many  new  co~operatives would be attracted by  that suggestion.  The 
solution which  ICOF  itself had hoped  to adopt was  to become  more 
like aa bank following the model  o£ the Caja Laboral Popular in 
Spain.  However it seems  that ICOF  is legally precluded from taking 
deposits and  so it cannot take this course.  For the time being it will 
continue to make  new  loans as and when  existing loans are repaid but 
inflation will anevitabl¥ whittle a~  ICOF's  capital base. 
4.9  Beechwood  College 
Beechwood  is a  co-operatively run college founded  in 1979  as 
a  nationwide resource to support improved ways  of working in co-operative 
enterprises within the context of a  changing  econo~ and  social 
organisational patterns. 
It has concentrated its efforts on developing a  style of 
education,  based on mutual  learning,  to tackle areas like democratic 
organisation balanced with technical training for management  skills.  This 
approach to education,  they maintain,  is suitable for any  type of 
co-operative and  community  based activities. 
Beechwood  runs  a  wide  variety of courses,  both residential at the 
College and in communities  and workplaces  throughout  the UK  and  also 
designs special workshop/courses for particular needs.  Beechwood  also 
offers conference facilities and a  resource and  inforw~ion librar,y 
on community  enterprise,  workers'  co-operatives and local  econo~ 
activities.  Beechwood  is engaged in producing a  number  of publications 
for assisting group~ to develop suitable systems for running co-operative 
enterprises including one  which introduces the idea of a  Social Audit 
for assessing the internal democracy  of co-operative enterprises and 
measuring the cost they impose  on the community iq which  they are located, 
as well as how  well they achieve their social objectives. 
*  *  * 
5.  CODA 
In very broad outline the situation in the United Kingdom is 
the same  as in several other countries.  Agricultural co-operatives, 
though relatively on  a  smaller scale than in other countries where_ 
the state has pl9\Y'ed  a  lesser.role in agricultural marketing,  have held 
their own  since the Second World  War.  Consumer  co-operatives,  though 
still.a substantial force in retailing,  have lost ground to the chains 
of supermarkets and hypermarkets.  Retailing has,  in an age  of what is 
called self-service,  become  less labour-intensive and more  capital-
intensive.  Much  of the labour is expected to be provided,  free,  by the 
consumer.  Co-operatives have  therefore found it more  difficult to compete-
not that that has been the only cause of decline.  Housing and  community 
co-operatives apart,  the growth sector has  - again as elsewhere - been 
in worker co-operatives.  To  .judge by  the figures  given earlier, if those 
are taken at their face value they imply_ that  (starting at a  much  lower 
base than France)  the growth in new_worker  co-operatives has been faster 
in Britain even than in France where  the range of support has been a  good 
deal more  substantial.  One  striking feature of the description given of 
the organisation of UK  support agencies is how  very complex it is.  The:r;e 
at least appear to be too many  such agencies with not  enough clear 
articulation between them • 
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1.  Case  Study of a  wholefood co-operative 
SUMA  is one  of the most  sU:ccessf.'IJl.l  of a  growing number  of 
co-operatives in the UK  specialising in the sale of wholefoods.  It 
is also a  classic example  of an  1alternative'  co-operative:  there 
is no  individual shareholding,  decision-making is collective,  there 
are equal wages  for all,  jobs are rotated,  time off is allowed as a 
matter of course for such things as CND  marches,  many of the members·  live 
as weJl  as work  collectively.  . 
It was  started in 1975  by Reg  Taylor,  He  had up until then been 
working in a  wholefood  shop  in Leeds  called Divine Light which was 
associated with an Indian religious movement  of the same  name,  led by 
a  young guru called Maharaj  Ji.  Reg  had made  contact with other Wholefood 
groups  around the country and had discussed with them  the possibility of 
buying in bulk instead of the relatively small quantities each shop 
was  buying for itself.  He  suggested that it would be sensible to have 
a  central location for deliveries from  which all the  small wholefood 
shops in the area could come  and collect. 
SUMA  started from Reg's house.  Though it wasn't a  co-operative 
to start with there was  a  commune  attached to it.  Reg's father had 
given him  £4,000  and a  friend had lent enough money  to buy  a  van.  From 
the beginning,  SUMA  had good  relations with the importers of wholefoods 
with whom  it dealt and managed  to secure itself good  credit terms. 
By  1977  it was  established as a  co-operative and sufficiently buoyan-t.  to 
finance most  of its capital requirements  from profits.  By  1979 it *LS 
in a  strong enough position to borrow £10,000  from  the bank to buy the 
large warehouse which was  by then its headquarters  • 
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SUMA  has  15  members  who  have made  it their policy not to grow 
any larger.  This is because they refuse to have  a  management  structure. 
Everyone at SUMA  shares management  responsibilities as  they also share 
all information.  As  far as possible all jobs are rotated even though 
it is sometimes  quite hard for individual members  to give up  a  job just 
when  they have got into the swing of it and feel that they are being 
really efficient at it. 
New  members  are recruited through an alternative news-paper called • 
the Leeds  Other Paper.  For their first six months  they are on  probation 
and there are regular reviews in which  everyone in the co-operative discusses 
Whether the new  recruit is fitting in.  At  the  end of six months  they 
decide whether he or she can eta;y  on  as  a  member.  No  one  can work at SUMA. 
after this initial period unless they become  a  member.  Though  their 
chief concern is that all new  members  should fit in well with their 
distinctly non-hierarchical system they do  insist on driving skills. 
This is because all the  jobs are rotated and  one  of them is to drive the 
two  vans  and  the 40-foot trailer which goes  to London  once  a  week  to 
collect supplies. 
The  members  meet  together every day  between 12.30 and  1.00 pm. 
in a  large room  which  serves as  communal  kitchen,  laundry and  dining room. 
"'1''  The  minutes of the previous da;y' s  m,~eting are read before discussion the 
businesa of the day  and  reaching a  collective decision on  any matters 
of importance.  Wage  reviews are held twice a  year and meetings to discuss 
them are always held at one  of the member's  houses rather than at the 
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range  from the need for higher wages  to a  suggestion that the surplus 
should be spent on  a  smallholding or a  barge which all the members 
could use. 
Perhaps what  is most  remarkable about  SUMA  is that there should 
be a  surplus to discuss.  That  the co-operative system of management 
they have  adopted has  succeeded is more  than borne out by the fact  that. 
in 1979-80  SUMA  had a  turnover of t1! million and made  a  surplus of 
£58,000.  In the past two  years  SUMA  has directly contributed to and 
helped set up  five other workers'  co-operatives as an alternative form 
of expansion under a  collective form of management.  It is collaborating 
with Beechwood  College in research on the problems of expansion and 
democratic working practices. 
2.  Kennington Office Cleaners'  Co-operative 
KOCC  is an office cleaning company  which operates on a  contract 
basis providing a  high quality reliable cleaning service.  It is 
registered as a  Friendly Society under the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act,  with ICOM  model  rules.  Nineteen women  are employed 
part-time.  Their hours range from  6 to 15  a  week.  All have children 
and live within two  miles of each other.  The  company  has an annual 
turnover of £18,000 per year and holds nine contracts,  mostly with 
charitable organisations. 
The  idea of setting up  a  Cleaners Co-operative arose  from 
discussions held at a  local mother and  toddler group which had been 
set up  by  a  community  worker from  Lady  Margaret Hall Settlement,  then 
based in Kennington.  Many of the women  who  attended the group had been, 
or were,  part-time office cleaners.  Few  opportunities for part-time 
work  existed locally,  ap~rt from  cleaning and all the women  were 
dissatisfied with the work.  Some  disliked their supervisors,  some  found 
that their equipment  was  poor,  materials were  sometimes  inadequate and 
would  be  supplemented out of their own  wages.  All felt that their 
PB¥  was  poor.  Unionisation was  discussed and a  local organiser was 
invited to a  meeting.  It was  then that the idea of a  6o-operative 
first emerged,  when  one  of the women  suggested that they would  be better 
off organising their own  work. 
With  the help of the community  worker,  the group,  who  continued 
to meet  regularly,  registered as a  Friendly Society,  applied for a  ' 
council loan and started to look for contracts.  An  £8,000 loan was 
approved,  repeyable over two  years 1t 1oi' per cent.  Only  £1,000 has 
been taken up.  Looking for contracts proved to be a  more  difficult task. 
The  co-op registered in May  1978,  but it was  December before the first 
contract started.  Three months  were  spent with the part-time help of 
a  worker from  another employment  scheme  in contacting local companies  by 
letter and telephone with no  success.  Firms  were  suspicious of a 
co-operative,  especially one with no  track record.  The  local authority 
were at the time putting cleaning jobs out to tender.  After political 
pressure,  and backing from the local Trades Council,  the co-operative 
was  allowed to tender for several small contracts. (small,  that is, in 
the council's terms - 15  or so women  would  have had to have been immediately 
employed).  Usually only  'approved'  fi11BlS  are allowed to tender for 
local authority contracts.  To  become  approved you have to have worked 
for the council before!  The  Co-ops  tender price proved to be higher than 
the other firms  and  as a  consequence of the legal requirement on local 
councils to _accept  the lowest tender,  the tender was  rejected.  At  the 
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same  time,  the local press were  encouraged to write articles about the 
co-operative.  This means  of publicity eventually proved the most 
successful means  of acquiring contracts. 
Of  the nine contracts held,  seven are with charities and  two 
with private companies.  All have been obtained through personal 
contacts,  recommendations  or through press publicity.  When  private 
firms have  been approached their reservations have centred around the 
functioning of the Co-operative as  a  business.  Some  of the questions 
they asked were: 
'What  happens if someone's off sick?'  'Who  do  we  deal with?' 
•If there are no  supervisors,  how  do  you make  sure that the 
job's done  properly?' 
Now  that the·co-operative has a  track record,  several of the  'clients' 
are happy to provide references but no  private firms have been reapproached 
yet. 
The  attitudes and motivations of workers have changed little 
since its inception.  All are committed  to the co-operative but in varying 
degrees  and for various reasons.  Advantages  of the co-operative have 
been expressed as follows: 
'Ypu pick the hours that suit·you- if you want  to work  during 
the  d~, you get a  day  job'. 
'No  supervisor's breathing down  your neck - you work  the w~  you 
want  to.  If you don't do  the  job properly,  you lose the 
contract'. 
'Everyone  should help each other'. 
'You are your own  boss'. 
1 I 1 d like to be able to employ all my  friends who  want  a  job,  .• 
The··ma;in  resources which  the co-operative has had at .its 
disposal have been Lady Margaret Hall Settlement and the time of the 
support worker.  Throughout  the first two  years of the co-operative's 
life, the Settlement acted as a  focal point.  Its address and telephone 
number  were  used,  meetings were  held there,  typing and photocopying 
facilities used.  The  only resource Which  has not been readily available 
is transport.  This has proved awkward  on occasions when  materials or 
equipment  have  needed to be moved.  Transport is really only needed once 
a  week  at the most  and  a  vehicle would  prove  too  expensive to buy  and 
run,  so taxis are used. 
The  first major decision that the co-operative took was  over 
pay.  It was  decided to pay £1.25  an hour and £1.)0 for unsocial hours 
(before 9  am  and  after 5 pm).  MOst  women  had  earned under £1  per hour 
previously.  This decision was  not  questioned until the Co-operative 
tendered for a  particular contract which might be lost unless the 
price could be  reduced at the expenses of wages~  No  worker earns enough 
to become  liable for tax or national insurance,  which simplifies wages. 
Those  on  social security keep  to the earnings limit.  Unlike some 
cleaning companies,  false names  and  addresses are never used.  It was  also 
d.ecided  early on that sick p~  and holiday p~  could not be  afforded. 
Pay and  conditions  a~e reviewed every year which  resu1~d in increasing 
pay to £1.35 and  £1.40 per hour earlier this year.  One  week's  holid~ 
pay was  also  in-troduced for anyone  who  had worked  for the co-operative 
·,r longer than six months.  Four other crucial decisions have been taken, 
:t.trstly not to employ  supervisors,  secondly to sack a  worker,  thirdly to UK  25 
get rid of one  contract and finally in September 1980,  not to take 
on any  new  contracts. 
Having no  supervisors·has meant  that the people working on 
each contract are responsible for their own  work.  If a  job is not done 
it reflects upon the whole  group.  An  example of how  this works  occurred 
with the sacking of one  worker.·  One  of the workers was  not pulling her 
weight.  The  others tried to encourage her to do  her share and turn up  . 
~egularly but it proved hopeless.  The  problem was  taken to the full 
co-operative meeting who  decided to give  he~ a  written wa~ng  and follow 
;tt up  with a  notice of dismissal if her behaviour did not i!JIProve. 
This process was  developed after going through agonies the first time. 
No  one  wanted to sack anyone  but it was  decided that the co-operative 
had to come  first. 
One  contract was  terminated because the company  constantly 
complained and  would  not stick to the written contract.  It took up 
so much  time that the group  concluded that it was  not worth it.  A 
difficult decision in the early days when  contracts were  so hard to 
come  by. 
Finally, it was  decided in September 1980  not to take on any 
new  contracts.  The  decision was  taken to allow the co-operative some 
breathing space.  Nineteen people were  employed  and  some  were  not getting 
involved in running the co-operative.  Jobs  such as buying stores and 
hoovers,  paying wages,  sending out invoices and following up  problems were 
being concentrated in the hands of too few members.  Since then jobs have 
been shared out more  equally,  people are paid for doing them and more 
members  are attending monthly meetings  •. 
The  first advisar to KOCC  was  the community  worker who  worked 
with mums'  groups.  She  was  the catalyst who  encouraged the women  to 
believe that a  co-op was  possible.  In her own  words: 
'When  the women  first proposed the idea of establishing 
a  cleaning co-operative,  neither they nor I  knew  anything 
about the technicalities involved.  This shared dilemma had 
a  positive side in that it contributed to a  sense of equality 
- at no  point could I  have  been considered some  ~stical 
source of knowledge'. 
What  she did have  was  the ability to identify· organisations which would 
provide the necessary technical information.  She  worked with the group 
for a  year,  helped with the registration of the group  as an Industrial 
and Provident Society,  explored methods  of costing and finding contracts, 
applied to the council for loan finance  and  secured the commitment  of the 
local council.  Now  members  of the co-operative chair their own  meetings, 
take the minutes,  cost contracts,  pay wages,  issue invoices,  do  the book-
keeping,  buy  the stores and  equipment  and  deal with day to day  problems 
which crop up. 
The  Co-operative now  has to decide where its future lies. 
There is no  lack of contracts being offered,  although some  are based in 
central London,  some  in parts of the borough not presently being covered 
by the co-operative.  Should the co-op continue to grow or say enough 
is enough?  If it stays  t~;same, will the lack of an office base become 
more  and more  of an obstacle to the smooth  running of the co-operative? 
(At  present,  stocks,  files and  books  are all kept in different places). 
If the co-operative grows,  does it expand as one unit or form  several 
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other co-ops which  share administration and office facilities?  If 
it grows  as one unit,  will this mean  that fewer members  are actively 
involved in the running of the co-operative?  Should they diversif.y 
into other related businesses such as  ca~et and upholstery cleaning 
or window  cleaning?  As  with any business,  major decisions have to be 
taken from  time to time.  This is a  turning point in the co-operative's 
life.  What  cannot be denied is that a  group of women  have  succeeded  · 
in providing for themselves better jobs in a  profitable compaQy  which 
they control themselves. 
3.  Last Days  of the Raj 
In November  1980,  a  unique new  restaurant opened in London's 
Drury Lane,  the Last Days  of the Raj.  It was  the outcome  of a  long 
struggle by the Bengali Workers  Action Group  to form a  workers• 
co-operative.  The  restaurant now  employs  eight people. 
Visitors to the restaurant would  never guess its history.  To 
all intents and purposes it appears  a  comfortable,  upmarket  restaurant, 
selling a  wide  range of high quality Indian food.  It is perhaps on 
the pricey side,  but it does  cater for Drur,y  Lane  theatre-goers and 
tourists from  nearby Covent  Garden. 
The  idea for the restaurant started back in 1978.  The  Bengali 
Workers  Action Group  and  Camden  Community  Relations Council were  concerned 
about  low pay and poor conditions in the catering trade.  Setting up  a 
restaurant in which the workers would  control these things seemed  the 
ideal solution.  There was  certainly 110  shortage of skilled cooks  and 
waiters in the Bengali community  and  ·the  market  seemed  right.  Even 
in a  recession,  there would  be a  demand  for places to eat out, particularly 
in a  tourist area. 
It is one  thing to have a  good  idea; it is quite another to 
put it into practice when  you belong to an ethnic minority group  and 
have little capital.  However,  the first step was  to form  a  steering 
committee.  This consisted o£ representatives of the Bengali Workers 
Action Group,  Camden  ORO,  officers from Camden  local authority,  a 
solicitor and  individual consultants in marketing and catering.  The 
committee met  every fortnight.  It faced two  main problems.  The 
first was  to find suitable premises in a  prime position.  Negotiations 
for premises  reached an advanced stage on one  occasion but fell through 
~t the last moment.  Finally,  after a  year and  a  half,  the workers 
th0mselves  found  the Drury  Lane  site.  But the building was  in a  state 
of disrepair and  £40,000 was  needed to convert it. 
The  other problem was  money.  The  major banks were  approached 
but refused to give a  loan.  A finance house offered a  loan of £110,000 
but only on condition that it was  guaranteed by the local authority. 
Fortunately,  the project had support  from key figures within the local 
authority and the guarantee was  given. 
· Having opened its doors to the public,  the workers still have 
:;o  put in long hours.  In the break bet:w.een  afternoon closing and 
evening opening,  there are usually meetings  to ·attend and  accounts to 
be written up.  Nevertheless,  the pay is reasonable - about  £100  per 
'"'ek  gross - and  this is far more  than the workers  earned before.  Above 
::...  l  they have  the  freedom  to run things in their own  way  and,  although two  of the staff are designated managers,  the restaurant is run as a 
co-operative and the members  work  harmoniously together. 
There  are still problems  to face.  Rates are high,  there is 
high interest to·pay on the loan,  which must  be cleared in seven years, 
and the workers  carry a  lot of personal responsibility if the project 
fails.  But  business is good  and preliminary figures  suggest the 
project is making a  profit. 
In the long run,  it is boped to channel profits into community 
centres and other ventures for the Bengali community.  At  present, 
the restaurant is used as a  base for English language classes. 
A further feature of the scheme  is to demonstrate to other 
workers,  particularly those who  are exploited by their employers,  · 
that self-help is possible.  MOreover,  if there are more  co-operatively 
run ventures,  traditional restaurant owners will have to mend  their 
w~s - or lose their workers to co-operatives. European  Communities - Commission 
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